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Chapter 1: An Introduction to the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ 
 
The contemporary world is made up out of sovereign states. The most commonly used 
definition of a state comes from the Montevideo convention of 1933. It specifies that a state 
should have the following qualifications: 1) a permanent population 2) a defined territory 3) a 
government and 4) the capacity to enter into relations with the other states (Montevideo 
convention 1933). The convention has one additional specification that is vital to our modern 
understanding of what makes a state: statehood is dependent on the recognition by other states. 
However, reality does not always correspond to theory. Throughout history entities have 
existed that have all the qualifications of a state but are not recognized as such by the 
international community. Well known examples include Taiwan in East Asia, Somaliland in 
the horn of Africa, and Transnistria in Europe. The concept of legitimacy is central to the 
scholarly and non-scholarly discussion of unrecognized states. Legitimacy is often understood 
as ‘the right to rule’ and has an internal (domestic) and external (international) element.  In 
2014, two new unrecognized states were proclaimed with Russian support in parts of the 
Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts in the South-East of Ukraine: the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ 
and the ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’.1 They were widely denounced as illegitimate entities. 
This thesis will examine legitimacy in the context of one of the newly formed unrecognized 
states: the DNR. An understanding of the DNR must be informed by the wider context of the 
conflict in Ukraine, what sparked that conflict, and what it meant for Ukraine-Russia relations. 
Therefore, before going into the theoretical aspects of legitimacy and outlining the research 
strategy, the following section provides a short history of the conflict in Ukraine.  
The Maidan revolution or the ‘Revolution of Dignity’ as it is called in Ukraine, started 
on November 21, 2013 when a group of protesters gathered in Kyiv’s central square. The 
square, known as ‘Maidan Nezalezhnosti’ (‘independence square’ in Ukrainian) gave its name 
to the protests who were quickly dubbed the ‘Maidan’ protests. The decision by president 
Viktor Yanukovych to refrain from signing an association agreement with the European 
Union, and to sign an agreement with Russia instead was the trigger. Social media was used 
to gather protesters on the square, with estimates of up to 200.000 people attending. The 30th 
                                                          
1 In Russian: Донецкая Народная Республика, ‘Donetskaya Narodnaya Respublika’. Луганская Народная 
Республика. ‘Luhanskaya Narodnaya Respublika’. In this thesis I will use ‘DNR’ and ‘LNR’ respectively for sake 
of brevity. This does not constitute any recognition of their statehood on my part. Moreover, in writing about 
any attributes of ‘statehood’ I will avoid from using mitigating terms (‘parliament’ instead of ‘so-called 
parliament’ for example). Again, this will be for sake of brevity and does not constitute any form of recognition 
from my part.  
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of November stands out as a turning point in the protests. That night, berkut anti-riot police 
were ordered to dismantle the camp that protesters had built, and protestors were pushed into 
other parts of the city. Arguably, this gave new momentum to the protests, and the in the 
following days more and more people came to gather at ‘Maidan Nezalezhnosti’ with many 
people from outside of Kyiv attending. There was a noticeable difference in support for the 
movement geographically. Support was highest in Western and Central regions of the country, 
and lowest in the Eastern and Southern regions. Particularly in Western Ukraine, there were 
Maidan protests that attracted tens of thousands of people, with the protests in L’viv attracting 
the largest crowds (Ishchenko 2016, 458). This stands in stark contrast to the Maidan protests 
organized in cities in Southern or Eastern Ukraine such as Donetsk, Lugansk, or Simferopol, 
where attendance was minimal. Indeed, polls seem to show that people in the Eastern and 
Southern regions were predominantly opposed to the Maidan revolution and subsequent 
power change (Lyubashenko 2014, 76). This environment set the stage for Russian 
intervention. 
Throughout the protests, delegations from countries that supported the protestors came 
to visit Maidan to express their solidarity with the protesters. Meanwhile, Russia was heavily 
involved in providing shelter to Yanukovych. When it became clear Yanukovych was out of 
power, the EU was quick to accept the new government. On the other hand, Russia spoke of 
an unlawful violent exchange of power and at first backed Yanukovych’ claim that he was 
still the legitimate president (which he was according to the constitution) (Lyubashenko 2014, 
82). Some scholars saw the quick acceptance of the new status quo by the EU and the U.S. as 
an indicator that the crisis in Ukraine signified a larger crisis in EU-Russia relations 
(Haukkala 2015, 34; Sakwa 2045). Others shared this point of view but argued that the crisis 
in Ukraine was the EU’s fault because it had not respected that Ukraine was in Russias 
privileged zone of influence (Mearsheimer 2014). The EU, which did not think in terms of 
zones of influence, had underestimated the importance Russia attached to Ukraine. Great 
power rivalry and zones of influence, concepts people associated with the Cold War, returned 
to European discourse. The Maidan revolution resulted in a deterioration of relations between 
Russia and the EU that continues to this day. This crisis was exacerbated by the Russian 
annexation of Crimea.  
 
After the change of power in Kyiv, soldiers without insignia started appearing on the 
Crimean Peninsula. On February 27, 2014, armed men occupied the parliament and an 
4 
 
emergency session was held to disband the government. On March 6, the council of Crimea 
voted to become part of Russia, and on March 16, a referendum was held for that purpose. 
Recognized by Russia as legitimate but not by the rest of the world, Russian officials spoke of 
a 95.5% majority of acceding to Russia (Morris 2014). This figure was widely discredited by 
Western governments. The EU issued a statement that it was ‘illegal and illegitimate and its 
outcome will not be recognized.’ (Barroso and van Rompuy 2014). Crimea was a turning 
point in Russian relations with Ukraine, the EU, and the West in general. The takeover of 
Crimea was coupled with an ‘information war’ offensive in the media that has continued ever 
since. The annexation emboldened separatists in the Donbas and Southern Ukraine repeated 
Crimea’s call for annexation. As it became clear that in Kyiv power had changed hands, pro-
Russia demonstrations grew bigger in the East and South of the country. On March 4, 
protesters occupied the Regional Administration building in Donetsk, and their leader, Pavel 
Gubarev, declared himself ‘people’s governor’. Separatists took over local headquarters of the 
intelligence service (SBU) and administrative buildings in Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts in 
April. In reaction to this the government in Kyiv started the ATO (Anti-Terrorist Operations) 
on April 15. This marked the start of armed conflict in the Donbas.  
 
The separatists organized a referendum on the May 11 in the parts of Donetsk and 
Lugansk under their control, with the question: ‘"Do you support the declaration of state 
independence of the Donetsk People's Republic?’’ to which voters could answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’. 
According to the separatists, there was a large turnout and the overwhelming majority voted 
‘yes’. Ukraine and Western states did not recognize the results (Vernon 2014). This marked 
the beginning of the DNR and the LNR. Soon after ATO was announced, peace talks were 
held in Geneva to stop the conflict from escalating (Davies 2016). The Geneva agreement was 
quickly broken with each side accusing each other of breaking it. In the first phase of the war, 
the Ukrainian army performed badly, as it was not prepared to fight a war in its own country 
both materially and morally (Rauta 2016; Malyarenko and Galbreath 2016). The armed forces 
of Ukraine were in a bad state due to years of neglect and underfunding (Katchanovski 2016). 
They relied heavily on conscripts, who are usually not motivated soldiers. In the first stages of 
the conflict, the separatists domestically procured most weapons: either bought on the black 
market, raided from army depots, or brought in by defecting Ukrainian soldiers (Ferguson and 
Jenzen 2014). Nationalist volunteer battalions helped the Ukrainian army and played a 
decisive role in the defense of large cities such as Dnipro and Mariupol.   
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After Petro Poroshenko was elected as president of Ukraine on May 25 in an election in 
which residents of occupied Crimea and the occupied parts of the Donbas did not participate, 
ATO operations increased with new vigor. By July, the separatists had lost most of their gains 
when there came another turning point in the war: the tragic downing of flight MH17 above 
Hrabove in separatist controlled Donetsk Oblast. This made the already international conflict 
even more a case of global concern as citizens from multiple countries perished in the attack. 
The majority of the passengers were from the Netherlands. MH17 came to be the symbol of 
the international ‘information war’ Russia and the West. Immediately after the crash, it was 
unclear what had happened, and Russian media quickly established a counter narrative to shift 
blame away from the rebels, accusing the Ukrainian government (Toal and O’Loughlin 2017). 
This process of blame attribution has continued ever since, with the consequence that there 
are two distinct ‘media spheres’, in which people blame different groups for the disaster, 
despite the conclusions of the Joint Investigation Team that confirmed the rebels shot down 
the plane with a Russian BUK missile. Aside from a temporary ceasefire around the crash site, 
fighting continued and the rebels were pushed back. 
 
At the end of August, the Ukrainians were pushed back by a new separatist offensive. 
The battle of Ilovaisk which cost the lives and capture of hundreds of Ukrainian servicemen, 
was a turning point (Grytsenko 2014; Cohen 2016). The battle at Ilovaisk highlights 1) the 
relation between the battalions and the central government/army and 2) Russia’s intervention 
into the war when the rebels were losing. Some of the battalions consisted mostly of locals, 
such as the Donbas battalion, while others were made up of members from all over Ukraine. 
Yet others were more problematic, for example the right-wing Azov battalion, which 
reportedly has neo-Nazi elements in its ranks (Cohen 2016). These battalions were motivated 
to fight, but often not properly equipped with heavy armaments such as tanks and artillery. 
The battalion forces in the beginning were swiftly ‘incorporated’ into the Ukrainian army 
making them legal parts of the army. However, this did not mean that they were well 
integrated: the parliamentary commission on Ilovaisk concluded that the communication 
between battalion commanders and the regular army was poor (Matios 2015). Secondly, at 
Ilovaisk it became clear Russian units were directly involved in the war (Grytsenko 2014; 
Cohen 2016; Clem 2018). Evidence for Russian involvement already existed but this 
incursion into Ukraine provided crucial evidence as local sources on the ground relayed 
irrefutable evidence of Russian army having entered Ukraine (Clem 2018). The defeat at 
Ilovaisk proved to be a painful one, and soon after Petro Poroshenko started negotiations for a 
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ceasefire (Judah 2014). An agreement was reached in Minsk on September 5, but the ceasefire 
was broken only hours after it was signed  
 
On November 2, elections were held in separatist controlled territories but neither 
Ukraine nor its Western partners recognized them. With Russia actively involved in the 
conflict, there were no guarantees that the elections would proceed in a free and fair manner. 
These elections saw Aleksandr Zakharchenko and Igor Plotnitskij elected in the DNR and 
LNR respectively. The elections did not stop the fighting, as the rebels were on the offensive 
with the help of Russian troops, and fighting continued until February 2015. A similar 
situation to that at Ilovaisk occurred as Ukrainian troops became trapped in the strategic town 
of Debal’tseve in early February 2015 (Kramer 2015). Just as the heavy defeat in September 
may have prompted the first Minsk agreements, the situation in early February necessitated 
another ceasefire dubbed Minsk II.2 On February 15, Angela Merkel, François Hollande, 
Petro Poroshenko, Vladimir Putin, Aleksandr Zakharchenko and Igor Plotnitsky drew up a 
new peace plan after long negotiations. The document was signed by the latter two leaders of 
the separatists and additionally by Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini, former president of 
Ukraine Leonid Kuchma, and the ambassador of Russia to Ukraine Mikhail Zubarov (OSCE 
2015). The Minsk agreements called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, exchange of 
prisoners, change in the constitution of Ukraine towards a more decentralized state, and local 
elections in the Donbas. Officially the agreements are still in place, but many of the 
agreements have not been reached. There is mutual distrust preventing both sides from taking 
steps to implement the agreements (Davies 2016). Nevertheless, since the Minsk II 
agreements the situation on the ground has stabilized with fewer civilian casualties, mainly 
due to the withdrawal of large pieces of artillery 15 km from the line of contact. Violations of 
the ceasefire occur until this day, particularly in Avdiivka and on the outskirts of Mariupol.  
 
The most important consequence of the Minsk agreements for the separatist entities 
was that the current status quo was recognized and frozen. For the ‘domestic’ situation in the 
separatist republics the agreements brought relative peace, which allowed the people in power 
to focus on state building projects. Some commentators argue that the agreements were 
‘doomed to fail’ from the beginning, pointing to the inability of Ukraine and the separatists 
and their Russian sponsors to implement parts of the agreements such as constitutional 
                                                          
2 From this point onwards, I will refer to the agreements reached in Minsk February 2015 as ‘the Minsk 
agreements’.  
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changes and local elections (Dempsey 2017). Nevertheless, it is the only peace agreement 
currently in place. Monitors from the OSCE observe the ceasefire through a ‘Special 
Monitoring Mission’(SMM). There have been no major alterations to the agreements. So far, 
the result has been a partly frozen conflict and two unrecognized states. The current situation 
gives the people in charge of the unrecognized republics the opportunity to engage in nation 
building and state building, and the longer the present situation continues, the harder it will be 
to eventually reintegrate these parts of the Donbas into Ukraine.  
 
Any government dealing with a war on its territory must decide how to interact with 
the leaders of the enemy forces. The default mode of dealing with a secessionist entity during 
a war of secession is to describe them as illegal or terrorists. As the name of the campaign 
against the separatists suggests, this is exactly what the Ukrainian government did. On 
September 16, 2014 the government in Kyiv adopted the law "On the special order of local 
self-governance in separate Raions of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts",3 designating the area 
as temporarily occupied territories. Besides the animosity and the designation of the 
DNR/LNR leadership as terrorists, there are still intricate connections between the 
government and the separatist controlled areas. Many of the coal mines and metallurgy plants 
that are vital to Ukraine’s economy are in the zone of conflict. As the Donbas was the 
heartland of Ukrainian industry, powerful oligarch-businessmen had ties to the region, the 
most important of them being Rinat Akhmetov, Ukraine’s richest citizen. Indeed, Akhmetov 
still employed thousands of people in the Donbas, and trade between government controlled 
and separatist territory continued throughout the war until February 2017 (Ash 2017; The 
Economist 2017). Besides business connections, human connections span across the front line: 
many Ukrainians have family still living in the occupied territories as they could not or did 
not want to move. For reintegration to be feasible, Kyiv needs to have ties to the population in 
occupied territories.  
 
On the 20th of February 2018 a new law was adopted in the Ukrainian parliament that 
labels Russia as an ‘aggressor state’ in the Donbas. As such, the ATO is no more; with 
operations now called “taking measures to ensure national security and defense, and repulsing 
and deterring the armed aggression of Russia in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.” 
                                                          
3 ‘Raion’ is both the Ukrainian and Russian word for an administrative unit smaller than an ‘Oblast’ which is 
more similar to province.  
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(Ponomarenko 2018). However, the situation on the ground has remained the same since 
Minsk and is characterized by a lack of large offensives. Ceasefire violations still happen 
every day, as such, the conflict is far from ‘frozen’. The situation is best described as a ‘low 
intensity conflict’. Even the assassination of Zakharchenko in September did not alter the 
status quo. Russian backed separatist entities have been stuck in the same situation for the 
past four years. The conflict has split communities along the contact line and has taken a 
considerable toll. People stranded in territories not controlled by Kyiv have been in limbo for 
the past four years living in unrecognized states. Moreover, people living close to the front 
line on both sides have had to deal with regular shelling and the danger of mines.  
 
The DNR has been widely denounced as illegitimate, first by the authorities in Kyiv, 
who launched an ‘Anti-Terrorist Operation’ (or ATO), against them. Russia supports these so-
called people’s republics and provides them with military assistance and controls the 
leadership of these states to a significant extent. They have been the de-facto authorities in 
parts of the Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts for almost five years. In these years, they have tried 
to present themselves as the rightful rulers of the territories they control to the local 
population as well as to an international audience. Meanwhile, these areas have become 
somewhat of an ‘information black hole’. Therefore, it is not known how the DNR has tried to 
legitimize itself in the past four years. Moreover, it is difficult to assess how successful they 
have been. Nevertheless, they have a significant online presence through their ‘state media’. 
Particularly the DNR has been prolific in presenting an image of itself. Hence, this thesis 
focuses on the DNR. Due to the repressive nature of the regimes and the ongoing conflict, 
practical research in the Donbas has become impossible. Particularly if that research is 
concerned with political legitimacy. Even online surveys of attitudes of the residents of the 
DNR are problematic, as there is no guarantee the answers will not be heavily biased. 
Therefore, I will examine the DNR ‘state’ media as it is published online. This allows me to 
examine the reasoning of the DNR regime from within. The research in this thesis will be 
guided by the following research question: 
 
How does the DNR try to legitimize itself domestically and internationally?  
More precisely, I will examine what legitimation strategies the DNR employs, and what their 
contents are. In order to capture both the domestic4 and international side, I will examine a 
                                                          
4 When talking about ‘domestic’ I refer to actions inside the DNR. Again, this does not constitute recognition.  
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sample of articles from two types of DNR state media in Russian and English: directed at a 
domestic and an international audience respectively. The structure of this thesis will be as 
follows: first, a review of the scholarly literature on legitimacy in general and legitimacy in 
unrecognized states will provide the tools to assess the success of a legitimation strategy and a 
theoretical framework to analyze the DNR state media. The literature review will finish with a 
methodology section based on the legitimation strategies identified by scholars of 
unrecognized states. Furthermore, the corpus of primary sources drawn from the DNR ‘state’ 
media will be presented. The analytical chapters are focused on getting a deeper 
understanding of how a certain legitimation strategy is employed. They are organized 
according to the main domestic and international legitimation strategies of unrecognized 
states discussed in the literature review: conflict and security; state building and regime 
performance; democratization; culture, history and identity; patron state engagement; and 
international engagement. Finally, I will make a two-point conclusion. First, I will assess 
which legitimation strategies have been most prominent in the time sample and how they are 
used in the context of the DNR. Second, I will assess whether the legitimation strategies of 
the DNR were successful by comparing the results of my research with scholarship on 
legitimacy and with the small amount of survey data available.  
 
This thesis covers two separate but related fields of research. It will draw from 
international relations and political science theory to understand the domestic and 
international elements of legitimacy and legitimation. Additionally, it will draw from 
literature on the history, politics and international relations of Ukraine, Russia, and the post-
Soviet space to understand the local context of the DNR. Finally, these two fields come 
together in the literature on post-Soviet unrecognized states. The research in this thesis aims 
to contribute to multiple types of research. First, I will add to the literature on unrecognized 
states with a study of the newest unrecognized state in Europe. Second, I will add to the 
literature about the conflict in Ukraine by providing an in-depth study of the reasoning of the 
DNR from the perspective of unrecognized states. Outside of academia a study of the 
legitimation strategies of the DNR has practical relevance: an understanding of the internal 
dynamics in the DNR is vital for Ukraine if reintegration is to be successful. If the DNR is 
seen as legitimate by the local population, reintegration will be difficult. A study of how the 
DNR tries to legitimize can help estimate whether they are seen as such by the local 
population. As the conflict in the Donbas has not yet been resolved, research on one of the 
actors in the conflict is of urgent relevance.  
10 
 
Chapter 2: Defining and Operationalizing Legitimacy  
In trying to explain the continued existence of unrecognized states, legitimacy as a concept is 
of fundamental help. Both ‘inside’ (domestic) and ‘outside’ (international) legitimacy need to 
be examined. This literature review has two main aims: first, to engage with the multifaceted 
nature of legitimacy by considering the academic debate. The aim of this section is to 
understand what empirical factors are important for internal and external legitimacy in states. 
Second, I will outline a theoretical framework that can be used to study unrecognized states. 
Therefore, the structure will be as follows: first, I will deal with definitional issues, describing 
and defining the domestic and international aspects of legitimacy. Second, I will look 
specifically at legitimacy in unrecognized states and construct a theoretical framework based 
on the most prevalent legitimation strategies according to scholars. This chapter concludes 
with a section on methodology that illustrates how the legitimation strategies described by 
scholars will be utilized in understanding the DNR.  
 
2.1: Towards a definition of legitimacy 
 
A first necessary step in defining legitimacy is drawing the line between normative and 
descriptive accounts of legitimacy. Roughly speaking, the normative accounts fit the field of 
political philosophy, while the descriptive accounts are more at home in sociology: the former 
deals with legitimacy mainly as the justification of (coercive) power, while the latter deals 
with people’s belief in the system (Fabienne 2017). This literature review, and by extension, 
this thesis will focus mainly on descriptive accounts of legitimacy. Nevertheless, making an 
absolute distinction between normative and descriptive accounts, or for that matter between 
political philosophy and sociology when it comes to legitimacy, is difficult if not impossible. 
In this thesis I am not going to make an explicitly normative argument about legitimacy in the 
DNR, rather, I will examine legitimacy empirically.  
 
One of the most influential theorist on political legitimacy is the German sociologist 
Max Weber. In the above-mentioned descriptive/normative framework, Weber is on the 
descriptive side. In his famous 1918 lecture ‘Politics as a Vocation’, Weber begins his 
discussion on legitimacy by defining the state, which according to him is ‘a human 
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force 
within a given territory’ (Weber 1921,1; in Gerth and Wright Mills 1947). Defining the state 
11 
 
as such, the next central question that needs answering is ‘why do people submit to this power 
of the state?’ Legitimacy explains a crucial aspect of these power relations. Weber moves 
away from the normative philosophical account of legitimacy and holds that a system is 
legitimate if the people perceive it as such. His tripartite distinction of how power structures 
are legitimated has become so influential that it is mentioned in almost every account of 
political legitimacy. This distinction is by no means a perfect fit to the real world; rather, they 
are ideal ‘pure’ types or categories into which different political systems are placed. The first 
is legitimation through tradition. This entails a claim to a right to rule based on the argument 
that ‘it has always been this way’, or, that the ruler in question has a god given mandate to 
rule. An example of this is the way in which most of Europe was ruled through the Middle 
Ages and into the modern era. Weber defines this as ‘traditional’ legitimacy. Then, there is 
legitimation based on ‘charisma’ -a hard to define ability of certain people to make others 
believe and trust them. An example of this are the elected warlords and demagogues that 
people have rallied around for centuries. The final type is based on rules. This happens when 
power is legitimated through a rule based legal system. Examples of this are modern 
bureaucracies and governments. Weber calls this ‘rational/legal’ legitimacy.  
 
David Beetham in his 1991 The Legitimation of Power- criticizes Weber. He claims 
that if legitimacy is related to the perception of people, and how people perceive things is 
influenced by societal structures, then how regimes are perceived is mainly in the hands of the 
regime itself. He takes this to its logical conclusion, saying that this view of legitimacy would 
‘imply that the reason for the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989 
lay in a deficiency of public relations, rather than anything actually wrong with the system of 
rule itself.’ (Beetham 1991, 9). This means that, taking a Weberian view of legitimacy, it is 
not possible to explain anomalous political events such as revolutions. Beetham is not 
proposing to disregard people's beliefs about the legitimacy of a given political regime; rather, 
he is proposing to deduce whether a given political regime can be ‘justified in terms of their 
beliefs’ (Beetham 1991, 11 italics in original). Beetham goes further to critique Weber’s focus 
on legitimacy as a matter of belief by shifting our attention towards two other dimensions of 
the concept: legality and consent. First, the legal part of legitimacy considers whether power 
is exercised within the confines of the law; whether or not it follows the rules. This legal view 
of legitimacy is relatively easy to determine and is more straightforward than any belief-based 
view: power is either exercised according to the law or not. Moving on to the consent element 
of the concept, Beetham argues that the showing of consent, either through going to elections, 
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attending rallies, etc… confers legitimacy to the political system (Beetham 1991, 12). 
Beetham considers legitimacy to be built up in three ways, arguing that a political system can 
be said to be legitimate if: 
 i) it conforms to established rules ii) the rules can be justified by reference to beliefs shared 
by both dominant and subordinate, and iii) there is evidence of consent by the subordinate to 
the particular power relation. (Beetham 1991, 16).  
These three points are Beetham’s three dimensions of legitimacy. The first one 
corresponds to the legal definition of legitimacy, but goes beyond a strictly legal 
understanding in terms of scope. The rules of power may be enshrined in a legal document, 
but they may also be informal and unwritten. The opposite of this Beetham calls ‘illegality’- 
when power is acquired not according to the rules (in modern regimes this would often be an 
unconstitutional change of power) that power will be illegal. The next dimension deals with 
beliefs, and more precisely, a common belief held by both dominant and subordinate about 
whether the rules of power can be justified (Beetham 1991, 17). The opposite of this 
dimension of legitimacy Beetham defines as a ‘legitimacy deficit’. Such a deficit occurs when 
the beliefs about power change; for example, when people no longer believe in the divine 
right of kings to rule, there is a legitimacy deficit or (or weakness). The third dimension, that 
of consent, is important for two main reasons. First, it creates a ‘normative commitment’ for 
those that have participated in the show of consent towards those they have demonstrated 
their consent to (Beetham 1991, 18). Second, by expressing consent to be ruled you confer 
legitimacy to the system: it is a public show of being content with the existing power relations 
on part of the subordinate. Because of the legitimizing nature of a show of consent, these 
actions are often ceremonial: think of elections for example, or of medieval displays of loyalty 
to the sovereign. The opposite of the third dimension Beetham characterizes as 
‘delegitimization’- or the pulling back of consent. An example of this could be the protests 
during the Prague spring in ‘68: they showed a public display of a withdrawal of consent, and 
thus were a clear delegitimization of power. The population might have stopped perceiving 
the regime to be legitimate for a long time, but protests presented a clear withdrawal of 
consent, which provided the delegitimization. Beetham primarily focusses on defining ‘inside’ 
or domestic legitimacy. The next subchapter will deal with the empirical study of legitimacy 
in its domestic form.  
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Demands of 
pluralism 
State  Performance  Legitimacy  
 
 
 
 
2.2: Domestic legitimation  
 
Bruce Gilley in his 2009 book ‘the Right to Rule’ tries to establish empirically what makes 
states legitimate. He takes Beetham’s distinction between legality, justification and consent, 
and applies them to a study of 72 countries. He attaches measurable indicators to these aspects. 
For legality, he takes the responses to three world values survey questions about confidence in 
‘human rights performance, the police, and the civil service’ to measure the law-abidingness 
of a state (Gilley 2009, 14). For justification, he again uses the world values survey and the 
incidence of violence in political protests. For consent, he uses the reliance of the state on 
easily avoidable taxes and voter turnout in elections (Gilley 2009, 15). Additionally, he places 
extra stress on the justification part. He justifies this by arguing that states nowadays are 
claiming to represent the interests of their citizens. Another interesting outcome of his study is 
about what makes a state legitimate- the explanatory variables. The three most important 
variables Gilley identifies are ‘General Governance’, Democracy/Rights’ and ‘Development’ 
(Gilley 2009, 44). What this entails, among other things, is that democracy is not necessarily a 
prerequisite for a legitimate regime.  
Moving into a more abstract level, Gilley attempts to create a general model of 
legitimacy (fig. 1). His basic assumption is that society is pluralist, with a range of demands 
by different actors who have different social identities and different powers in shaping the 
state. These ‘demands of pluralism’ are directed at the state. Additionally, the state has some 
power to shape the demands of society. In responding to these demands the state performs and 
produces outputs. As Gilley discussed and found from his analysis, development, 
democracy/rights, and governance are key (63). There is also a double relationship between 
performance and legitimacy: on the one hand, good performance creates legitimacy while on 
the other hand, states that enjoy legitimacy are able to perform better. Finally, legitimacy 
influences demands of pluralism. In this model, the state is in a double relationship with 
society as it not only responds to the demands of citizens but also helps shape them. 
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Fig. 1. The pluralist model of legitimation (after Gilley 2009, 63).  
In essence, this moves away from Weberian models of legitimacy and the other models 
previously described. Moreover, it describes how states have to manage demands of a 
pluralist society. This model provides a roadmap to study legitimacy: if we want to find out 
how a state is trying to legitimize itself, we need to study these processes. However, what is 
described here relates to internal or domestic legitimacy alone. The next section will deal with 
international legitimacy.  
 
2.3: International legitimation 
 
Some authors argue that globalization has intertwined internal and external legitimacy (Clark 
2007; Gilley 2009; Hurrelman et al 2007). As states are more integrated into what could be 
called an ‘international society’ of states, domestic legitimacy becomes more important for 
international legitimacy writes Ian Clark. He uses a tripartite distinction: legality, morality, 
and constitutionality. In this distinction, legality refers to the following of rules, be they 
national legal systems or international legal systems. Finally, Clark understands 
constitutionality as belonging to the ‘political realm of conventions, informal understandings, 
and mutual expectations’ (Clark 2007, 220). Legitimacy building consists of finding a 
consensus between these norms. Clark claims an international order works if there is 
consensus on the ‘rightful membership’ and ‘rightful conduct’ criteria of international society. 
In a shift of international order, these criteria change. Clark argues that after the cold war 
there was a shift in the rightful membership criterion that was now heavily based on 
democracy. Moreover, rightful membership and rightful conduct became even more 
intertwined. 
In the 90’s a new ideology of humanitarian intervention was propagated, knows as 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P). This was based on the idea that it was the obligation of 
states to ensure basic human rights, and that they were accountable to the international society 
if they could not or did not want to do this (Clark 2007, 160). He argues that the fact that 
these norms exist that means that there is an international society. If states did not adhere to 
these basic norms, the international society had the right to intervene (forcefully) to ensure 
that the state in question would adhere to these norms in the future. While many saw this as a 
challenge to sovereignty, Clark sees it as a manifestation of a revolution in legitimacy (Clark 
15 
 
2007, 160). States who did not want to conform to the new ideas of what a state should be 
were ostracized by other states as ‘rogue’ or ‘outlaw’ states. The inclusion into international 
society was used as a ‘carrot’, while the exclusion was used as a ‘stick’ to get states to adapt 
to the new demands of international society. Inclusion or exclusion into ‘international society’ 
(i.e. adhering or not adhering to global norms) can be a matter of life and death for states; 
particularly for unrecognized ones.  
 
2.4: Legitimacy in unrecognized states 
 
Scholars usually define unrecognized states as ‘entities that have proclaimed independence, 
developed certain elements of statehood and possess partial sovereignty (i.e. maintain durable 
control over a certain territory and have built own governing institutions that are viewed as 
legitimate by the majority of local populations).’ (Axyonova and Gawrich 2018, 423). There 
is as no scholarly consensus yet whether the DNR counts as an unrecognized state. Although 
the conflict has not stopped, the DNR has had control over a certain territory since March 
2015. Whether the authorities are viewed as legitimate is hard to establish and will form part 
of the subject matter of this thesis. Unrecognized states have a state they seceded from, which 
is known as the ‘parent state’, and a state that supports their independence, known as a ‘patron 
state’ (Ó Beacháin, et al 2016, 442). Influenced by the parent states, the tendency has been to 
describe unrecognized states as mere ‘puppet regimes’ of their patron states (Broers 2013). 
Moreover, they have been characterized as bandits and outlaws, profiting from their 
unrecognized status of a lawless area (Caspersen 2015). All these conceptualizations have 
hindered the full understanding of the complexities of the behavior of unrecognized states.  
 Unrecognized states are particularly prevalent in the post-Soviet space. After 
perestroika, several unrecognized states appeared. The post-Soviet unrecognized states (and 
their parent states) are Nagorno Karabakh (Azerbaijan, 1994–), Abkhazia (Georgia, 1993–), 
South Ossetia (Georgia, 1992–), Transnistria (Moldova, 1991–), and now the DNR (Ukraine, 
2014-) and the LNR (Ukraine 2014-). On the post-perestroika states a wealth of research is 
available. Many scholars have written about the DNR/LNR in the context of the war in 
Ukraine (Katchanovski 2016; Robinson 2016; Mateeva 2016). As of yet none have written on 
the DNR from the perspective of unrecognized states.   
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One would expect power in an unrecognized state to be legitimate if it conforms to 
established rules, if the rules can be justified, and if there is evidence of people consenting to 
power. (Beetham 1991). What is clear from the discussion of legitimacy above is that we 
should not examine how these unrecognized states are perceived by their population. Rather, 
it is fruitful to examine legitimacy according to empirical attributes such as Gilley’s 
conceptualization of what is most important in legitimacy: ‘General Governance’, 
‘Democracy/Rights’ and ‘Development’. The better an unrecognized state is able to provide 
these, the more internal legitimacy it will enjoy. Although in international relations legitimacy 
is seen as absolute, in the literature on unrecognized states it is seen in degrees (Caspersen 
2011). Due to the difficulty of obtaining empirical data from unrecognized states, it is 
rewarding to examine legitimation strategies rather than trying to determine the absolute level 
of legitimacy (Caspersen 2015, 186). Unrecognized states often form after a secessionist 
(ethnic) conflict which may initially bolster internal legitimacy through the ‘rally around the 
flag’ phenomenon (Fabry 2016). However, unrecognized states do not automatically enjoy 
internal legitimacy. Due to the situation unrecognized states find themselves in (often that of 
an unresolved conflict) some building blocks of legitimacy weigh more heavily than in 
recognized ones.  
Unrecognized states are denied legitimacy from their parent states and international 
society, which sees legitimacy as something absolute: states either are or are not (Broers 
2013). In the literature on unrecognized states5 scholars often speak of ‘earning’ sovereignty 
or ‘playing’ the recognition game (Berg and Mölder 2012; Broers 2013; Lynch 2002; 
Caspersen 2009; 2015). The goal of this game is external legitimacy in the form of 
recognition by international society. The benefits of recognition are considerable: with 
borders recognized by international society the control of the regime over the secessionist 
territory is cemented. As Clark has argued, internal and external legitimacy have become 
more closely tied than ever. For unrecognized states this rings true: they have to prove their 
statehood not only to a domestic audience, but also to an international audience in order to 
gain recognition. Recognition opens access to international aid, trade and mobility for the 
population. Unrecognized stress their supposed internal legitimacy as an argument for 
external legitimacy. External legitimacy exists in degrees; therefore, it is most fruitful to study 
external legitimation strategies. The following section presents six of the most prominent 
                                                          
5 I will use ‘unrecognized’ over ‘de facto’ following Ó Beacháin et al. who note that every state is a de facto 
state- but not every state is unrecognized. 
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legitimation strategies of unrecognized states according to scholars. Due to the close 
connection between internal and external legitimacy, domestic legitimation strategies may 
have international elements and vice versa.   
 
Conflict and Security 
 
In general accounts of legitimacy as discussed above conflict has an adverse effect on the 
most important sources of legitimacy. Conflict is detrimental to development, regime 
performance, and democracy. Frozen conflicts could have the same adverse effects. For 
example, the tense military situation in the region South Caucasus has not been conducive to 
democratization of the unrecognized states located there (Broers 2013, 2). However, a frozen 
conflict and the threat of reintegration can instill patriotic fervor in the population causing a 
‘rally around the flag’ phenomenon (Fabry 2016, 27). For some unrecognized states, the 
external threat is the main reason for their internal legitimacy (Berg and Mölder 2012, 543). 
C,aspersen argues that providing security is a particularly important element of domestic 
legitimation in unrecognized states (Caspersen 2015, 185). Indeed, unrecognized states often 
have a hostile parent state for whom violence may be acceptable in the reintegration of the 
territories. If the war of secession was an ethnic war, the ability of the unrecognized state to 
protect their kin is key in ensuring internal legitimacy. Moreover, if the conflict was 
particularly violent the residents of the unrecognized states may harbor grievances against the 
parent state. The patron state is often essential in security guarantees. However, as 
unrecognized states have to maintain credibility that they can fend off an attack by the parent 
state. In an international sense, if the war of secession is seen as a last resort to protect the 
population against a hostile parent state, the unrecognized state will be more tolerated (Berg 
and Toomla 2009, 43). If the war of secession is seen as illegitimate it has an adverse effect 
on external legitimacy.   
 
Regime performance & state building  
 
Regime performance and state building are significant aspects of domestic legitimacy (Gilley 
2009; Rothstein 2009). They touch on all three foundations of legitimacy described by Gilley. 
Some authors argue that unrecognized states come into existence when the former warlords of 
the conflict become state builders (King 2001). State building is a process of forming working 
organs of government. Regime performance is how well the government can deliver public 
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goods and services, ranging from education to trash collection. Caspersen notes the 
importance of delivering public goods for ensuring domestic legitimacy (Caspersen 2009; 
2015). Moreover, Kolstø and Blakkisrud have also focused on state building when explaining 
legitimacy in unrecognized states, which they see as the physical buildup of state capacity 
(2008). Ó Beacháin et al argue that ‘legitimacy is also based on the capability to deliver basic 
services and to offer a degree of opportunities and mobility to their core resident population’ 
(Ó Beacháin et al 2016, 447). The unrecognized status makes it more difficult to deliver 
public goods or to foster development as there is no access to international trade. The public 
good of security is particularly important for unrecognized states, and in this thesis, I will 
examine it as separate from other public goods such as healthcare or education. Some authors 
hold that the international legitimacy of an unrecognized state is dependent on how 
convincing the regime comes across as state builders (Bakke et al 2014). They also form a 
part of external legitimacy as unrecognized states sometimes argue their ‘state’ is functioning 
better than the parent state. For example, a key part of Somaliland’s international legitimation 
is stressing its regime performance and state building successes compared to Somalia (Felter 
2018).  
 
Democratization  
 
Democracy is an important aspect of unrecognized states’ domestic and international 
legitimation strategies (Caspersen 2011). In a study on state building in Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia, Transnistria, and Nagorno-Karabakh Ó Beacháin et al argue the building of 
(relatively) democratic systems in all of these states except for South Ossetia has contributed 
to their domestic legitimacy (Ó Beacháin et al 2016). This is not surprising as Gilley finds that 
democracy/rights is an important component of legitimacy. This strategy fits in both the 
international and domestic legitimation categories. If the democratization process is genuine, 
the inhabitants of the unrecognized state will feel their concerns are listened to, and the state 
will be better able to respond to the demands of a pluralist society. Moreover, people will 
have a standardized way of expression consent in the form of elections. Democratization in 
unrecognized states often remains limited to an ethnic democracy (Caspersen 2012). Besides 
playing a domestic role, democratization also is used as an international legitimation strategy. 
In the post-Cold World democracy has become an element of rightful membership in 
international society, and leaders of unrecognized states have admitted being democratic 
might make it easier for eventual recognition by other democracies (Caspersen 2011, 342). 
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Kopecek et al note that from 2005 onwards, the leadership of several unrecognized states 
began placing extra stress on their democratic credentials while simultaneously embarking on 
a democratization program as an international legitimation strategy (Kopecek et al 2016). 
Democratization thus has internal and external benefits for unrecognized states.  
 
Culture, History and Identity 
 
Kolstø and Blakkisrud deem nation building to be an important legitimation strategy of 
unrecognized states, which they see as the instilling into people a sense of belonging (Kolstø 
and Blakkisrud 2008, 484). The importance of identity in these states is exemplified by the 
fact that they often build a limited ‘ethnic democracy’ (Caspersen 2011). A sense of national 
identity may be strengthened by the position of unrecognition (Fabry 2016). Moreover, it may 
be key to eventual recognition (Richards and Smith 2015). In some other unrecognized post-
Soviet states such as Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia, ethnic identity is a major legitimizing 
factor for the regimes. These states have their origin in ethnic warfare and protection of the 
ethnic group provides an integral source of legitimacy of the unrecognized state. Indeed, the 
fact that secessionist conflicts of post-Soviet state were predominantly ethnic wars, allowed 
the elite of these entities to demonize the parent state and proclaim to be the only defenders of 
the group (King 2001, 533-534). In others such as Transnistria there is no clear ethnic 
majority and the identity building project was based on other factors. Identity building may be 
based on a shared language, culture, or history. Internationally, some unrecognized states 
benefit from a diaspora that supports external legitimation strategies.  
 
Patron state engagement  
 
The most important international partner for an unrecognized state is its patron state. Patron 
state support is important because they are usually the unrecognized state’s security guarantor, 
leading some scholars to view the unrecognized state as a mere ‘puppet state’ (Broers 2013, 
4). However, patron state engagement is a balancing act in which too much integration into 
the patron state can have negative effects on both internal and external legitimacy. Internally, 
too much reliance on the patron state can jeopardize the claims to independence which drove 
the initial war of secession. Externally, unrecognized states’ dependence on the patron state 
leads to them be seen pawns of that patron states foreign policy, which is detrimental to 
recognition strategies (Souleimanov et al 2018). Trust in the patron state is directly linked to 
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trust in the whole state building project (Bakke et al 2018). In the case of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, which were recognized as states by Russia in 2008, this serves as a piece in their 
argument for wider recognition (Caspersen 2015). There is a spectrum of patron state 
engagement in which unrecognized states can fall; from almost total patron state control such 
as in South Ossetia, to more independence such as in Nagorno-Karabakh. Patron states who 
support but do not recognize can engage in an array of recognizing acts that fall short of 
recognition: from the visits of minor officials to organizing joint sports tournaments. Perhaps 
the more sensitive areas of patron state support, such as security guaranties, are not made 
public by unrecognized states (Ó Beacháin, et al 2016, 448). Integration with the patron state 
is one of the DNR’s self-professed top priorities as the initial call was for outright annexation. 
Patron states can recognize unrecognized states and can persuade other states to do the same.  
 
International engagement  
 
There is a large spectrum of how much unrecognized states interact with the outside world, 
from isolation such as South Ossetia to a high level of interaction such as Taiwan (Berg and 
Vits 2018). Unrecognized states differ in the extent to which they are tolerated by the 
international community. Berg and Toomla argue that if secession was the last resort against 
serious injustice, the unrecognized state has a bigger chance of being tolerated (Berg and 
Toomla 2009, 43). Despite their unrecognized status, unrecognized states try to engage with 
the world. States and international organizations prefer to interact in an explicitly non-
recognizing way (Ker-Lindsay 2018, 364-368). For example, the EU has an ‘engagement 
without recognition’ for the unrecognized states in the Caucasus (de Waal 2017). However, as 
reintegration into the parent state is the goal, this form of engagement is explicitly non-
recognizing. Unrecognized states can use mimicry of official diplomacy to and could open 
‘embassies’ or ‘consulates’ in other countries, presenting themselves as recognized states 
(Mcconnell et al 2012, 807). The parent state usually sanctions interaction with the 
unrecognized state and pursues a counter recognition strategy. Nevertheless, they cannot 
always stop international engagement with unrecognized state. Post-Soviet states such as 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria cooperate and recognize each 
other. 
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2.5: Methodology  
 
The strategies discussed above provide a comprehensive overview of how unrecognized states 
try to legitimatize themselves domestically and internationally. The practical application of 
these strategies differs per unrecognized state. I will examine how the above-mentioned 
strategies are used in the DNR by analyzing information available in the in the public space: 
the DNR ‘state’ media. In order to draw conclusions from the selected primary source 
material this thesis uses content analysis. Content analysis is a prominent method in the social 
sciences that is employed to gain meaningful insights from the study of a large body of data. 
It can be subdivided into quantitative and qualitative analysis. The former looks at large 
corpora of sources and usually makes use of computer programs. The latter looks at smaller 
corpora and offers more depth. Classifying the data in a content analysis is done through 
coding. A ‘code’ in this case is a word or short phrase that captures the essence of the text 
sequence analysis (Saldana 2011). In qualitative content analysis there are multiple ways to 
create the categories. The first, ‘conventional’ method consists of immersion into the data and 
the construction of categories based on patterns in the data. A second one makes categories 
informed by theory (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 1297-1281). Both are potentially valuable 
methods in the research of legitimation strategies.  
In this thesis, I will employ the latter method. Practically, this means that I will take 
the articles in a time sample, and color code them for the legitimation strategies discussed 
above. For example, I used yellow to indicate ‘conflict and security’. If a text was mostly 
yellow, it was grouped under the ‘conflict and security’ category. If a text had many different 
colors, it was put into the ‘other’ category. The majority of articles consist of a few sentences. 
This facilitated categorization of articles. The legitimation strategies described above are 
general, and in the DNR legitimation strategies may be used differently. To analyze how the 
legitimation strategies are used in the DNR, I have differentiated within the legitimation 
strategies. These subcategories were found by immersion into the data and color coded into 
the text. For example, within ‘conflict and security’ the focus could be on the Ukrainian army 
attacking the DNR. This was color coded with dark-yellow. Going back to the research 
question: How does the DNR try to legitimize itself domestically and internationally? The 
research will answer two parts of the research question. It will 1) establish which legitimation 
strategies are used most and 2) analyze how legitimation strategies as described by scholars 
are used in the DNR.  
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The corpus of primary sources consists of coverage from the DNR ‘state’ media 
agency ‘Donetskoe Agenstvo Novostej’ or DAN news and the DNR ‘state’ international news 
agency ‘Donbas News Agency’ or DoNi news. DAN news functions as the main news outlet 
of the regime in the DNR. Besides news articles they publish official announcements. DAN 
publishes predominantly in Russian but translates some of its articles into English. Its 
intended audience seems to be people living in the DNR, as many of the events it covers are 
of a local character. However, this does not mean that Russian language articles are intended 
for a purely domestic audience as Russian is still widely spoken in the post-Soviet space. As 
DAN is the official state media agency of the DNR, it is an instrument of propaganda for the 
DNR. Janus Putkonen, a Finish citizen who moved to the Donbas in 2015 and was the first 
foreigner to receive a DNR passport, owns DoNi news. Through DoNi news, he controlled the 
accreditation of foreign journalists and made sure that only people sympathetic to the DNR 
were allowed in (Shandra 2016). DoNi writes in English, French, and Italian, which suggests 
that its target audience is those living in (Western) Europe. DoNi is both a conspiracy website 
on the fringes of the media spectrum and the official international news agency for the DNR. 
Accordingly, its audience is likely to consist of people who already support the DNR in some 
way.  
  
In order to obtain a sample of articles that is both representative and manageable for 
qualitative analysis, I will employ Ovala and Pantti’s technique, which they used for study of 
the geopolitical framing of Maidan in big European newspapers. They focused on particular 
events that have the most emotional value, for example the downing of MH17. The news 
coverage within these periods, they argue, has ‘particular relevance in public framing’ (Ovala 
and Pantti 2017, 44). This would arguably be the same for the DNR media: events of great 
emotional value would be more relevant for them to show the strategies of legitimation. 
Taking the strategy of Ovala and Pantti and examining crucial moments in the DNR’s 
existence seems the most fruitful way of ensuring a sample of data that is small enough to 
analyze qualitatively but still representative of the whole corpus. The need to legitimize the 
state in the media at these moments would be the biggest in the days leading up to these 
events (if anticipated) and the days immediately after.  
 
Arguably, the first crucial events were the Minsk agreements which were signed on 
February 11th. These agreements were the second attempt of brokering a ceasefire in the area 
and were signed by all parties involved. No English language media exists during this time 
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sample. Nevertheless, as the Minsk agreements are crucial to the existence of the DNR I have 
decided to include them. A second critical moment were the ‘primaries’ for the elections that 
they would have (but were ultimately postponed). The primaries were a moment in which the 
DNR sought to legitimize itself both domestically and internationally through democracy. 
These primaries took place on the 2nd of October 2016. A third critical moment is the renewal 
of large-scale clashes between the Ukrainian government and the separatists on January 29, 
2017. On this day the armed forces of both sides clashed over the Ukrainian controlled village 
of Avdiivka. A fourth critical moment was the decision by Vladimir Putin to recognize 
identity documents as well as other certificates of residents of the separatist republics. This 
move was widely seen as a recognition of the separatist republics by Russia. I will study the 
news coverage from the day before, the day itself, and the day after each event. The following 
tables will illustrate the resulting data sample: 
 
Minsk time sample Primaries time 
sample 
Avdiivka time 
sample 
Identity Documents 
time sample 
DAN news 10 feb DAN news 1 oct DAN news 28 jan DAN news 17 feb 
DAN news 11 feb DAN news 2 oct DAN news 29 jan DAN news 18 feb 
DAN news 12 feb DAN news 3 oct DAN news 30 jan DAN news 19 feb 
N/A DoNi news 1 oct DoNi news 28 jan DoNi news 17 feb 
N/A DoNi news 2 oct DoNi news 29 jan DoNi news 18 feb 
N/A DoNi news 3 oct DoNi news 30 jan DoNi news 19 feb 
Table 1: days of coverage. 
A complete list of Russian language articles used is provided in appendix I (pp 102-120); for 
the English language articles in appendix II (pp 121-130). All legitimation strategies show up 
in some way in all samples with two exceptions: ‘democratization’ is only present in the 
Primaries sample, and ‘history, culture and identity’ does not show up in DoNi news articles. 
The following tables illustrate which legitimation strategies are present in the four time 
samples of DAN news and the three samples of DoNi news. I will refer to the articles using 
footnotes. All translations are by the author.   
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DAN news Conflict 
and 
security 
State 
building and 
regime 
performance 
Democratization History, 
Culture 
and 
Identity 
Patron state 
engagement 
International 
engagement.  
Minsk 
sample 
X X  X X X 
Primaries 
sample 
X X X X X X 
Avdiivka 
sample 
X X  X X X 
Identity 
documents 
Sample 
x X  X X X 
Table 2: legitimation strategies in the DAN sample 
DoNi News Conflict 
and 
security 
State 
building and 
regime 
performance 
Democratization History, 
Culture 
and 
Identity 
Patron state 
engagement 
International 
engagement.  
Minsk 
sample 
X X   X X 
Primaries 
sample 
X X X  X X 
Avdiivka 
sample 
X X   X X 
Identity 
documents 
Sample 
x X   X X 
Table 3: legitimation strategies in the DoNi sample. 
The corpus of articles resulting from such a focusing strategy is still significant: 287 in 
Russian and 147 in English. Russian language sample contains more articles than the English 
language one due to the missing Minsk sample from DoNi. Additionally, DAN publishes 
more articles in general. Fig. 1 and fig. 2 illustrate the articles grouped according to prevalent 
legitimation strategies in unrecognized states. 
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41%
16%
13%
7%
6%
11%
6%
Main themes in Russian language articles (287)
Conflict and Security
Regime Performance and State
Building
Democratization
Culture, History and Identity
Patron state Engagement
International Engagement
Other
57%
11%
16%
0%
6%
9%
1%
Main themes in the English language articles (139)
Conflict and Security
Regime Performance and State
Building
Democratization
Culture, History and Identity
Patron state Engagement
International Engagement
Other
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: breakdown of Russian language articles 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
Fig. 3: breakdown of the English language articles  
In some articles, multiple codes are prevalent: for example, a text may be about protecting 
citizens but also about international engagement. However, these graphs are a result of the 
texts by their main category. That there are so few in the ‘other’ category is mostly due to the 
1) broadness of the initial categories and 2) the short length of most texts. Many articles are 
merely rewritten versions of earlier articles. Additionally, many articles are not diverse 
content wise. Particularly articles about the conflict tend to be mere statements of how many 
times Ukraine has shelled the DNR. The only substantial articles usually reportages and 
interviews which are a clear minority in the sample. Of the DoNi sample, 67 articles are 
translations of (parts of) articles from DAN news; almost half (48%) of the whole sample.  
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43
37
23
25
Conflict and security Russian 
(118 articles) 
Avdiivka time
sample
Minsk time sample
identity
documents time
sample
Primaries time
sample
8111
10
10
10
6
Conflict and security Russian 
Ukraine attacking
DNR
Ukraine immoral
Ukraine army bad
DNR army good
disengagement
prisoners
39
24
16
Conflict and security English (79 
articles)
Avdiivka
Identity
Documents
Primaries
44
20
3
4
7
3
Conflict and security English
Ukraine attacking
DNR
Ukraine immoral
Ukraine army bad
DNR army good
Disengagement
Prisoners
Chapter 3. Conflict and Security.  
For unrecognized states in general, and for those engaged in an active conflict in particular, it 
is important to convey the message that they are able to provide security for their citizens. 
Unsurprisingly, articles related to providing security in the broad sense are most numerous in 
the time sample. As fig. four shows, in Russian language media the articles about the conflict 
appear most in the Avdiivka and Minsk samples. The English language sample follows the 
same logic, in the Avdiivka sample there are more articles about the conflict.   
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig 4. Russian articles by time sample      Fig 5. English articles by time sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 6. Subcategories Russian        Fig 7. Subcategories English 
As fig. six and seven show, most articles about the conflict are simply about the DNR 
attacking Ukraine. These are often short articles about how many times Ukraine has shelled 
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the DNR. However, these articles sometimes turn into accusations that the Ukrainian army or 
groups fighting on the side of Kyiv in general are immoral. These have been marked as 
‘Ukraine immoral’. The English language sample has more of these articles. Furthermore, 
there are articles about how good the DNR army, and how bad the Ukrainian army is. These 
articles have been marked as ‘DNR army good’ and ‘Ukraine army bad’ respectively. Finally, 
there are issue specific articles about disengagement and prisoner exchange due to two 
planned actions at that time. These have been marked as disengagement and prisoners 
respectively.  
 
3.1. Ukraine attacking the DNR 
 
The largest percentage of articles in the time samples are about Ukraine attacking the DNR. 
Articles about Ukrainian attacks on the DNR are rarely about the DNR army being attacked. 
Rather, the articles talk about the Ukrainian army shelling ‘settlements’ or are more specific 
about places. For example, in the Minsk time sample there are five articles about the shelling 
of the bus station ‘center’ in the middle of Donetsk. All articles are remarkably similar, the 
only difference being the number of casualties mentioned. The people who die in these 
incidents are peaceful citizens. This is stressed in the media also in the shorter articles, where 
it is stressed that the Ukrainian army attacks civilians, and is thus waging a war against 
civilians.6 The articles about Ukraine shelling are usually a summation of the amount of shells 
Ukraine has fired, or the amount of times the ceasefire has been violated.7 No OSCE SMM 
reports are cited, who are usually more detailed, but also mention the ceasefire violations of 
the DNR. In DNR propaganda, Ukraine is always at fault. The DNR propaganda about 
Ukrainian attacks is seemingly quite factual to the uninformed as it regularly mentions the 
exact weapons used by the Ukrainian side and the caliber.8 Thus, it may be intended as a 
                                                          
6 Such as in this article from 11 Feb. (22:47, Minsk sample): В больницу № 20 Донецка попал снаряд ВСУ. ‘a 
shell from the VSU fell on the hospital Nr 20 in Donetsk’. VSU is Russian language abbreviation for the armed 
forces of Ukraine.   
 
7 Such as in this article from 28 Jan. (14:33, Avdiivka sample): Число обстрелов территории ДНР со стороны 
украинской армии за сутки возросло до 1270 раз – Басурин. ‘the number of shelling of the territory of the 
DNR from the side of the Ukrainian army in the past 24 hours rose to 1270 times – Basurin.’  
 
8 Take this sentence from 1 Oct. (7:30 Primaries sample) as an example: Наряду с артиллерией и танками ВСУ 
также использовали минометы калибра 82 и 120 мм, вооружение БМП, гранатометы и стрелковое 
оружие. ‘Next to artillery and tanks the VSU also used mortars of 82 and 120mm caliber, armed personel 
carriers, rocket launchers and shooting weapons.’ 
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mimicry of the OSCE SMM reports, or, more likely, the Ukrainian army reports on 
Facebook.9 The OSCE SMM does make it into the reports occasionally. However, that is 
mostly when the DAN news writes that the OSCE is informed of Ukrainian10 misdeeds by the 
DNR. Articles about Ukraine attacking the DNR army are the exception: there the DNR army 
is able to stop the Ukrainian side.11 Perhaps the DNR is trying to put forward the image that 
Ukraine is waging a war against the civilian population of the Donbas.  
 
The English language articles follow the same line as Russian ones in that the majority 
of articles are about the conflict. Many small articles in DoNi news are translations of those 
that appear on DAN news. A major difference between DoNi and DAN is that the former 
produces translations of the ‘Donetsk Defense Reports’ and ‘Donetsk Defense Situation 
Report’ which appear in the form of TV programs and press conferences by ‘ministry of 
defense’ spokesperson Eduard Basurin respectively. These are longer articles in which 
Basurin summarizes the Ukrainian attacks of the past days. DoNi news claims to give the 
‘official translation’.12 The beginning of these reports are similar to the short articles 
described above. Later however, Basurin talks about possible future attacks from Kyiv. 
Particularly in the Avdiivka sample, Basurin’s remarks are allegations that Kyiv is instigating 
the conflict. The articles take the same line as Russian language one. Namely, as described 
above, Kyiv is held responsible for the conflict. For example, in a report about Ukrainian 
shelling an ‘official’ takes it as proof that the ‘Ukrainian criminal government is not planning 
to follow Minsk agreements and make all that is possible to disrupt them, leading fratricidal 
war’.13 The civilians living in the DNR are painted as victims. In the DONI articles, Ukraine 
                                                          
9 The Joint Forces Operation centre regularly posts similar updates about the conflict, although with 
significantly less stress on the targeting of civilians.  
 
10 Such as in this article from the 29th of Jan. (12:32, Avdiivka sample): «Все факты преступлений украинского 
командования зафиксированы следственной группой и будут переданы в комиссию по расследованию 
преступлений ВСУ и представителям Миссии ОБСЕ», — подытожил Басурин. ‘All facts about the crimes of 
the Ukrainian command will be recorded by the investigation team and will be given to the commission of the 
research of crimes by the VSU and the representatives of the OSCE mission – summed up Basurin.’  
 
11 Such as in this 19 Feb. (14:02, Identity Documents) article: ВСУ при поддержке минометов атаковали 
позиции ДНР под Донецком — Басурин. ‘The VSU with the help of mortars attacked the position of the DNR 
under Donetsk – Basurin.’ 
 
12 From 28 Jan. (14:54, Avdiivka DoNi sample): Vice-Commander of the DPR People's Militia Eduard Basurin, 
official translation by DoNi News Agency.  
 
13 From 17 Feb. (15:22 Identity Documents DoNi sample). Not the badly translated Russian.  
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is not shelling military positions, but civilian infrastructure and settlements. DONI news puts 
out the message that Ukraine is always at fault for ceasefire violations. It is easy to record 
ceasefire violations; but it is more difficult to determine who violated the ceasefire first. The 
OSCE SMM has cameras and monitors close to the line of contact, and most Western media 
get their sources about ceasefire violations from the impartial SMM (as opposed to the 
Ukrainian army or the DNR/LNR). DONI news is pushing a counter narrative based on DNR 
army sources. Articles demonizing the enemy in a conflict situation are the norm. 
 
3.2. Ukrainian attacks as immoral 
 
Articles stressing the immorality of the Ukrainian army or parts of that army are either about 
events that happened, or planned events. In DNR media, Ukrainian attacks on DNR territory 
are constantly referred to as attacks on ‘settlements’ or on ‘peaceful citizens’.14 15 This already 
sets the tone of how the DNR writes about Ukraine. Nevertheless, there are regular articles 
that go further than stressing the target of shelling. Take for example a series of articles about 
the shelling of the Donetsk central bus station in 2015. The progression of those articles is 
noteworthy: where the first article mentions only the tragedy and the number of wounded,16 
later articles put the act in (the DNRs) perspective. A tragedy such as this is used to 
emphasize that Ukraine is bad and does not care about its population: in an article later that 
day,17 Kyiv is accused of indifference towards the inhabitants of the DNR. In the piece itself it 
becomes clear how multiple themes are used when an official from the ‘Ministry of Internal 
Affairs’ calls on international society to pay attention of the ‘genocide’ the regime in Kyiv is 
perpetrating . In another article about the incident, ‘sabotage and reconnaissance groups’ are 
                                                          
14 Such as this article title from 17 Feb. (9:42, Identity Documents sample) suggests: ВСУ с вечера обстреляли 
девять населенных пунктов ДНР, выпущено порядка 365 снарядов и мин. ‘The VSU since yesterday shelled 
nine settlements of the DNR with about 365 grenades and mines.’  
 
15 Such as this article title from 29 Jan. (13:49, Avdiivka sample): Мирный житель ранен в результате 
обстрела Донецка со стороны ВСУ — командование. ‘Peaceful civilian injured by shelling of Donetsk by the 
VSU – command.’  
  
16 From 11 Feb. (9:17, Minsk sample): ВСУ нанесли удар по центру Донецка, снаряд попал в автостанцию 
«Центр», где находилось большое количество людей. ‘The VSU (Ukr army) struck the center of Donetsk, a 
shell hit the bus station ‘center’ where there were a large amount of people present ’.  
 
17 The last 11 Feb. (14:47, Minsk sample) article about the bus incident features the title: «Киевский режим 
окончательно продемонстрировал свое безразличие в отношении жизней и судеб миллионов граждан 
Донецкой Народной Республики» ‘The Kyiv regime finally showed its indifference towards the lives and fates 
of millions of citizens of the Donetsk People’s Republic . ’ 
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blamed for the tragedy.18 This example shows how a story about Ukrainian shelling evolves 
into an accusation of genocide. In February 2017 the DNR was busy preparing a petition for 
the ‘world leaders’.19 This petition was an appeal to Trump, Merkel, and Putin to get Ukraine 
to stop the ‘genocide’ in the Donbas.20  
 
In the English language version of the articles, the same wording is used. This is 
similar to Putin’s rhetoric for justifying the takeover of Crimea (Starink 2016). Moreover, it 
fits in the propaganda story of vilifying Ukrainian nationalist as Nazis, and seeing the Maidan 
revolution as a coup by Ukrainian nationalists. Other articles about the Ukrainian side 
attacking the DNR that are not about Debaltsevo mention the notorious Azov battalion, which 
is presented as a Nazi battalion.21 The DNR militia is then credited with ‘destroying’ some 
Azov battalion soldiers. Besides the Azov battalion, the ‘right sector’ fighters are also features 
in the articles. These battalions are well known to the local population as they feature in 
Russian language media about Ukrainian as ‘boogeymen’; symbols of a nationalist Ukraine 
that has become fascist. Thus, in DNR media, when these groups are mentioned it is about 
their (planned) immoral acts against the DNR.22 Stories about the horrors that the Ukrainian 
army or battalions are supposedly perpetrating are an integral part of Russian and DNR 
propaganda. A notorious one is a Russian propaganda piece about the Ukrainian army 
supposedly having publicly crucified a little boy in Slovyansk.23 Moreover, in the ‘Direct Line’ 
                                                          
 
18The article from 11 Feb. (10:12, Minsk sample): Обстрел автостанции в Донецке был спланированной 
диверсией. ‘The shelling of the bus station in Donetsk was a planned diversion’ 
 
19 From 18 Feb. (18:46, Identity documents sample): Обращение к трем мировым лидерам о ситуации в 
Донбассе поддержали свыше 164 тыс. жителей ДНР. ‘appeal to three world leaders about the situation in 
Donbas is supported by more than 164 thousand inhabitants of the DNR’.  
 
20 A copy paste sentence, used in articles about the petition (Identity Documents sample, 10:56; 10:56; 13:12; 
17:07; 18:46). 
 
21 Such as in this article from the 12 Feb. (10:15): Нацистский батальон «Азов» мешает эвакуации 
мирного населения поселка Широкино. ‘Nazi ‘Azov’ battalion disrupts the evacuation of peaceful civillians 
form the village of Shirokino’  
 
22 such as this headline from 28 Jan. (14:10, Avdiivka sample): «Правый сектор» готовит провокационные 
обстрелы объектов с хлором вблизи ДФС для обвинения сил ДНР. ‘’Right sector’ is preparing provocative 
shooting of objects with chlorine in the vicinity of the Donetsk Filtration Station so that they can accuse the 
forces of the DNR.’ The DFS is a vital part of the drinking water infrastructure of Donbas.  
 
23 "Fake: Crucifixion in Slovyansk." StopFake.org. April 07, 2017. Accessed Oct.ober 17, 2018. 
https://www.stopfake.org/en/lies-crucifixion-on-channel-one/. 
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format Zakharchenko suggested that Ukrainians where preparing a nuclear disaster at a power 
plant in Zaporozhe.24 While these stories seem absurd, it is important to note that Russian 
propaganda about Ukraine centered on the absurd. However, the absurd, when repeated long 
enough, becomes plausible in people’s minds (Tarentieva 2018). It is clear that the DNR in its 
media is attributing horrible things to the Ukrainian side.  
 
Another example in which the Ukrainian side is shown to be immoral was during the 
evacuation of Debal’tseve, and the exchange of prisoners.25 26 The first example is about the 
supposedly planned evacuation of citizens from the besieged city of Debal’tseve that was in 
the hands of the Ukrainian army at that time. The DNR complaint was that the citizens were 
only informed of an evacuation to Artemovsk (now Bakhmut), and not of the evacuation of 
into the DNR. Eventually, states the article, it was too late to evacuate them. Another article 
about the evacuation of Debal’tseve is about the evacuation of Ukrainian army soldiers, who, 
according to the DNR, should give up and sit out the rest of the war in captivity in the DNR. 
The DNR spokesperson for the ‘ministry of defense’, Eduard Basurin is quoted as saying that 
the DNR will guarantee a peaceful withdrawal. They promise to let the soldiers stay alive, in 
contrast to the Ukrainian side, where they will be shot by detachments from the army.27  
 
In the English language sample the language used to describe the Ukrainian side of the 
conflict is more inflammatory than in Russian language sample. Furthermore, there is a clear 
differentiation between the Ukrainian army and the battalions fighting in the war. The English 
language sample has a stronger focus on the supposed immorality of the Ukrainian side. The 
Ukrainian army is variously described as murderers,28 terrorists,29 criminals,30 and 
                                                          
24 Zakharchenko, Aleksandr. "Онлайн-конференция Александра Захарченко с жителями Запорожья 
(ЗАВЕРШЕНО)." Dan-news. June 08, 2016. Accessed May 07, 2018. https://dan-news.info/politics/onlajn-
konferenciya-aleksandra-zaxarchenko-s-zhitelyami-zaporozhya-obnovlyaetsya.html. ‘От них ВСЁ МОЖЕТ БЫТЬ, 
даже ядерный теракт.’ ‘From them EVERYTHING is possible, even a nuclear terror attack.’  
 
25 From 11 Feb. (20:25, Minsk sample): Организованная эвакуация из Дебальцево в ДНР остановилась, 
Киев не идет навстречу Донецку – Басурин. ‘The organized evacuation from Debal’tsevo into the DNR has 
stopped, Kyiv does not agree with Donetsk - Basurin’  
 
26 Four articles (Minsk sample) in total: 10 Feb. (15:33), 11 Feb. (13:19), 12 Feb. (17:33; 17:36). 
 
27From 11 Feb. (20:25, Minsk sample):  « Мы гарантируем им мирный выход и жизнь». «Если они будут 
выходить в противоположную сторону, они будут расстреливаться заградотрядами» We guarantee them a 
peaceful withdrawal and life. ‘When they will exit to the side controlled by the enemy, they will be shot by 
detachments’ 
 
28 From 30 Jan. (12:08 Avdiivka DoNi sample): Mayorsk checkpoint in Gorlovka shelled by Ukrainian murderers. 
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punishers.31 Ukrainian battalions are also described as terrorists. Moreover, they are deemed 
Nazis,32 and nationalists.33 This reflects Russian propaganda that holds that Ukrainian 
nationalism is close to Nazism in. DoNi does not make up these terms itself. Rather, it 
borrows them from the established Russian language narrative. Only when the article deals 
specifically with something immoral these terms are used. Moreover, when talking about the 
Ukrainian army, the ‘softer’ terms are used such as criminals and punishers. Interestingly, 
while the Ukrainian army is depicted as immoral because they too are shelling civilian 
infrastructure, they are also depicted as victims of the battalions. In the Avdiivka sample 
Basurin describes them as nationalist battalions (Particularly Right Sector) that are 
uncontrolled by Kyiv.34 Again, Right Sector is used as a boogeyman. Just as with the normal 
attacks, DoNi news promoting Russian/DNR line of the war in the Donbas. This includes 
accusing the Ukrainian side of terrible deeds. Interestingly, in the DoNi sample there were 
more words used to indicate the immorality of the Ukrainian side, particularly of the 
Ukrainian groups fighting in the war. Due to the target audience of DoNi, these articles are 
not meant to bolster domestic legitimacy.   
 
 
3.3 Praising the DNR army 
 
The DNR army is described as competent in in articles about the Ukraine army attacking the 
DNR. Moreover, the technicians of the DNR army are painted as heroes who help keep 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
29 From 30 Jan. (16:25 Avdiivka DoNi sample): (…) Ukrainian terrorists used their usual tactics of warfare, and 
launched massive artillery strikes (…).  
 
30 From 28 Jan. (15:55 Avdiivka DoNi sample): Ukrainian criminals shell DPR territory 1,270 times over past 24 
hours. 
 
31 From 17 Feb. (16:41 Identity Documents DoNi sample): Ukrainian punishers open fire at DPR territory 
over six thousand times. 
 
32 From 30 Jan. (17:24, Avdiivka DoNi sample): More than five Ukrainian servicemen were killed by the 
Ukrainian Nazis (…).  
 
33 From 18 Feb. (16:30, Identity Documents DoNi sample): In particular, units of nationalist battalions were 
given the task to conduct attacks on vital facilities and infrastructure of all localities near the frontline. 
 
34 From 30 Jan. (17:24, Avdiivka DoNi sample). ‘More than 5 Ukrainian servicemen were killed by the Ukrainian 
Nazis, and nearly 10 were wounded.’ 
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citizens safe by clearing mines.35 Other ways the DNR is described as protecting is in the 
articles about the possible evacuation from Debal’tseve and articles about the exchange of 
prisoners with Kyiv, and in an article about mobilization. The article starts with a statement 
that Zakharchenko ordered mobilization in February. Then, the ‘boss’ of the center where 
people can apply to become volunteers is quoted as saying that unlike in Ukraine, where there 
is forced mobilization, in the DNR it is voluntary.36 To prove this, they quote a man who has 
just signed up who says he cannot watch anymore as peaceful citizens are shelled.37 In this 
article several elements come together: the DNR army is portrayed as good because it consists 
of volunteers, the Ukrainian army is bad because they use forced conscription, and the 
Ukrainian army predominantly attacks civilian infrastructure. In other articles a similar 
pattern can be observed.38 First, the DNR army is portrayed as good since it captured strategic 
heights around the city of Debal’tseve, then, it is explained that despite that the Ukrainian 
army attacked several settlements. It finishes with a summary of the losses of the Ukrainian 
army. In another article, Basurin is quoted saying that the DNR army is doing everything it 
can to protect Ukrainian soldiers.39 The DNR is presented as not wanting to harm ordinary 
soldiers. In the issue specific category of prisoner exchanges, the DNR presents itself in the 
articles as organized and ready to exchange prisoners. This is contrasted with the Kyiv side 
that is supposedly unorganized.40 Indeed, the DNR is presented as both ready and able to 
participate in these exchanges, while the Kyiv side is characterized as neither.  
                                                          
35 From 10 Feb. (15:17 Minsk sample) and 11 Feb. (14:34, Minsk time sample)  
 
36 From 10 Feb. (no time given, Minsk sample): «В отличие от принудительной мобилизации на Украине, 
набор в ряды ополчения ДНР происходит на добровольной основе (…). ‘Unlike the coercive mobilization in 
Ukraine, requitement in the ranks of the militia in the DNR is on a voluntary basis (…)’ 
 
37 From 10 Feb. (no time given, Minsk sample): Нет сил больше смотреть на беспрерывные обстрелы жилых 
кварталов, расстрелянные автобусы и троллейбусы, — рассказал доброволец Сергей Латынцев. ‘I have no 
more strength to look at the shelling of civilian houses, the shooting of busses and trolleybuses – said volunteer 
Sergej Latyncev’  
 
38 Such as in this one from 10 Feb. (21:04, Minsk sample). Ополчение ДНР заняло все высоты вокруг 
Дебальцево – Минобороны ДНР. ‘The militia of the DNR capture all heights aroud Debaltsevo – Ministry of 
Defence of the DNR’.  
 
39 Вместе с тем замкомкорпуса МО ДНР заверил, что ополчение делает все возможное, чтобы сохранить 
жизни солдат ВСУ. ‘together with the communication department of the Min Def of the DNR, stated that the 
militia is doing everything it can to protect the lives of Soldiers of the VSU’  
 
40 Such as this article from 11 Feb. (13:19) suggests: Обмен пленными между ДНР и ВСУ отложен из-за 
бюрократических трудностей с украинской стороны. ‘prisoner exchange between the DNR and the VSU 
deferred due to bureaucratic difficulties on the Ukrainian side’  
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DoNi follows the DAN line in describing the DNR army as superior in both fighting 
prowess and morals. Comparatively, about the same percentage of the articles about the DNR 
protecting citizens is praising the DNR army. An interesting article that appears in the DoNi 
sample is the translation of a commercial aired on DNR TV that attempts to recruit men into 
the army. The recruits are promised 15,000 rubles as well as clothing and food.41 This wage is 
well above average in the DNR. Furthermore, the DoNi features a video in which citizens 
record video messages for the Ukrainian army. DoNi news translated some of these messages, 
thereby emphasizing the local character of the uprising. They feature classic propaganda lines 
such as ‘We are so fed up by Ukrainians, so-called ‘liberators’ that our people rebelled on 
their own without the help of Russian military.’42 It seems that DoNi is not so much occupied 
with praising the DNR as with discrediting the Ukrainian side.  
 
3.4: Stressing the incompetence of the Ukrainian army 
 
The Ukrainian army is described as being demoralized and/or incompetent. DAN news 
portrays the Ukrainian generals and politicians as the main culprits, who send their soldiers to 
war without a reason. Mentions of the losses of the Ukrainian army get their own article.43 
Other articles are entirely or partially devoted to the Ukrainian army being demoralized and 
incompetent. For example, there is an article that describes how Ukrainian officers tried to 
flee Debal’tseve in civilian clothing. This is presented as proof that ordinary Ukrainian 
soldiers are not told about their encirclement and the officers only want to save their own 
lives.44 The Ukrainian army in Debal’tseve is characterized as ‘disorganized’ and ‘depressed’ 
                                                          
41 From 30 Jan. (19:18 Avdiivka DONI sample): ‘The salary from 15,000 rubles is paid. Clothing, food security 
and subsistence support are provided.’ At the time, 15000 rubles was about 230 euros; a good salary in the 
DNR. 
 
42 From 18 Feb. (15:12, Identity Documents DONI sample).  
 
43 Such as this one from 10 Feb. 12:19: Украинские силовики потеряли за ночь 42 человека убитыми и 
ранеными — Минобороны ‘Ukrainian security forces lost 42 men killed and wounded in in one night – ministry 
of defense’ 
 
44 Article from 10 Feb. (21:00, Minsk sample) Офицеры ВСУ бросают свои подразделения и скрываются из 
Дебальцево – Минобороны ДНР. ‘Officiers of the VSU leave their units and sneak out of Debal’tsevo ’  
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in another article, captured by the dumb decision by the ‘men in Kyiv’.45 46 The 
demoralization of the Ukrainian army is still an issue later on in the conflict.47 Moreover, in 
some articles about losses of the Ukrainian army, the Ukrainian side itself is blamed for the 
losses.48 As we have seen in the previous section on radical groups, ‘Right Sector’ plays the 
role of boogeyman in DNR propaganda, and this articles serves an example of how different 
themes overlap in articles. the English language articles there are even two instances in which 
the Ukrainian forces are depicted as drunks. Basurin states in his defense rapport on the 1st of 
October 2016 that areas were shelled due to the drunken behavior of Ukrainian 
commanders.49 The other articles states that a ‘Drunken Ukrainian soldier shot himself’.50  
 
3.5: Disengagement in Petrivske 
In October 2016, both sides of the conflict agreed to a disengagement of forces in the 
Petrivske area. This was confirmed in talks with the OSCE in September that year (OSCE 
2016). In articles about this disengagement, the DNR is presented as the side that is willing to 
commit to the agreed measures. Ukraine is depicted as unwilling to commit to the agreements 
and to pull back their troops from the disengagement area.51 Agreements signed in September 
between the OSCE, the Joint Center for Control and Coordination, the Ukrainian army and 
                                                          
45 Article from 12 Feb. (19:47, Minsk sample): ВСУ в Дебальцево дезорганизованы и подавлены, все 
попытки прорвать окружение безуспешны – Минобороны. ‘The VSU in Debal’tsevo is disorganized and 
depressed, every attempt to break the encirclement is unsuccessful – ministry of defense’  
 
46From 12 Feb. (19:47, Minsk sample): «Но, к сожалению, господа в Киеве приносят военнослужащих в 
жертву своих амбиций. ‘But, at the moment, the gentlemen in Kyiv bring soldiers to their death for their 
ambitions’.  
 
47 Such as this 17 Feb. article shows (15:06, Identity Documents sample): За неделю из украинских 
подразделений под Авдеевкой дезертировал 21 человек – разведка ДНР. ‘In a week 21 people deserted 
from Ukrainian detachments around Avdeevka – intelligence service of the DNR’.  
 
48 From 29 Jan. (18:21, Avdiivka sample): (…) подразделения ВСУ попали под минометный обстрел 
группировки «Правый сектор», в результате «дружественного огня» Киев также потерял 5 боевиков 
убитыми и более 10 ранеными. ‘(…) Detachments of the VSU came under mortar fire by the group ‘Right 
Sector, as a result of the ‘friendly fire’, Kyiv also lost 5 soldiers killed and more than 10 injured.’  
 
49 From 1 Oct. (17:13, Primaries DoNi sample): (…) ‘the commander of the 58th separate motor-infantry brigade 
Dropaty finished up the entire arsenal of forbidden arms being in an alcoholic delirium’ (…).  
 
50 From 28 Jan. (17:40 Avdiivka DoNi sample).  
 
51 From 1 Oct. (13:05, Primaries sample): «Однако Украина по каким-то причинам отказалась это делать в 
симметричном порядке». ’’However, Ukraine for whatever reason refused to do the same in symmetrical 
order’’ 
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the DNR/LNR stipulated that symmetrical withdrawal of troops should take place. These 
symmetrical withdrawals are coordinated jointly by Ukrainian and Russian army officers of 
the JCCC and observed by the SMM of the OSCE. Articles about how Ukraine is not 
implementing the Minsk agreements are common in DNR propaganda. The articles about the 
Petrivske disengagement zone fit exactly in that line. Take for example the article from the 3rd 
of October (16:40), which is just a small announcement that the OSCE asked Kyiv to ‘take 
measures’ after the shelling of a DNR village from a position where there should not have 
been any troops.52 The eventual disengagement did not take place on 3rd of October. DAN 
news was quick to blame the Ukrainian side. DoNi news only published translations of DAN 
articles about the disengagement thus echoing the DAN news line about Ukrainian sabotage 
of these agreements.  
 
3.6: Conclusion: conflict and insecurity?  
 
The articles about ‘conflict and security’ do not present a celebration of the strength of the 
DNR army nor of the military successes of the DNR. Rather, the focus is on Ukraine 
attacking civilians in the DNR, and the Ukrainian army being both immoral and incompetent. 
On the one hand, as we saw in the previous section, the Ukrainian army seems bent to 
willfully destroy the civilian population and perpetrate a genocide of the Donbas with the help 
of extremist groups and indiscriminate shelling. On the other hand, the Ukrainian army is 
painted as demoralized, incompetent, and sometimes at odds with the extremist groups. This 
seems to be contradictory: the Ukrainian army is demoralized and incompetent but at the 
same time is something to be feared. Perhaps this is a consequence of the DNR having 
multiple goals in the strategy of providing security to their citizens. The first is emphasizing 
the need for protection. The second is to ensure them that the DNR is able to provide security. 
The third is making reintegration into Ukraine seem unthinkable, thereby positioning the 
DNR (with Russia’s support) as the sole guarantor of the DNR people’s security. The second 
goal seems less prevalent in the propaganda than the first and third. The articles intended for 
an international audience seemed to focus predominantly on discrediting Ukraine. They repeat 
Russian/DNR propaganda line, and are similar to other Russian news outlets aimed at a 
foreign audience.  
 
                                                          
52 From 3 Oct. (16:40, Primaries sample):  
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As unrecognized states often prioritize their ability to protect citizens from the parent 
state, the DNR media posting articles about Ukrainian shelling which they are powerless to 
stop seems counterintuitive (Berg and Mölder 2012; Caspersen 2015). However, seeing the 
articles as reminders that the DNR needs to exist to protect the people from Ukraine, they fit 
with what scholars write about unrecognized states. Internal legitimacy rests on the ability of 
the entity to protect the community against a hostile parent state (Berg and Mölder 2012). In 
the case of the DNR, there is exceptional effort into painting the parent state as hostile. Kemp 
describes the attitude of the local population of a secessionist movement towards the people in 
power there thus: ‘they may be bastards, but they are our bastards’ (Kemp 2005, 19: in 
Caspersen 2015). The overwhelming attention to Ukraine attacking the DNR points to the 
DNR trying to nurture that feeling. The population hating Ukraine is more important than 
them liking the DNR. In the English language media directed at an international audience, the 
explicit goal is to demonize Ukraine. This is reflected in the larger percentage of articles 
devoted to the immorality of Ukraine. DoNi news is justifying the war to an international 
audience, framing it as self defense by the DNR against a hostile Ukraine.   
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Chapter 4: State Building and Regime Performance.  
Unrecognized and recognized states aim to provide public goods to their citizens, and the 
DNR is no exception. State building and regime performance are key components of 
legitimacy in general, and legitimacy in unrecognized sates in particular. State building is an 
endogenous process of how the state interacts with the population. This usually entails the 
building of both institutions and capacity. Regime performance on the other hand, is how well 
the state is able to provide for its citizens in a broad sense by delivering public goods.  
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
  
Fig 8. Russian articles by time sample          Fig 9. English articles by time sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
       
Fig 10. Subcategories Russian      Fig 11. Subcategories English     
 
In this thesis, I have decided to analyze the public good of ‘security’ separately. I have made 
an exception for articles about the police keeping order inside the DNR. Under regime 
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performance, I have also grouped articles about the economic development of the DNR. In a 
situation as polarized as in the DNR, the economy is also political. It must be clear that in the 
DNR media there are several strategies to refer to state building or regime performance. In 
general, these should be seen as part of the same strategy: conveying the message that, despite 
the war, the DNR is functioning as a state. In the DAN news sample, the majority of articles is 
about the DNR providing services while in the DoNi sample there is no clear majority. In 
Russian language sample, the articles about regime performance are divided across the time 
samples equally. In the DoNi sample the Identity Documents sample has the most articles 
although the division of articles is different from the DAN sample: there are fewer articles 
devoted to providing services, and only one to institutions and political system.  
 
4.1: Providing services 
 
As DAN news agency functions as an official outlet of the DNR, it does not only publish 
news articles but also official statements. These highlight the ability of the DNR to take care 
of its citizens by claiming that the DNR provides social services as well as free ‘republican’ 
TV channels.53 54 The TV channel example shows the at least rhetorical commitment to a 
DNR that encompasses the whole of the Donbas: Kramatorsk and Volnovakha were located in 
government-controlled territory at the time of publishing. DAN news writes about the DNR as 
if the state is rebuilding all things destroyed during the war: ’80 people received the 
qualification to become a trolleybus or tram driver in the time of the conflict.’55 The DNR is 
depicted as a developing state. Shortages of goods or services are explained as a consequence 
of the war.56 The DNR is depicted as able to cater to the needs of its population.57 In the 
                                                          
53 From 11 Feb. (14:53, Minsk sample): Сообщение Министерства труда и соцполитики ДНР о 
выплатах компенсаций пострадавшим от военных действий. ‘Announcement by the ministry of labor and 
social affairs of the DNR about the payment of compensation of those injured by hostilities’.  
 
54 Article from 12 Feb. (17:52, Minsk sample): Зона вещания цифрового телевидения ДНР охватила регион 
от Волновахи до Краматорска — Минсвязи. ‘The broadcasting reach of DNR TV encompasses the region from 
Volnovakhi to Kramatorsk – Ministry of communication’.  
 
55 From 28 Jan. (12:08, Avdiivka sample): Квалификацию водителей троллейбуса и трамвая в 
ДНР за время конфликта получили 80 человек.  
 
56 Such as medical workers: from 10 Feb. (11:34, Minsk sample): Центру экстренной медпомощи ДНР не 
хватает 700 сотрудников, пополнения ждут через несколько месяцев. ‘The center for emergency medical 
help of the DNR lacks 700 employees, the filling up these positions will take a few months’.  
 
57 From 11 Feb. (17:18 Minsk sample): ДНР обеспечена основными медикаментами на несколько месяцев 
вперед — Минздрав. ‘The DNR is provided with basic medical supplies for the next few months ahead.’  
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category of the DNR helping to build up there are also short articles about DNR restoring 
infrastructure damaged by Ukrainian shelling. These articles are primarily found in the 
samples with many articles about the conflict and shelling.58 59 Besides houses, DAN writes 
about other facilities destroyed by Ukrainian shelling which are being restored currently, such 
as the return of a bus line to the train station in Donetsk.60 Rebuilding and restoring seems to 
be an important theme that encompasses every facet of life in the DNR: there are even articles 
about restoring forests.61 Several articles in the primaries sample credit the DNR police,62 and 
medical workers63 with providing security and medical assistance respectively. In these 
articles the DNR provides security as a public good. The DNR also stresses its ability to 
provide in emergencies.64 Thus, the ‘providing services’ part relies to a large extent on 
rebuilding that what was destroyed during the war and providing security, medical services, or 
other services to the population. 
Slightly more than half of the articles in the broad category of regime performance and 
state building in Russian sample fall in this category. In the English language sample they 
make up less than a quarter. The English language articles are about the restoring of damage 
after shelling, the easing of checkpoint procedures and the increase of pensions.65 Still, one 
would expect the propaganda mouthpiece of an unrecognized state to celebrate the regime 
performance of that state. DoNi news seems to be more focused on criticizing Ukraine than 
on praising the DNR. DoNi news is more focused on humanitarian aid and the economy. 
Another explanation could be that DoNi news does pay attention to regime performance of 
the DNR, but that this does not come forward in the selected time sample. I believe this is 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
58 From 28 Jan. (17:04) 29 Jan. (16:43; 18:10) 30 Jan. (17:15) all Avdiivka sample.  
 
59 From 19 Feb. (15:12, Identity documents sample).  
 
60 From 3 Oct. (15:03, Primaries sample).  
 
61 From 2 Oct. (7:50, Primaries sample) and 19 Feb. (8:00, Identity documents sample).  
 
62 2 Oct. (11:13; 14:26; 15:27; 21:23; primaries sample). Or 18 Feb. (15:58 Identity Documents sample).  
 
63 3 Oct. (13:10 Primaries sample) 
 
64 From 30 Jan. (17:31, Avdiivka sample): МЧС ДНР в связи с ухудшением погоды открыло в Республике 12 
мобильных пунктов обогрева. ‘The Ministry of emergency situations of the DNR in reaction to the worsening 
weather opened 12 mobile heating points.’ 
 
65 29 Jan. (17:58, Avdiivka DoNi sample): about restoring power (translation). 28 Jan. (15:37 Avdiivka DoNi 
sample): about pensions and 17 Feb. (15:19 Identity Documents DoNi sample): about checkpoints.  
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doubtful seeing as the DNR providing goods and services for its citizens was a prominent 
feature of Russian language time samples.  
 
4.2: Humanitarian aid 
 
In February 2017 the DNR and LNR embarked on a ‘humanitarian aid’ program for the 
citizens of the DNR/LNR living in ‘temporarily occupied territories’.66 Note the use of 
language: the DNR uses exactly the same terminology Kyiv uses to talk about the Donbas. 
The name of the program is telling: ‘Humanitarian program for the unification of the people 
of Donbas’.67 The program was supposed to provide free medicine and education, social 
payments for WWII veterans and aid for families separated by the conflict. Zakharchenko and 
Plotnitskij argue that the ‘Rajons of Donbas controlled by the Ukrainian authorities are on 
the brink of a humanitarian and ecological disaster.’68 According to the DNR, the situation in 
Ukraine for ‘their’ citizens is worsening as the standard of living is declining. Moreover, the 
Ukrainian government is accused of indifference towards the population of the Donbas, 
causing the region to be on the brink of disaster. They reason that they should come to help 
‘their’ citizens. Additionally, the program is meant to ‘unify’ the population living on 
different sides of the contact line.  
 
The DNR can not provide for its own population without the help from Russia. It is 
thus likely that the program was not meant to be implemented but was meant to accomplish 
other goals. First, it is a way to impress the population living on the Ukrainian side of the 
contact line and to discredit Ukraine. Second, by proposing to provide humanitarian aid the 
DNR positions itself as a state that is not only able to provide for its own citizens, but also for 
those living in territory not controlled by them. Starting from January 25 2017, Ukrainian 
                                                          
66 The announcement of the Humanitarian program, in the article From 17 Feb. (12:20, Identity Documents 
sample) begins with explaining that: наши земляки, дончане и луганчане, проживающие на территории, 
временно подконтрольной Украине, находятся в сложном положении. ‘our countrymen, residents of 
Donetsk and Lugansk living in territory temporarily under the control of Ukraine, are in a difficult situation.’  
 
67 From 17 Feb. (16:24, Identity Documents sample): Гуманитарная программа по воссоединению народа 
Донбасса. The article consists of a picture of the document that signed to start the program.  
 
68 From 17 Feb. (12:21, Identity Documents time sample): Захарченко и Плотницкий отметили, что 
подконтрольные украинской власти районы Донбасса поставлены на грань гуманитарной и 
экологической катастрофы. 
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battalions started a blockade of the Donbas. Trains carrying coal and metal were blocked, but 
the blockade extended to other products as well such as alcohol, wood and cigarettes 
(Kostanyan and Remizov 2017). It is likely that the humanitarian program was set up as a 
response to this blockade. In the articles, it is argued that while Ukraine puts up a blockade, 
the DNR is trying to unite. DoNi provides translations of the aforementioned articles about 
the humanitarian program.69 An article about a UN report that claims a million children in 
Donbas need urgent humanitarian aid is also present in the sample.70 This reinforces the 
argument that the citizens of the Donbas need a humanitarian aid program. As opposed to the 
DNR providing services, Russian and English samples have about the same percentage of 
articles about the humanitarian program. Perhaps this reflects the international propagandistic 
nature of the program.  
 
4.3: Institutions and political system  
 
In the DNR media, the institutions and political system of the DNR are described as real 
legitimate entities. DAN news publishes short articles about DNR ‘government’ decisions 
which mention the state organs that carried them out.71 People working the for DNR are 
presented with their full official title in the media. 72 In international media the titles are 
always preceded by ‘self declared’, or ‘fake’ or may be put in brackets. Part of state building 
is the building of a political system. This does not only relate to ministries and official 
position, but also to the workings of a parliament and political activism. Articles about the 
founding of a workers union of metallurgy and mining as well as the founding of the Donetsk 
department of the youth wing of the leading political party also fit in this category.73 74 The 
                                                          
69 In 17 Feb. (12:40 Identity Document DoNi sample). 
 
70 From 18 Feb. (11:22 Identity Documents DoNi sample). This article shows the alarmist nature of DONI. The 
tilte of the article is ‘One million children in Donbas need urgent humanitarian aid — UNICEF’.  
 
71 Such as this article from 11 Feb. (18:01): В ДНР отказались от взимания таможенных сборов на 
импортируемые продукты. ‘The DNR refuses to collect customs fees on imported products’.  
 
72 Such as Pushilin who is the официальный представитель ДНР в Контактной группе ‘Official representative 
of the DNR in the contact group’ or Basurin who is the заместитель командующего корпусом Минобороны 
ДНР ’Deputy commander of the corps of the Ministry of defense of the DNR’  
 
73 From 12 Feb. (14:09): В ДНР создан профсоюз металлургической и горнодобывающей промышленности. 
‘In the DNR the trade union of metallurgical and miners was created’. 
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most important political movement is the ‘Donetsk Republic’ social movement and its youth 
party the ‘Young republic’. The appearance of a trade union for this industry gives the DNR a 
semblance of a functioning democracy. In articles about institutions and the political system 
the youth wing is presented as the future leaders of the country thus conveying some sense of 
a future that an independent DNR can provide its citizens with.75 The political parties in the 
DNR for the most part do not resemble the ideological preferences of the citizens. In this 
sense, they do not differ much from other post-Soviet countries in which party politics is 
underdeveloped. Even in Ukraine most parties are not ideological parties (Fedorenko 2016). 
The Donetsk Republic social movement almost the only political party that gets attention in 
the time samples. Articles about the social movement are propagandistic.76 In the primaries, 
they won 505 out of 514 seats, which is unthinkable in a real democracy.77 However, having 
political parties already gives the DNR the semblance of a working state.  
The creation of a party of power is common in the post-Soviet space. Furthermore, in 
unrecognized states such a dominant party system tends to develop (Ishiyama and Batta 2012). 
The DNR has little control over its own internal political affairs. The murders of popular 
militia commanders and other figures in the DNR point toward Moscow exercising control 
over the leadership of DNR (Portnikov 2017). The DNR claims to have multiple groups who 
are active in politics and as such is conveying the message through DAN news that it has a 
working political system. DoNi news only features one article on the political system- a 
translation of the article about the Young Republic movement repairing houses. Again, the 
question here is why there is so little attention to institutions/political system in the English 
language media. The explanation could be that these issues are profoundly local and thus not 
worthy of international exposure.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
74 From 12 Feb. (13:24, Minsk sample): В Донецке учреждено городское отделение «Молодой Республики». 
‘In Donetsk the city department of ‘young republic’ was established’. Young republic is the youth wing of 
‘Donets Republic’ which claims a majority in parliament.  
 
75 From 12 Feb. (13:24, Minsk sample): «Инициативных молодых людей хочется видеть больше и больше, 
чтобы строить новое успешное государство. ‘we want to see more and more initiatives of young people, in 
order to build a successful state’. Quote from the leader of ‘Donetsk Republic’ political party in the peoples 
Soviet Anatolij Koval’ 
 
76 Such as this one from 30 Jan. (13:44, Avdiivka sample): Депутаты фракции «Донецкая Республика» за 
осеннюю сессию провели 368 приемов в отделениях ОДДР. ‘Deputies from the faction ‘Donetsk Republic’ 
held 368 receptions in the offices of the ODDR.’ ‘ODDR’ stands for Общественное Движение «Донецкая 
Республика» or ‘Public movement ‘Donetsk Republic’’. 
 
77 From 3 Oct. (11:23, Primaries sample).  
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4.4: Economy  
 
The economy of unrecognized states is characterized by control of whole sectors of the 
economy by the ruling elite and a criminalization of the economy (Kolstø 2006, 729). In the 
DNR the situation is the same. DAN news writes about the economy to depict the DNR as a 
flourishing place. An interesting article about what the DNR provides is about the founding of 
a register for IT companies.78 The aim of the register is that IT companies can compete for 
‘state’ tenders and so ‘state’ may support them through economic programs. It is impossible 
for the DNR to foster a growing IT sector in the same way Ukraine or Belarus has; it seems 
more likely that this article serves the purpose of portraying the DNR as a modern functioning 
state. To illustrate the point that articles about the economy serve this purpose, take this 
headline: ‘All possible measures are taken to fill the market of the DNR with domestic 
production.’79 This program of import substitution has the support of the leadership of the 
DNR. The reality in the DNR is far from the rosy picture painted in DAN news. Prices for 
basic products widely fluctuate and differ from place to place, suggesting a weak economy 
and trouble with the allocation of resources (Mincheva 2017). The economy in DAN news is 
subservient to the state. Apolitical private enterprise in the DNR is impossible as the big 
businesses are either in the hands of Ukrainian oligarchs or the local elite. Moreover, business 
is political in that the focus is on self-reliance and a shift towards Russia. Take for example an 
article that outlines the aforementioned domestic production, which celebrates the fact that 
over 40 new types of household chemicals have been introduced to the DNR market in 
2016.80 This conveys the message that the economy of the DNR is doing well in production.  
 
The articles about domestic production in the DNR acquire special importance when 
keeping the timing in mind: while not directly mentioning the blockade, they present the view 
it will not adversely affect the DNR because they are switching to local production. Thus, 
                                                          
78 Article from 10 Feb. (13:27, Minsk sample): Сообщение Минсвязи ДНР о формировании реестра ИТ-
предприятий. ‘announcement by the Ministry of communication of the DNR on compilation of a register for IT 
companies’ 
 
79 From 17 Feb. (9:30, Identity Documents sample): Для заполнения рынка ДНР товарами отечественного 
производства принимаются все возможные меры – МЭР. ‘all possible measures are taken to fill the market 
of the DNR with domestic production.’ 
 
80 From 17 Feb. (10:15, Identity Documents sample): Производители бытовой химии ДНР за 2016 год 
выпустили на рынок Республики 40 новых продуктов. ‘Producers of household chemicals in 2016 introduced 
40 new products to the market of the Republic.’  
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while there are comparatively few articles about the economy, they do serve a specific goal. It 
is thus highly likely that the DNR through articles in DAN news tries to convey the image that 
the DNR is doing well and developing the economy, despite the blockade. DoNi news is 
certainly reacting to the blockade by publishing articles about the DNR economy.81 DoNi 
affiliated DNI press also posts an article by Christelle Néant82 that argues that the blockade 
will actually be good for the DNR.83 The argument is the same as with Russia: sanctions 
bolster domestic production. The argument is also the same as Russian language articles about 
domestic production, although these Russian language articles do not explicitly mention the 
blockade. DoNi however writes that the ‘blockade risks plunging Ukraine into energy 
collapse’.84 Thus, the message coming from DoNi news is clear: Ukrainian radicals blocked 
the railways, which will lead to a collapse in Ukraine and renewed domestic productivity in 
the DNR. This is exactly the message the DNR wants to send into the world and shows how 
DoNi is used as a mouthpiece for DNR propaganda in English.  
 
4.5: Conclusion: State Building and Regime Performance as a Comparison 
 
According to scholars, regime performance is one of the main ways a state can earn 
legitimacy (Rothstein 2009; Gilley 2009). The same goes for unrecognized states: the 
provision of public services is a key strategy of unrecognized states to bolster internal 
legitimacy (Caspersen 2015, 17). Moreover, the (perception of) material wellbeing of the 
inhabitants of post-Soviet unrecognized states is important for those states’ legitimacy 
(O’Loughlin et al 2014). The DNR providing services was the main category in the regime 
performance and state building sample confirming Caspersen’s assertion. Articles about 
regime performance have a double goal as they discredit the parent state while praising the 
DNR. Bakke et al, based on empirical research in Abkhazia, note that the internal legitimacy 
of unrecognized states is dependent on whether the ruling elite can convincingly portray 
                                                          
81 In articles about Zakharchenko visiting a new longwall from 17 Feb. (13:13; 13:47 Identity Documents DoNi 
sample).  
 
82 A figure similar to Janus Putkonen: foreigner living in the DNR and publishing pro-DNR/Russian news. 
Christelle Neant is French and writes predominantly in French for DNI press but also makes her own videos as a 
‘citizen journalist’.  
 
83 17 Feb. (DNI press): What does not kill us makes us stronger: blockade and new internal productivity in 
Donbas.  
 
84 19 Feb. (17:59, Identity Documents DONI sample).  
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themselves as state builders (Bakke et al 2014). DAN news tries to present the DNR as a 
normal, stable state. In the sample, they did this by articles about providing services, the 
economy, building a political system, and even embarking on a humanitarian help program 
for ‘their’ citizens living in ‘temporarily occupied territories’.85 Consequently, state building 
and regime performance are highlighted in comparison to the parent state. Furthermore, the 
articles show that the DNR reacted to the blockade imposed by Ukrainian battalions. The 
main message seems not to be that the DNR is doing better than Ukraine. Although the DNR 
is dependent on patron state support, it is presented as being able to provide for their citizens, 
even those living in parts of the Donbas controlled by Kyiv. As an international legitimation 
strategy, state building and regime performance are often used to compare the unrecognized 
state with the parent state. DoNi seems to try to do the same thing. However, many articles 
about regime performance and state building seem to have been too local for DoNi to report 
on. English language articles in particular depict the blockade as being good for the DNR but 
bad for Ukraine. Unrecognized states claims for recognition are often based on claims that 
they have successfully built institutions rather than claims based on regime performance or 
economy (Caspersen 2015, 19). However, I would argue that praising regime performance of 
the DNR to an international audience constitutes an attempt at international legitimacy 
seeking by presenting the DNR as a more competent ‘state’ than Ukraine. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
85 What the DNR calls the areas of the Donbas under the control of Kyiv. Kyiv uses the same name to refer to 
the territories controlled by the LNR/DNR.  
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Chapter 5: Democratization  
Democratization is used by unrecognized to bolster both internal and external legitimacy 
(Caspersen 2011). However, democratization in unrecognized states is always limited due to 
their unrecognized status (Caspersen 2012, 95-98). Democratization only appeared as a theme 
in the Primaries time sample. In the broad category of democratization, I have made the 
distinction between domestic and international aspects. This distinction cuts across 
Russian/English divide in the sample. As fig 11 and 12 show, the English language sample 
boasts a slightly higher percentage of articles with an international focus. Articles were 
marked as ‘international’ due to their focus on 1) the presence of international observers or 2) 
their discussion of the international implications of the elections.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 12. Subcategories Russian   Fig 13 Subcategories English  
Interesting to note is that in this time sample we see the largest amount of ‘copy-pasting’: for 
example, the goal of the primaries is explained by the same sentence a total of 27 times.86 
Another shorter version is used 5 times.87 Another curious instance of copy pasting is the 
remark that the primaries are in line with the Minsk agreements. This is done with a copy-
                                                          
86 Цель праймериз – в преддверии выборов в местные органы власти в Донбассе выявить наиболее 
перспективных кандидатов, которые пользуются подлинным авторитетом среди населения. ‘The goal of 
the primaries is to identify the candidates with the most perspectives for the local elections in the Donbas, those 
candidates who have genuine authority among the population ’. 
 
87 Цель — выявить тех, кто пользуются подлинным авторитетом среди населения перед местными 
выборами в Донбассе. ‘The goal is to identify those who have genuine authority among the population before 
the local elections in the Donbas’. 
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paste sentence that is used 17 times.88 The editors may think the audience needs constant 
reminders of what the primaries are about and why they do not contradict the Minsk 
agreements. Another reason may be that the editors use them to make the articles look longer.  
 
5.1 The Primaries: domestic  
 
The first article in the sample is about how the ‘day of silence’ went into effect in the DNR, 
and tells about how all participants are obliged to remove their agitation.89 This article points 
out the DNRs democratic credentials. The abovementioned ‘copy paste’ sentence about the 
Minsk agreement is present here. The article highlights the rule of law as it is dedicated to the 
decision of the ‘Provisional Electoral Commission’ (PEC). The article refers to a decision 
made on September 1 by the PEC, understating that the DNR is conducting elections in an 
organized manner. Explaining the primaries, DAN news published an article detailing why 
the preliminary voting is important and how they do not violate the Minsk agreements. 90 The 
primaries are described by Zakharchenko as preceding the local elections proscribed by the 
Minsk agreements.91 It is emphasized that the people participating in elections are ordinary 
people. The PEC notes that among the candidates are ‘politicians, doctors, cultural figures, 
militiamen, mineworkers, and representatives of science and education.’92 These candidates 
are listed as independent. Furthermore, he emphasizes the elections as steps towards 
                                                          
88 Предварительное голосование в ДНР не противоречит Минским соглашениям и соответствуют 
стандартам ОБСЕ. ‘Primaries do not contradict the Minsk agreements and are held according to OSCE 
standards ’ 
 
89 from 1 Oct. (5:30): В ДНР наступил «День тишины» перед первыми в истории Донбасса праймериз. ‘In 
the DNR the ‘day of silence’ went into effect before the first primaries in the history of Donbas’.  
 
90 2 Oct. (00:00) В Донбассе впервые в истории пройдет предварительное общественное голосование. ‘for 
the first time in history, preliminary public voting will take place in the Donbas’.  
 
91 Oct. 2 (00:00): ‘’(…) праймериз предшествуют местным выборам в Донбассе (предписаны Минскими 
соглашениями) и призваны выявить тех, кто «пользуются подлинным авторитетом среди населения».’’ 
‘The primaries precede the local elections in Donbas (prescribed by the Minsk agreements), and will identify 
those who enjoy genuine authority among the population’. The last sentence about identifying those with 
authority is used in other articles to explain why the primaries are held.  
 
92 2 Oct. (00:00): Среди них известные в Донбассе и на Украине политики, врачи, деятели культуры, 
ополченцы, шахтеры, представители науки и системы образования. ‘Among them (independent candidates) 
are politicians, dOct.ors, cultural figures, militiamen, mineworkers, and representatives of science and 
education famous in Donbas and Ukraine.’ 
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independence,93 as well as a key step in the peaceful regulation of the conflict. A sociological 
poll is presented as saying that 56% of the population actively follows the news about the 
primaries, while 46% intends to vote.94 More than 600 thousand ballots were prepared by the 
PEC.95 
 
5.1.1: Turnout and context 
 
The DNR tries to convey voting as a citizens’ duty to strengthen the new ‘republic’. Voting in 
the primaries is presented as voting for the future of the DNR. This is expressed in an article 
about a local polling station in a school in one of the zones of Donetsk closest to the line of 
contact. The director of the school is quoted saying it makes him happy that ‘our Donetsk 
youth actively interest themselves in the primaries of the DNR, and consider it their 
responsibility to make their choice for their candidate’.96 In the same article the polling 
station tells DAN news that the turnout is higher than expected. On election day, a 
‘spontaneous’ auto-parade drove through the center of Donetsk inciting people to ‘make a 
choice in favor of any of the candidates’.97 After explaining the actions of the auto-parade, the 
articles uses copy-paste sentencing to explain again the goal of the primaries and that they do 
not contradict the Minsk agreements. The temporary electoral commission press attaché Oleg 
Balykin announces that already 124 thousand people voted at noon.98  
                                                          
932 Oct. (00:00): «Это последние шаги к приобретению нашей независимости, потому что за ними 
последуют выборы, на которых мы должны гарантированно победить. ‘These are the last steps towards 
the acquisition of our independence, because after them will follow elections, in which we must be guaranteed 
to win’.  
 
94 2 Oct. (00:00): Согласно сентябрьскому опросу общественного мнения социологического центра 
«Особый Статус», 56 процентов жителей ДНР следят за новостями о предварительном голосовании, 46 
процентов готовы принять в нем участие. ‘According to a September public opinion poll by sociological center 
‘special status’, 56% of the inhabitants of the DNR follow the news about the preliminary voting, while 46% is 
ready to participate in them.’ 
 
95 Oct. 2 (00:00).  
 
96 2 Oct. (13:39): Радует, что наша донецкая молодежь активно интересуется праймериз в ДНР, считает 
своим долгом сделать выбор за своего кандидата», — сказала директор школы. 
 
97 From Oct. 2 (16:25): (…) сделать выбор в пользу кого-либо из кандидатов. ‘(…) make a choice in favor of 
any of the candidates’.  
 
98 2 Oct. (12:08): Более 124 тыс. избирателей проголосовало на праймериз к 12:00 – ВрИК. ‘More than 124 
thousand voters voted in the primaries before 12:00 – Temporary Electoral Commission’.  
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Indeed, it seems that turnout is a key issue for the DNR at these elections. However, there is 
no article with the exact turnout as a percentage in the sample. Rather, DAN news opted to 
quote the PEC that the ‘more than 370,5 thousand’ people turned up to vote.99 Compared with 
the 600 ballots prepared, this seems to be a turnout of roughly 60%. When people are cited 
talking about the turnout, they are all enthusiastic and claim the turnout it is very high. Even 
the international observers are brought in to comment on the turnout. Czech observer Zdenek 
Ondrachek compares the high turnout in the DNR with the low turnout in his home 
country.100 Moreover, there is a separate article about foreign observers praising the DNR for 
high turnout: ‘Observers from Italy and South Ossetia announce that they did not expect such 
a high turnout for the primaries’.101  
It seems that the DNR wants to demonstrate citizens are actively engaged in the 
elections by reporting about (an expected or real) high turnout ratio. International observers 
add strength to these claims. A high voter turnout is usually taken as a show of consent 
towards the regime. The DNR is trying to create an atmosphere in which it seems that people 
enthusiastically participated in these elections and thus in the building of the ‘republic’. This 
is comparable to Soviet elections. There, turnout was high, often reaching the 99% mark. 
Voting was considered a citizens’ duty, and the whole election show was reminiscent of a 
theatre in which the voters where the actors. Furthermore, election day was a festive occasion 
(Swearer 1961; Zaslavsky and Brym 1978). Ukrainian dissident in the DNR Stanislav 
Aseyev102 describes the voting process in the DNR as a ‘theater’ (Aseyev 2016). The elections 
in the DNR are reminiscent of the Soviet Union as they had food,103 mobile voting for sick 
                                                          
99 From 3 Oct. (10:16): В предварительном голосовании приняли участие свыше 370,5 тыс. человек — 
окончательные данные ВрИК. ‘In the preliminary voting more than 370,5 thousand people participated – final 
data PEC’.  
  
100 2 Oct. (22:20): «Мы-по хорошему завидуем вам, так как в нашей стране, например, явка на выборы 
едва достигает 30-35 процентов избирателей. ‘we envy you because in our country, for example, the turnout 
for elections hardly ever reaches above30-35%’ 
 
101 2 Oct. (15:57): Наблюдатели из Италии и Южной Осетии заявили, что не ожидали столь высокой явки 
на праймериз.  
 
102 Who is currently in prison in the DNR, reportedly on hunger strike since July 2018. 
 
103 From 2 Oct. (18:40) Рестораторы Донецка напоили горячим чаем избирателей центрального района 
столицы. ‘Restaurant owners of Donetsk give voters warm tea in the central rayon of the capital’. Moreover 
near to these stands a ‘social fair’ operated.  
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people,104 and a general festive atmosphere.105 These are all strategies to achieve a high voter 
turnout, and the DNR claims that they achieved a high turnout. Whether the turnout rate was 
real or not is hard to establish.  
 
5.1.2: Content  
 
Soviet Elections were a way in which the population could express local grievances (Birch 
2011, 712).  However, in the DNR it is surprising to note that while the elections were local, 
no local issues came up in the sample. That is, when officials are cited about the importance 
of voting they mention only general slogans for the future of the republic.106 107 Moreover, 
when voters are quoted, they share the same opinion.108 109 The primaries in the DNR 
probably did not have any major consequences. In any case, of the 514 constituencies that 
were up for contest, 505 were won by ‘independents’ who were members of the ‘public 
movement’ ‘Donetsk republic’, which is the ‘party of power’.110 Moreover, the acting mayor 
of Donetsk was reelected with 83,2% of the vote.111  
                                                          
104 Quote from a head doctor in an article from 2 Oct. (15:33): «Выбор на голосовании может сделать 
каждый – и тот, кто лежит в больнице, и тот, кто находится дома, но не может передвигаться, инвалиды I 
группы. ‘Everyone is able to vote, those who lie in the hospital, and those who are at home, who cannot move, 
invalids of the 1st class.  
 
105 From 2 Oct. (17:45): Между тем рядом с избирательным участком уже начался праздник. Здесь 
открылась полевая кухня, заработала ярмарка, местные творческие коллективы устроили небольшой 
концерт. ‘Among those near to the polling station the holiday already started. Here they opened a field kitchen, 
a fair, and local artists’ collectives staged a small concert’.  
 
106 Such as this quote by the acting mayor of Donetsk Martynov on 2 Oct. (11:00) Я считаю, что от того, как 
пройдут праймериз, во многом зависит будущее государства. ‘I consider that the future of the state 
depends a lot how these primaries go.’.  
 
107 Or this quote by Zakharchenko from 2 Oct. (11:08): ‘’Мы голосуем все за наше будущее’’. ‘We all vote for 
our future’.  
 
108 Such as this voter from an article from 2 Oct. (18:26): Надеемся, что праймериз приблизят нас к 
желаемой тишине и началу новой жизни – без войны. ‘We hope that the primaries will bring closer to the 
desired silence and the beginning of a new life- without war’.  
 
109 Such as this voter from an article from 2 Oct. (17:45): Мы верили и верим в то, что наша молодая 
республика сможет отстоять свою независимость и получит дальнейшее развитие. За это и голосовали 
сегодня». ‘We believed in and believe now that our young republic can defend its independence and develop 
further. That’s what we voted for today’.  
 
110 From 3 Oct.ober (11:23): Члены ОД «Донецкая Республика» победили в качестве самовыдвиженцев в 
505 округах из 514 на праймериз. ‘Members of the Public movement ‘Donetsk Republic’ won as independent 
sin 505 out of 514 districts’.  
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The English language articles adhere to the same lines: of the 16 ‘domestic’ articles, 
only three were not translations of DAN news articles. Articles about the domestic 
implications of the primaries catered to an international audience serve the purpose of 
international legitimation. Of the articles that are not translations, one stands out in particular. 
An article about how supposedly a journalist from Ukraine came back to the LNR to vote. 
This journalist is only quoted saying bad things about Ukraine.112 Although this article is 
about the LNR (DoNi writes about both), the article fits into what is a familiar pattern by now: 
DoNi not only praises the DNR but also discredits Ukraine. DoNi serves as the DNR’s outlet 
to an international audience. Therefore, DoNi is the medium through which this international 
recognition strategy through democratization is communicated. The DoNi sample was even 
less focused on local issues than the DAN news sample which corroborates the assumption 
that the DoNi coverage of the elections only served only propagandistic purposes. In the DNR, 
the content of the primaries seems to have been less important than the primaries themselves. 
Neither Russian nor English language articles mentioned local issues in any way.  
 
5.2 The Primaries: International  
 
The international observers appear to feature in the DAN news articles to prove that the DNR 
is doing the right thing. For example, an Italian observer, Guilietto Chiesa, is quoted 
emphasizing the importance of the primaries: ‘The primaries are a serious organization (…) I 
see, that there is no way back, you made your step forwards for the creation of a new 
state.’113 Also not the copy and paste claim that the election is observed by ‘(…) 1043 
observers from the candidates and 22 international observers from Finland, Greece, 
Germany, Italy, South Ossettia, France, The Czech republic, Serbia, and other countries’.114 
115 The DAN news articles about the elections have a strong international component. An 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
111 From 3 Oct. (10:23): Мэр Донецка победил на праймериз с результатом 83,2%. ‘the mayor of Donetsk 
won with a result of 83,2%.’. The candidate that came closest had a mere 5,4% of the vote.  
 
112 From 2 Oct. (13:27 DoNi sample). For example he calls life in Ukraine "survival rather than living". 
 
113 From 1 Oct. (9:52): «Праймериз – это серьезная организация, — добавил в свою очередь Кьеза. — Я 
вижу, что назад дороги нет, вы сделали шаг вперед для создания нового государства.  
 
114 (…) 1043 наблюдателя от кандидатов и 22 международных наблюдателя из Финляндии, Греции, 
Германии, Италии, Южной Осетии, Франции, Чехии, Сербии и др. стран. Exact sentence is used 5 times.  
 
115 namely in the articles from Oct. 1 (9:52; 16:37; 16:41) and Oct. 2 (00:00).  
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appeal from the ‘head’ of the DNR Zakharchenko is posted in which he does not mention 
even one local issue but does mention the international impact of the primaries.116 
Zakharchenko’s appeal ends with: ‘The people of the DNR should show that we are building a 
civilized, constitutional state, capable of holding open and honest elections.’ 117 It seems from 
the articles the DNR primarily wants to show ‘the world’ and ‘international society’ how 
democratic they are.118 Balykin explains the elections are legitimate because they rely on 
‘adherence to the norms of international electoral law, adherence to the standards of the 
OSCE and the standards of freedom and democracy’.119 Again, the article finishes with the 
same copy-paste sentences that explain what the primaries are and that they do not contradict 
the Minsk agreements.  
One way the primaries are internationally oriented is through the Minsk agreements; 
the other is through the international observers. These agreements clearly stipulate that local 
elections should be held after a complete withdrawal of troops (Financial Times 2015). DAN 
news argues that since these elections are a preparation for the local elections stipulated by the 
Minsk agreements, they do not contradict them. Regardless of the question whether or not the 
primaries actually contradict the Minsk agreements, it is interesting to note the DAN news 
goes so far in assuring their readers the elections are in line with Minsk. The DNR presents 
itself as the party that does follow the agreements, as opposed to Ukraine. Indeed, as the 
elections are presented as ‘one of the key points of a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the 
region’120, Kyiv is charged with not coming up with the necessary law to make this happen.121 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
116 From 2 Oct. (11:23): Обращение Главы ДНР Захарченко к жителям Республики. ‘appeal of the Head of 
the DNR Zakharchenko to the citizens of the republic’.  
 
117 From 2 Oct. (11:23): Народ ДНР должен показать – мы построили цивилизованное, правовое 
государство, способное на открытые и честные выборы.  
 
118 Oct. 2 (21:08): Праймериз пойдут на пользу политическим институтам ДНР и ее имиджу в мире — 
депутат. ‘The primaries will benefit the political institutions of the DNR and its image in the world.’ 
 
119 From 2 Oct. (12:19): Он напомнил, что легитимность процесса проведения предварительного 
голосования «опирается на следование нормам международного избирательного права, соблюдение 
стандартов ОБСЕ и стандартов свободы и демократии». ‘He (Balykin) reminded us that the legitimacy of the 
process of preliminary voting relies on adherence to the norms of international electoral law, adhere to the 
standards of the OSCE and the standards of freedom and democracy ‘’  
 
120 from 2 Oct. (00:00): Напомним, что проведение местных выборов в Донбассе — однин из ключевых 
пунктов мирного урегулирования конфликта в регионе.  
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For the domestic audience, this is a familiar story as Kyiv is always blamed for not following 
the Minsk agreements. Thus, with respect to the elections, reference to the Minsk agreements 
is not so much to get international attention as it is for domestic attention.  
 
Another way of international engagement is through international observers. One 
observer already introduced in this chapter is Guilietto Chiesa. He is a former chairman of the 
communist party in Italy. Later, he became a writer, journalist and filmmaker who regularly 
comments on current events for Russia Today and Sputnik. His remarks about the DNR 
elections shed light on the purpose of bringing in international observers and his comments 
about the primaries are worth quoting at length: ‘popular’ voting is of great importance in 
international politics. Because this is practiced nowhere in the West, there, the democracy 
has long been degraded. The creation of such a state as democratic, stable and free as the 
Donetsk Republic becomes a big example for us.’122 In another article he thus urges the people 
of Donetsk to ‘not look towards Europe and build your own democracy’.123 Another Italian 
observer held the same opinion about the difference between democracy in Donetsk and in 
‘the west’ claiming that the EU decides everything for Italians.124 The message seems to be 
that democracy in the west should not be an example for the DNR.  
The international observers present are marginal figures in their home countries. The 
articles they might publish will probably not appear in main stream media but rather will 
likely be distributed among people who are already ‘pro-Russian’ in any kind of way. The 
DNR strictly controls which foreign journalists can enter its territory. Serious foreign election 
observers would not go to observe the primaries anyway since that would constitute some 
form of recognition. The observers at the primaries were marginal figures who already 
supported the DNR. Although DAN undoubtedly also have an international Russian audience, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
121 from 2 Oct. (00:00): Однако на данный момент Киевом документ не только не был принят, не 
существует даже законопроекта. ‘at this moment Kyiv not only did not accept the document, there is not even 
a draft law.’ 
 
122 Oct. 1 (16:37): Народное голосование в международной политике имеет большое значение. Потому 
что нигде на Западе нет такой практики, там вообще демократия давно деградировала. Создание такого 
государства, как демократичная, стабильная и свободная Донецкая Республика станет большим 
примером для нас»,  
 
123 Oct. 2 (19:47): не смотрите на Европу, стройте свою демократию» 
 
124 Quote from Italian observer Mauricio Marone from 2 Oct. (14:14): (…) в Италии люди ничего не решают, а 
страной руководят из Евросоюза’’. (…) in Italy people do not decide anything and the country is governed 
from the European Union.’ 
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the intended target seems to be the people actually living in the DNR.125 Therefore, it seems 
likely that international observers serve the purpose of legitimizing the elections for the locals. 
That these observers make these statements is perhaps more due to their own political 
positions: most are highly critical of the state of affairs in their own country and in the EU; 
otherwise they would not be in Donetsk.126 What is more relevant is that DAN news so 
prominently features these international observers. If they do not serve the purpose of lifting 
the information blockade,127 they serve the domestic purpose of bestowing the elections with 
legitimacy by their praising of the DNR. Furthermore, by their presence alone they bestow the 
DNR with some international legitimacy. Moreover, once they get to their home countries, 
they will support the DNR narrative.  
 
The situation is different for the English language articles about foreign observers. The 
two main contributors to DoNi news, Janus Putkonen and Christelle Néant both participated 
in the elections as observers and voters. Unsurprisingly, they both think the democracy in the 
DNR is better than their respective Finland and France.128 DoNi calls the vote of Janus 
Putkonen, who is apparently the first foreigner to have received DNR citizenship, a ‘triumph 
of freedom’.129 Not one of the foreign observers was critical of any aspect of the primaries, as 
critical observers, or even journalists, are not allowed inside the DNR. Janus Putkonen 
himself was responsible for keeping unwanted journalists out and giving accreditation for 
journalists favorable to the DNR (Shandra 2016). The DNR can count on the support of some 
marginal figures in the EU. Putkonen and Néant run the international media of the DNR and 
try to promote the DNR as a functional state and democracy in their respective home 
countries. Intriguing is that they overshoot their own goal when it comes to the primaries: the 
DNR is not merely a functioning democracy; it is an example of democracy for the rest of 
Europe. Furthermore, the democracy of the DNR is not compared with Ukraine, but rather 
with Western countries- the observers’ home countries. Without exception, the home 
                                                          
125 They publish, for example, all official announcements, which apply only to the people living there.  
 
126 One of the observers, was Johan Bachman, a Finnish citizen who tried to open a ‘representative office’ for 
the DNR in Helsinki and who is well acquainted with Putkonen (yle 2014).  
 
127 Which ‘people’s Soviet’ deputy Miroslav Rudenko claims is one of the purposes of the primaries from 2 Oct. 
(21:08).  
 
128 From 2 Oct. (21:03, DoNi sample).  
 
129 From 2 Oct. (16:53 (DoNi sample). 
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countries of the observers and their mainstream media see the DNR as Russia backed 
separatists and thus do not confer the elections with any legitimacy. The audience of DoNi 
news in these countries is thus probably limited to a group that is already sympathetic to the 
DNR. These people are likely very critical of their own states and thus more likely to agree 
with the observer’s claims that democracy in the West does not work properly. This might 
explain DoNi’s ambitious coverage of the primaries.  
 
5.3: Conclusion: local primaries with international goals  
 
Elections are a way in which they the population is able to express consent to being ruled. 
Democratization has become an important element in international society, and nearly all 
states at least nominally subscribe to it (Clark 2007). For unrecognized states, democratization 
has become an important legitimation strategy as the ‘internal’ attribute of democracy has 
become an important part of external legitimation (Caspersen 2011). Accordingly, the 
primaries served multiple domestic and international goals. In one way, the election was a 
‘test’ of loyalty of the DNR people to the regime. At the same time, it was a showcase of the 
regime’s power: high turnout rates and a high percentage of votes for ruling elite. Furthermore, 
DAN news is portraying the DNR as a normal functioning democracy. To what extent the 
primaries in the DNR were a genuine show of consent is not clear. However, the DNR 
authorities have tried portray the primaries as a massive show of consent by high turnout rates. 
This is similar to post-Soviet authoritarian regimes (Saikkonen 2017; Birch 2011, 717). 
However, while turnout can be fabricated, consent cannot. Whether the primaries have given 
citizens the idea the DNR is listening to their concerns cannot be concluded from the data. 
However, it seems that the DNR regime has not listened to local concerns as the news 
coverage did not reflect local concerns. On the other hand, as the cessation of hostilities is 
perhaps the most important local concern, making people believe that they are voting ‘for 
peace’ may be a working strategy.  
 
Internationally, it seems that the DNR attach value to being perceived as democratic. 
This seems to corroborate what Clark wrote about democracy becoming an important internal 
attribute for membership of international society, and with Caspersen’s argument about how 
democratization is also an international legitimation strategy of unrecognized states (Clark 
2007; Caspersen 2011). The DNR invited a wide array of international observers that served 
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to confirm to a local and international audience that the elections were democratic. 
Interestingly, both DAN and DoNi went further than merely stating the DNR is a functioning 
democracy. Instead, argue that the democracy in the DNR is better than democracies in the 
EU. The observers mentioned in DAN and DoNi articles are highly critical of their own 
countries and the EU, while being ideologically committed to the DNR or Russia. They thus 
likely serve to propagate an DNR/Russian narrative to Western audiences.  
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Chapter 6: Culture, History and Identity.  
 
Unrecognized states are often based on an ethnic identity. This is not the case for the DNR. 
while some scholars argued that the specific Donbas identity caused the conflict to escalate 
before Russian interference (Kudelia 2014), others argued that while identity did play a role, 
the conflict was primarily caused by Russia (Aslund 2014; Wilson 2016). What is relatively 
understudied, is how the DNR have engaged on an identity building project after their break 
with Kyiv (Abibok 2018).130 Identity and culture are multifaceted concepts. In this thesis I 
have marked text as being about culture when they were about cultural events or about the 
culture of the people living in the DNR. I understand identity as something that is expressed 
in text when DAN news writes about the characteristics of the DNR people. Identity thus 
comes through in texts about history and culture.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 14. Articles by time sample      Fig 15. Subcategories  
 
At first glance the population of the DNR seems to have most in common with (parts of) their 
parent state. The DNR does not cover the whole of Donetsk Oblast, at both sides of the front 
live ‘Donbas’ people. If they are to protect the DNR people from a ‘genocide’ that Ukraine is 
perpetrating, they need to define who the DNR people are. The following sections will 
investigate how the DNR utilizes history and culture to form a DNR identity. Compared to 
other articles, pieces about history and culture of the DNR are rare. In the English language 
                                                          
130 Although there are some interesting works on the concept of Novorossiya by renowned scholars such as 
Marlene Laruelle, Gerard Toal and John O’Loughlin, this is more related to Russian imperialism/nationalism 
than the DNR specifically.  
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sample, they are not present at all. A possible explanation for this is that these articles are of 
deemed to be of little international importance. They range from the opening of a regional 
museum with a mammoth,131 to the memorial concert of a famous Soviet singer.132 An 
international audience might be less interested in this. 
 
6.1: History  
 
One way of defining a community is through history. Accordingly, as the DNR was founded, 
the leaders sought for a historical predecessor. It was unclear whether this was to be 
Novorossiya, which included the whole of South and Eastern Ukraine, or whether this would 
be something else entirely. The DNR itself does not occupy wholly any geographic or 
historical region. The choice was made to make the ‘Donetsk Krivoj rog Republic the 
historical predecessor of the DNR. This DKR existed from the of February12 until the March 
20, 1918. The DKR was a self-proclaimed short-lived republic in the chaos of the post-
revolutionary Russian civil war. There is no data on how much the ‘citizens’ of the DNR 
know about the DKR. However, the fact that at the end of each article about the DKR there is 
an explanation about it indicates that people know little about it.133 In a memorandum on the 
of February 6 the DNR leadership decided to declare the DNR to be the historical successor 
of the DKR.134 The deputy speaker of parliament Andrej Purgin explains why having being 
the historical successor to the DKR is good for the DNR: ‘It is like a call to remember, that 
we were once united in such an interesting and mighty way’.135 The DNR occupies part of the 
                                                          
131 From 30 Jan. (16:32, Avdiivka sample): Останки мамонта вернутся в экспозиционный зал Донецкого 
республиканского краеведческого музея. ‘The remains of a mammoth return to the exposition hall of the 
Donetsk Republican museum of local history.’  
 
132 From 17 Feb. (20:29, Identity Documents sample): Вечер памяти знаменитой певицы Анны Герман 
собрал в Макеевке более 400 зрителей. ‘Evening of remembering the famous singer Anna German in 
Makeevka attracted more than 400 spectators.’  
 
133Similar to the articles about the Minsk agreements, there is a copy-pasted paragraph at the end of each 
article: Feb. 12 (5:30;16:07; 18:50) 
 
134 "Депутаты Народного Совета провозгласили ДНР преемником Донецко-Криворожской Республики." 
DAN-News. Feb.ruary 06, 2015. Accessed Oct.ober 04, 2018. https://dan-news.info/politics/deputaty-
narodnogo-soveta-provozglasili-dnr-preemnikom-donecko-krivorozhskoj-respubliki.html. ‘Deputies of the 
peoples Soviet proclaimed the DNR to be the successor of the Donetsk-Krivoy rog Republic’.  
 
 
135 12 Feb. (5:30, Minsk sample): ‘«Это как бы призыв вспомнить, что мы когда-то были едины в таком 
интересном и мощном образовании»’  
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former territory of the DKR. However, they do not claim the whole territory that the DKR 
covered. The DNR sees more similarities than territory with the DKR: as the DKR was a 
‘people’s republic’ their system of governance is also taken as an example for the DNR.136 
Indeed, the situation of the DNR now and the DKR then is seen as similar.137 On the 12th of 
February a meeting was organized in celebration of the 97th anniversary of the DKR.138 Again, 
it is highly doubtful that, as the article claims, hundreds of citizens came out in genuine 
support of remembering the DKR. The citizens that are quoted in the article supposedly came 
out to protest Kyiv’s aggression and in support of their rights to speak Russian. A participant 
is quoted: ‘I came out today to support the DNR and our region. We want to keep our rights 
and want to talk in Russian’.139 This sentence echoes normal DNR and/or Russian propaganda 
and is completely unrelated to the DKR. The memorandum on becoming the historical 
successor of the DKR is a sign of a search for a historical identity that the DNR can build on. 
 
Another important part of DNR historical identity is WWII. This was also a major part 
of Soviet identity, where it was known as the ‘great patriotic war’. WWII comes up once in 
the Minsk time sample: an official is quoted comparing the current situation of Ukraine to that 
of Nazi Germany. He notes that after Germany lost WWII they started compensating the 
victors for their losses. According to him, so should Ukraine.140 The comparison is only part 
of the role WWII plays in DNR historical legitimation. In the Soviet Union, and afterwards in 
                                                          
136 From 12 Feb. (18:54, Minsk sample). «Девяносто семь лет назад в Харькове создалась Донецко- 
Криворожская Республика с четырьмя тысячами депутатов, избранных от своих регионов. Это та основа, 
та связь с нашей землей, связь с государственностью, которая позволяет нам сейчас строить наше 
будущее». ‘Ninety years ago in Kharkov the Donetsk-Krivoy rog Republic was founded with four thousand 
deputies, chosen from their regions. Such a basis, such a relation with our land, our state, allows us right now to 
build our future’. Quote from Purgin. 
  
137 12 Feb. (18:50) Пургин обсудил историческое наследие Донецко-Криворожской Республики с внуком 
Артема и писателем Владимиром Корниловым. ‘Purgin discussed the historical heritage of the Donetsk-
Krivoy rog Republic with the grandchild of Artyom and the writer Vladimir Kornilovym'. ‘Artyom’ was a 
revolutionary and one of the founders of the DKR.  
 
138 12 Feb. (16:07, Minsk sample).  
 
139 From 12 Feb. (16:07, Minsk sample): «Я сегодня вышел поддержать ДНР и наш регион, — рассказал 
участник митинга Никита Шевченко. — Мы отстаиваем свои права, хотим говорить на русском языке».  
 
140 From 12 Feb. (19:39, Minsk sample): «Мы считаем, что каждый должен отвечать за свои поступки. Вот 
Германия проиграла Вторую мировую войну и вынуждена была компенсировать нанесенный ущерб 
странам-победителям. ’We consider that each must answer for their own deeds. Just like Germany lost the 
Second World War and had to pay compensation for the damage to the victorious countries’ Quote from Igor 
Bilodid.  
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much of post-Soviet states, a myth was created about the Soviet people beating the Nazi 
Germans together. Ukraine, with its rehabilitation of Stepan Bandera, is going against this 
myth. Ukrainian nationalists that fought against the Soviet Union such as Bandera have long 
been described as Nazis in the Soviet Union. As shown in the previous section, the DNR and 
Russian propaganda still depict Ukrainian nationalists as Nazis. The DNR argues Ukraine is 
rewriting history. This is particularly painful as rehabilitation of Ukrainian nationalists goes 
against the myth of the Great Patriotic War. For example, in an article about a meeting in 
Donetsk about the Minsk agreements a director of a school is quoted saying that the 
Ukrainians ‘(…) tell in lessons in schools that we are not Slavic at all, but Arian’.141 The view 
that Ukrainians are rewriting history is further emphasized in an interview with ‘People’s 
teacher of the USSR’ and WWII veteran Viktor Shatalov. He is quoted saying that the 
Ukrainians ‘Distort history’, making heroes out of ‘Nazis and traitors’.142  
 
The myth of the great patriotic war is supported by Russia. In the DNR, this is obvious 
by the involvement of the ‘Russian center’. Russian center was formed with the goal to 
further the integration between the Donbas and Russia along mostly cultural lines.143 It is this 
Russian center which propagated the DKR story in 2015, while in 2017 they are busy with the 
Soviet great patriotic war myth. They, together with local writers, wanted to make Fadeev’s 
‘the young guard’ a part of the school curriculum again. This book is about a partisan 
organization that existed in Krasnodon. 144 Bringing back this novel in the school curriculum, 
they argue, is good to instill patriotism in the youth, although they do not mention to with 
country.145 The answer to this question may lie in the use of Russian and relations with Russia.  
                                                          
141 From 18 Feb. (13:03, Identity Documents sample): И теперь, не дождавшись новых учебников, на уроках 
в школах рассказывают, что мы вовсе не славяне, а арии,(…). ‘And now, not waiting for the new school 
books, they tell in lessons in school that we are not Slavic at all, but Arian (…). ’  
 
142 From 2 Oct. (13:08, Primaries times sample): Неправильно и то, что сегодня в Украине искажают 
историю, делая из нацистов и предателей героев. ‘It is wrong that today in Ukraine they are distorting 
history, making heroes out of Nazis and traitors.’  
 
143 Русский центр основан с целью усиления процессов интеграции Донбасса с РФ в гуманитарных, 
социальных и культурных аспектах (.). ‘Russian center was formed with the goal of strengthening the 
processes of integration of the Donbas with the RF in the Humanitarian, Social, and Cultural aspects(…). ’ 
https://dan-news.info/category/regions  
 
144 In Luhansk Oblast, renamed Sorokin in 2015 under Ukraine’s decommunization laws (but not implemented 
as it is now occupied by Russia in the LNR).  
 
145 From 29 Jan. (16:55, Avdiivka sample): «Необходимость воспитания у молодежи патриотизма требуют 
возвращения романа Александра Фадеева «Молодая гвардия» в школьный курс литературы ( .). ‘The 
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The DKR would for many people not be something they can readily identify with. In 
the Donbas there is a significant amount of nostalgia for the Soviet Union, particularly among 
the older population. Choosing a short-lived republic that was later incorporated into the 
Soviet Union as a historical predecessor is odd (Kuzio 2015). Moreover, it is completely 
different than the older and imperial Novorossiya. Suslov argues that the switch was made 
because of the collapse of the Novorossiya project: the South of Ukraine was not conquered 
by Russian troops and the ‘revolution’ was contained to (parts of) the Donbas. This required a 
more regional identity, hence the sudden focus on the DKR (Suslov 2017, 209). As a concept 
of regional identity the DKR reference works. However, it cannot be as strong as the regional 
identities in ethnic separatist conflicts in, for example, the Caucasus. In this sense the DNR 
has a weak historical base on which to present its separatist claims. This is reflected by their 
struggle to find a historical predecessor. Indicative of this historical confusion is the statement 
by Zakharchenko in 2017 that he created a new state, ‘Malorossiya’ which would replace 
Ukraine (BBC 2017). This was later denied by Kremlin spokesperson Peskov and the leaders 
of the LNR.  
 
6.2: Culture  
 
Activists from Donetsk participate in patriotic events in Russia, presumably as Russian 
patriots and not as DNR patriots.146 As one of the stated goals of the DNR is integration with 
Russia, they are Russian nationalists. In other articles only Russian language is seen as an 
important part of DNR identity. The woman quoted earlier at a meeting about the 97 year 
existence of the DNR emphasizes the language issue. When Pushilin stresses in an interview 
about the just agreed upon Minsk agreements that there are many Russians left in Ukraine 
which the DNR needs to think about.147 He does not emphasize that there are many Donbas 
people left in Ukraine, and Russian speakers are not mentioned anywhere in the time sample. 
Due to the conflict in the Donbas, the linguistic and ethnic makeup of Ukraine has become a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
necessity of education the youth with patriotism requires the return of the novel ‘The Young Guard’ by 
Aleksandr Fadeev to the school subject of literature.’  
 
146 From 18 Feb. (18:10, Identity Documents sample). 
 
147 From 12 Feb. 2-15 (21:20 Minsk sample): Нам важно было переключиться и подумать немного шире о 
той части Украины, где много русских остается. ‘It was important for us to switch and think about those parts 
of Ukraine where a lot of Russians remain.’  
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topic of many articles. Articles in the media tend to oversimplify, and note that in the South 
and East people speak Russian, while in the rest of the country they speak Ukrainian. The 
linguistic makeup of a country is rarely that simple, and Ukraine is no exception. It is true 
however that the Donbas is predominantly Russian speaking. However, not all Russian 
speaking regions in Ukraine are pro-Russian. Basing a separatist identity solely on language is 
untenable. Sure, Donetsk is thought to be a part of the ‘Russkij Mir’ or Russian world, but this 
concept only shows up once in all the articles.148 It is thus unclear whether people from the 
Donbas are Russians or Russian speakers. While, the idea of Russian world does not come out 
strongly in the articles, although the connection with Russia is certainly stressed.  
 
There are other ways of delineating group identity which are not history or language 
such as an article about the burying of a time capsule by members of the ‘young republic’ 
youth organization. Here they take a more ambiguous stand, as the leader is quoted while 
burying the capsule that he wishes that people in the 22nd century will ‘always remember 
those who shed blood on for your native land’.149 Most articles about culture are less dramatic 
though, and are about events,150 or about the history of some cultural institution.151 These 
have a local focus. Cultural institutions of Donetsk remained open during the war as people 
longed for some distraction (Lyman 2015). This is also seen by the DNR. DAN news 
published an article which tells how Zakharchenko organized a day in the planetarium for 
schoolchildren.152 Besides obviously praising Zakharchenko, it recognizes that children need 
                                                          
148 In a quote from Serdyukov, who participated in the primaries 2 Oct. (13:12, Primaries sample): Мы делаем 
это, для чтобы наши дети жили в свободной стране, чувствовали себя частью русского мира. ‘We do it 
(voting in the elections) so that our children live in a free country and felt themselves part of Russian World.’  
 
 
149 From 28 Jan. (16:19 Avdiivka sample): (…) чтобы вы всегда помнили о тех, кто проливал кровь за вашу 
родную землю.  
 
150 Such as this one from 17 Feb. (12:05, Identity Documents sample): Ансамбль «Донбасс» в канун Дня 
защитника Отечества представит новую программу в прифронтовой Горловке. ‘Ensemble ‘Donbas’ in the 
cadre of the Day of the protector of the Fatherland presents a new show in the frontline town of Horlivka.’ ‘This 
holiday is an originally Soviet holiday still celebrated across the post-Soviet space. Ukraine got rid of this 
tradition and celebrates day of the defender of the fatherland on the 14th of Oct.ober.  
 
151 From 1 Oct. (21:27, Primaries sample): Донецкая филармония отметила 85-летие концертом и 
спецгашением художественных почтовых конвертов. ‘The Donetsk Philharmonic is celebration its 85th year 
of existence with a concerts and special artistic envelopes.’  
 
152 From 1 Oct. (16:19, Primaries sample): Глава ДНР организовал ученикам Амвросиевской 
школы-интерната поездку в донецкий планетарий и аквапарк. ‘’Head of the DNR organized a trip to the 
Donetsk planetarium and aqua park for the students of the Amvrosievska boarding school.’ 
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a distraction from war. Articles about cultural event give DAN news the appearance of an 
essentially local newspaper. These are the most numerous in the sample. Perhaps this is why 
DoNi news is not represented in this category. Take for example this article about the Donetsk 
circus giving free masterclasses.153 Or about the Donetsk opera having a new show.154 These 
are essentially local topics, only interesting for citizens of Donetsk. Cultural institutions and 
events are hallmarks of stability much needed in a time of war. In Donetsk, the opera 
remained open even in the hottest phases of the war (Walker 2015). Articles in this category 
do not serve the explicit goal to form DNR identity and do not relate to the Donbas regional 
identity. I would argue that we should see these articles more as messages that life in the DNR 
is similar to life anywhere else. 
 
6.3: Conclusion: Historical Confusion and Culture as a Distraction 
 
If the main priority of unrecognized states is protecting the group they are supposedly 
representing, that group must then be identified. The DNR has trouble with identifying what 
exactly constitutes a ‘DNR’ identity. This results in a confused search for history and for 
identity with regional, Soviet, and Russian elements. The articles in the sample confirm this 
conclusion. At first, the DKR was taken as a historical predecessor of the DNR. Then, focused 
shifted towards Novorossiya. When the Novorossiya project was abandoned, a local, regional 
focus was sought. In the articles about culture in the time samples, identity building seemed to 
play a smaller role than presenting the image that the DNR is a functioning state. The lack of 
articles about history, culture, and identity could be simply because there are other more 
pressing issues to write about such as the conflict, or because the medium of DAN news is not 
used for these articles. 
 
Identity is important for unrecognized states as it may set the stage for external recognition as 
it may legitimize claims for secession (Richards and Smith 2015). Moreover, the condition of 
non-recognition may bolster national identity. Fabry argues that the uncertain status 
unrecognized states live in without the legal protection of being a recognized state produces a 
‘siege mentality’ (Fabry 2016, 27). De Cordier attributes the DNR with a kind of ‘resistance 
                                                          
153 From 17 Feb. (17:25 Identity Documents sample): Артисты донецкого цирка «Космос» проведут серию 
мастер-классов для народных коллективов ДНР. ‘artists of the circus of Donetsk ‘Cosmos’ are holding series 
of masterclasses for folk groups of the DNR’ 
 
154 From 18 Feb. (16:12, Identity Documents sample).  
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identity’, which is based on: ‘the Donbas identity, the legacies of the USSR, the Great 
Patriotic War and anti-fascism, Orthodox Christianity, the freemen identity of the steppe of 
Novorossiya, and anti-colonial resistance.’ (de Cordier 2017, 2). The DNR has a multitude of 
vectors along which they try to create an identity pointing to a confusion about what DNR 
identity should be. Moreover, they have the additional problem of differentiating between the 
Donbas and the DNR identity: yet, there is no specific DNR identity. Cultural affinity with 
Russia a strong marker of Donbas identity. I would argue that the DNR has tried to use a 
siege/resistance mentality based on regional identity. The DNR presents itself as the protector 
of Donbas identity, and Ukraine as going against the Donbas identity.  
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Chapter 7: Patron state engagement.  
The DNR’s patron state, Russia, almost fully controls what happens in the DNR. However, 
Moscow has neither recognized the DNR as an independent state nor annexed it. The forum 
where Russian support is most tangible is the Minsk agreements. Without Russia, the DNR 
would not have been at the negotiation table. The DNR also engages with their patron in ways 
that are more practical. First, Russia can perform recognizing acts that fall short of 
recognition. This can come in various forms, but in the sample, they are mostly related to 
students, sports, and professional groups. Second, Russian citizens can visit the DNR. These 
can be cultural groups or minor officials. And third, Russia lets the DNR participate in events 
in Russia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 16. Russian articles by time sample  Fig. 17. English articles by time sample
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 18. Subcategories Russian   Fig. 19. Subcategories English 
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In unrecognized states, most interaction with the patron state will not be made public due to 
its sensitive nature (O Beacháin et al.2016, 448). This would be the case in the DNR. Russia 
is heavily supporting the DNR both militarily and financially but officially, Russian army has 
never been in Ukraine. In Russian language sample patron state engagement is predominantly 
found in the Identity Documents time sample whereas in the English language sample it is 
more mixed. During the identity documents sample, as its naming suggests, Vladimir Putin 
issued a decree recognizing documents from the DNR/LNR. As such, most articles are from 
that time sample. The Minsk agreements are used in multiple ways by the DNR, some of 
which have already been described in previous chapters. Articles specifically about the 
agreements show up in the Minsk agreements sample, while reference to the agreements 
exists throughout all samples.  
 
7.1: Minsk agreements  
 
Most articles related to the Minsk agreements are not about Russian support, as Russian and 
DNR line is that the DNR is an independent actor in the talks. Rather, the international side of 
the agreements is highlighted. Articles related to the agreements are mostly about Kyiv 
breaking the agreements. Furthermore, in the primaries sample the Minsk agreements feature 
as a legitimation of the elections. During the negotiations in Minsk the DNR with the help of 
Russia had a military advantage on the front line around Debal’tseve. They were thus in a 
strong negotiating position backed by Russia. The DNR’s representative at the Minsk talks 
was Denis Pushilin. In the process of negotiations, Pushilin, backed by Russia, made demands: 
‘a full and comprehensive political settlement of the conflict with Ukraine is possible on if 
that country will have a non-block status and will be neutral in its relations to any security 
union’.155 This statement reflects the subservient role of the DNR in the Minsk talks. While 
nominally an independent actor, they serve mostly Russian interests. It is telling that the first 
article on the February 12 about the Minsk agreements (who were agreed the night of the 11th 
to the 12th) is about Vladimir Putin confirming that the ceasefire will start on the 15th of 
February.156  
                                                          
155 From the 11 Feb. (21:33, Minsk sample) article: «Полное и всеобъемлющее политическое 
урегулирование конфликта с Украиной возможно только в том случае, если эта страна будет иметь 
внеблоковый статус и будет нейтральна по отношению к любым военным союзам» 
 
156 12 Feb. (12:18, Minsk sample): В Минске заключена договоренность о прекращении огня с 15 февраля 
— Путин. ‘In Minsk an agreement is made about a ceasefire from the 15th of February - Putin’  
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The Minsk agreements are taken as an opportunity to start building the ‘state’ on their own 
and with the help of Russia.157 158 Pushilin takes the importance of the Minsk agreements 
further as he presents them as an uneasy solution to the problem which exists, namely, that 
many ‘Russians’ (unclear whether he means Russian speakers or ethnic Russians) are left in 
Ukraine. He argues Russia cannot forget their compatriots still living in territory controlled by 
Kyiv.159 Tellingly, he makes the comparison with the whole of the Donbas and Russia: the 
DNR cannot forget Russians left in Ukraine just as Russia could not forget Russians in the 
Donbas.160  
 
Due to the missing Minsk time sample, there are less articles about the Minsk 
agreements in the DoNi sample. DoNi news takes a similar position to DAN news with 
regards to the Minsk agreements. They portray Kyiv as unwilling to implement them.161 It 
presents the DNR as an independent actor in the Minsk agreements. Articles about the Joint 
Center for Control and Coordination are more positive. The JCCC was created to help 
implement the ceasefire and ensure protection for the OSCE SMM monitors. The JCCC 
consisted of Ukrainian and Russian officers.162 The JCCC was responsible for coordinating 
ceasefires so that essential infrastructure could be repaired. DoNi attributes Russian side of 
the JCCC of having coordinated ceasefires to repair infrastructure damaged by Ukrainian 
shelling which fits with Russian propaganda line that Russia is trying to create peace. 163 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
157 Such as in this 12 Feb. (21:18, Minsk sample) article where Zakharchenko is quoted saying that the 
agreements: «положит конец боевым действиями позволит ДНР и ЛНР заняться мирным строительством 
на благо народа» ‘put an end to the hostilities and allows the DNR and LNR to engage in the peaceful building 
(of their states) for the benefit of the people’.  
 
158 Or as in 12 Feb. (19:25, Minsk sample).  
 
159 Article from 12 Feb. (21:18, Minsk sample): Донбасс сейчас борется не только за свои права, но и за 
права всех жителей Украины – Пушилин. ‘Donbas does not only fight for its own rights, but also for the rights 
of all citizens of Ukraine - Pushilin’.  
 
16012 Feb. (21:18, Minsk sample): Так же как и Россия не смогла забыть и откреститься от нас». ‘Just like 
Russia could not forget about and disown us’.  
 
161 Evident from this headline 17 Feb. (10:51, Identity Documents DoNi sample): ‘Minsk talks – smokescreen to 
prepare AFU offensive’ 
 
162 Russia withdrew from the JCCC in December 2017 
 
163 From 30 Jan. (15:13, Avdiivka DoNi sample).  
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7.2: Recognizing acts 
 
Vladimir Putin signed a decree recognizing the documents given out in the DNR/LNR on 
February 18, 2017. These documents included all types of certificates (death, marriage, birth, 
etc .), as well as passports. Putin made the decision public during the München security 
conference, just after U.S. vice president Mike Pence had strongly judged Russia’s behaviour 
in Ukraine. Additionally, it came right after a flare up of the conflict near Avdiivka, leading 
commentators to argue that the move to recognize documents was made to put pressure on the 
West (Górecki 2017). The decree states that it is guided by humanitarian principles (Putin 
2017). According to the decree, inhabitants of certain regions of the Donetsk and Lugansk 
oblast can now travel to and from Russia without needing a visa. This was a major step 
forward and a major PR victory for the DNR. The first article appearing on DAN news about 
the decision is a summary of the decree. In a second article Pushilin is quoted saying that the 
decree was ‘long awaited’ by the people of the Donbas,164 and thanked president Putin. In a 
subsequent article, Zakharchenko also gets the chance to thank Putin. In stark contrast with 
Western commentators, Zakharchenko sees the decree as proof that Russia ‘(…) supported 
and continues to support the rights of its compatriots and fights for their lives, their culture, 
their language, and, eventually, for their honour and dignity.’165 Thus, DAN employs this 
recognition as a propaganda tool. The recognition of documents is presented as a sign that 
Russia cares deeply about the fate of those living in the DNR. Moreover, Zakharchenko calls 
it the ‘merit of every citizen of the DNR’, although he does not explain how the citizens of the 
DNR influenced this decision.166 In total, only three articles are dedicated to this decision. 
One would expect more importance given to this event.  
DoNi news has the same number of articles about the recognition of identity 
documents. They cite Zakharchenko saying: ‘If the Motherland is supporting our struggle 
openly and safely, it means that this struggle is righteous.’167 This statement confirms the 
                                                          
164 From 18 Feb. (18:55, Identity Documents sample): Пушилин назвал долгожданным указ о признании в 
РФ документов, выданных в ДНР и ЛНР. ‘Pushilin called the decree about the recogniztion of documents 
issued by the DNR and LNR by Russia long awaited.’  
 
165 From 18 Feb. (19:28, Identity Documents sample): (…) Россия поддерживала и будет поддерживать 
право своих соотечественников бороться за свою жизнь, свою культуру, свой язык и, в конце концов, за 
свои честь и достоинство» 
 
166 Same article, Это признание заслуг каждого жителя Донецкой Народной Республики. 
 
167 From 19 Feb. (15:05, Identity Documents DoNi sample).  
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DNR sees Russian acts such as these as contributing to their struggle for independence. 
Aimed at an international audience, DoNi news exploits Russia’s recognition of identity 
documents as a major victory for the DNR. The OSCE was strongly against Russia’s move of 
recognizing identity documents, arguing that this was a step in the eventual recognition of the 
republics (Gutterman 2017). It is unclear how much Putin’s decree changed the situation on 
the ground. Russian border guards at the border uncontrolled by Kyiv may have long turned a 
blind eye to people travelling with DNR/LNR passports. Furthermore, many people may have 
already owned a Russian passport. In other unrecognized states Russia has started a process 
called ‘passportization’ in which it gives residents of these entities Russian citizenship 
(Nagashima 2017). To what extent this has already happened in the DNR is not clear. 
Furthermore, in Ukraine having double citizenship is illegal but the government has no way of 
checking if people have double citizenship. Therefore, before the conflict many people in the 
Donbas could have already had Russian citizenship (Hoffmann and Chochia 2018). So far the 
recognition of identity documents has been the biggest recognizing act Russia has made 
towards the DNR.  
 
7.3 Russian visits to DNR and vice versa 
 
Besides large acts such as the recognition of documents, Russia engages with the DNR in 
other ways. This can be the visiting of the Donbas by Russians. One example already 
mentioned of such visits was the meeting between the writers’ union of Russia and writers 
from the DNR. This article is mostly about returning the novel ‘the Young Guard’ by Fadeev 
into the school curriculum. However, it also shows that the DNR is engaging with Russia on a 
‘low politics’ level. Indeed, the meeting is described as ‘(…) strengthening the cultural ties 
between Russia and the young republic.’168 The ‘Russian Center’ in Donetsk thus plays a key 
role in Russian engagement with the DNR. Another example of the DNR working together 
with Russian organizations on a low level is the cooperation of the DNR with Russian 
organizations from the regions. For example, on the 17th of February the ice hockey 
federations of the DNR and Chechnya signed a cooperation agreement.169 Signing such an 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
168 from 29 Jan. (16:55 Avdiivka sample): (…) укрепление культурных связей России и 
молодых республик. 
 
169 From 17 Feb. (18:33, Identity Documents sample): Хоккейные федерации ДНР и Чеченской Республики 
71 
 
agreement is a way in which the DNR is presented as having close relations with Russian 
officials. Moreover, cooperation with Russian regions is less risky for Russia. 
The Identity Documents sample has articles about a delegation from occupied Crimea 
going to Donetsk. Head of the delegation was Andrej Sobolev who is a member of the 
federation council in Russia as well as a member of the executive organs of the Sevastopol’ 
city administration. Sobolov was accompanied by Russian music ensemble ‘Music-X’ 
performed in the program ‘We are one family’. This visit is described as ‘(…) marking the 
beginning of a new stage of cultural cooperation between the DNR and Russian city of federal 
significance’.170 The title of the program alludes to the Russkij Mir ideology which sees the 
Donbas and Russia as parts of a civilizational space. Likewise, in symbolic fashion Sobolev 
gifted Zakharchenko a golden bell as a sign of the unity of their respective regions.171 There 
are obvious similarities between Crimea and the Donbas as both are products of Russian 
military intervention in Ukraine. Indeed, Sobolev emphasizes that they are both products of 
the so-called ‘Russian spring’.172 These articles serve the same purpose as the aforementioned 
articles about DNR groups going to Russia. By describing visits of groups and officials from 
Crimea (which the DNR recognizes as Russian territory), DAN news is presenting the DNR 
as an independent state that aspires to have closer relations with Russia. Moreover, although 
Russia, the patron state, does not recognize the DNR officially, regions of Russia appear to 
have the freedom to engage with the DNR. Alternatively, they could be pressured into 
engaging with the DNR. Engaging with the DNR might also be a way of showing loyalty to 
the Kremlin. On the other side, for the DNR media, the engagement with Russia provides a 
welcome opportunity to prove the DNR integration process with Russia is going well. The 
timing of these articles strengthens this assumption: they appear just as Russia recognized 
identity documents given out in the DNR.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
подписали соглашение о сотрудничестве. ‘Hockey federations of the DNR and the Chechen Republic signed 
an agreement about cooperation.’  
 
170 From 19 Feb. (16:15, Identity Documents sample): (…) положив тем самым начало новому этапу 
культурного сотрудничества между ДНР и российском городом федерального значения. 
 
171 From 19 Feb. (14:56, Identity Documents sample): Член Совфеда от Севастополя передаст Главе ДНР в 
подарок символ города как знак единения регионов. ‘Member of the federation council will give the head of 
the DNR a symbol of the city as a gift as a sign of the unity of regions. ’  
 
172 from 19 Feb. (20:22, Identity Documents sample): «Вместе с Донецкой и Луганской Народными 
Республиками мы ровесники «Русской весны», —сказал, выступая в театре Соболев. ‘Together with the 
Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics we are contemporaries of the ‘Russian Spring’.’  
 
72 
 
Relations between the DNR and Russian regions are highlighted again in an article about 
DNR students participating in Russian patriotic events. Although no high officials were 
delegated, still people with official sounding titles were sent.173 Other articles also describe 
the participation of delegations from the DNR in Russian events or conferences.174 This is 
interesting as in the other samples there is a distinct lack of such articles. This could be a 
coincidence, and further research with a larger sample could establish whether articles about 
DNR-Russian engagement are published more during periods in which Russia officially 
performs a recognizing act. Articles about visits to Russia serve to cement the relationship 
with Russia. Articles about, for example, young people participating in competitions in 
Russian regions illustrate that the DNR is already cooperating with Russia in many aspects.  
Surprisingly, the DoNi sample has no articles about such visits. One would expect that 
the visit of a Crimean official to Donetsk would be good propaganda material for DAN as 
well as DoNi. Possibly the material is again ‘too local’, similar to articles about cultural 
events. Moreover, it might just not be sensational enough: DoNi writes in alarmist headlines 
mostly about war. The visit of a Crimean official with a Russian pop group does not fit in 
with their usual work. Again, there is a remarkable absence of DoNi articles about delegations 
from the DNR visiting Russia. The only such article is, in DoNi style, about children flown to 
a Moscow hospital to receive treatment.175 There is a general absence of DoNi articles on 
patron state engagement beyond translations of articles about Minsk or the recognition of 
identity documents. I would argue this is because the ‘international’ engagement of the DNR 
with Russia has a primarily local character and DoNi does not report on local events except 
for war related issues.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
173 From 18 Feb. (18:10 Identity Documents sample): (…) командир центрального штаба Республиканских 
молодежных студенческих трудовых отрядов Павел Анацкий и комиссар центрального штаба Максим 
Жусупов. (…) ‘the commander of the general staff of the republican student labor brigades Palev Anatskij and 
the Kommisar of the general staff Maksim Zhusupov.’  
 
  
174 Such as 18 Feb. (15:45; 18:03; 18:40 Identity Documents sample).  
 
175 From 28 Jan. (17:31, Avdiivka DoNi sample): 13 Donetsk children sent to Moscow for treatment - 
TV Report.  
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7.4: Conclusion: Recognizing acts short of Recognition  
States can interact with unrecognized states in different ways (Ker-Lindsay 2018, 364). The 
patron state interacts most with the unrecognized state it supports. In the case of the DNR, the 
patron state fulfills first and foremost the role of security guarantor as the conflict is still 
ongoing. However, as argued above, such a form of interaction will not be made public. 
Considering the situation in the Donbas, the DNR will not publish records of how much 
Russia helped them militarily. What stands out more in the samples is interaction with Russia 
on a smaller scale, such as interaction in the cultural sphere and interaction with Russian 
regions. Most articles about Russian visits to the DNR and vice versa were from the Identity 
Documents sample. While one of the self-professed goals of the DNR is to build an 
independent republic, paradoxically, integration into Russia is also a stated goal. Articles 
about patron state engagement support both these directions. On the one hand, the 
engagement is depicted as distinctly international. On the other, articles depict this 
engagement as a sign the DNR is integrating with the ‘motherland’. This corresponds to the 
foreign policy options of other post-Soviet unrecognized states; there is a constant strain 
between relying on the patron state and claiming independent existence and unrecognized 
states exist somewhere on a spectrum of more dependent and more independent (Berg and 
Vits 2018, 402-403). The DNR is on the dependent end of the spectrum. The rhetoric of DAN 
news discussed above in all three segments of patron state engagement presents the DNR as a 
part of Russia. Perhaps this is a sign the DNR has not completely given up the idea of being 
annexed by Russia.  
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Chapter 8: International Engagement. 
There is significant variation in how unrecognized states engage with countries besides their 
patron state. Some unrecognized states have extensive international connections, such as 
Taiwan. Others are more isolated and rely almost exclusively on their patron, like South 
Ossetia. For unrecognized states, any interaction with the outside world contributes to their 
(perception of) recognition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 20. Russian articles by time sample  Fig. 21. English articles by time sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 22. Subcategories Russian   Fig. 23. Subcategories English  
International engagement exists in three forms in the samples: 1) articles which may or may 
not be intended for an international audience that are about international engagement 2) 
articles not specifically about international engagement intended for an international audience, 
and 3) articles specifically about international engagement for an international audience. This 
section will discuss all three but will focus on the first and the third forms as the second form 
has already been discussed in previous chapters. Most articles in the DAN news sample are 
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related to the Minsk agreements and the OSCE.A minority is related to foreigners visiting the 
DNR. In the DoNi sample, Minsk and the OSCE show up, but most articles are about various 
types of international affairs.  
 
8.1 Minsk and the OSCE  
 
As described in the previous chapters, the DNR media uses the Minsk agreements in multiple 
ways: to stress patron state support, and to discredit Kyiv. The Minsk agreements and the 
SMM, are used as international platforms. The OSCE is the only international organization 
the DNR is in intensive contact with. The Minsk agreements and the OSCE SMM are used by 
the DNR to engage with the outside world. Another way is drawing attention to their claim 
that Kyiv does not adherer to the agreements. The goal is the same: trying to get international 
attention through the Minsk process. A good example of this is the petition that was prepared 
in the DNR in February 2017. It was an ‘appeal from the People’s Soviets of the DNR and 
LNR to the leaders of Russia, the U.S.A., and Germany with the request to stop the genocide 
of Donbas from the side of Ukraine.176 Such a petition does not have any real international 
consequences as none of the states it is directed to recognize the DNR. However, it does 
provide citizens with the idea that the DNR is taking action against Ukraine on an 
international level. To add strength to this petition, there was also a march through the centre 
of Donetsk with the same purpose. The Head of the ‘parliamentary faction’ of the Donetsk 
Republic movement explained that the Minsk process is the way the world ‘listens’ to the 
Donbas.177 The Minsk agreements are the only international forum in which they participate 
and are supposedly listened to. In the article about this march a woman is quoted saying that 
their efforts will direct the attention of international society to the ‘criminal junta’ that is 
‘rewriting history’.178 Again, such protests will not convince the leaders of international 
society that Ukraine is perpetrating a genocide of the Donbas.  
                                                          
176 From 17 Feb. (10:56, Identity Documents sample): обращения председателей Народных Советов ДНР и 
ЛНР к лидерам Российской Федерации, США и Германии с просьбой остановить геноцид Донбасса со 
стороны Украины.  
 
177 From 18 Feb. (13:03, Identity Documents sample): «Благодаря встречам в Минске нас услышал мир, и 
они знают правду (…). ‘Thanks to the meetings in Minsk the world listened to us, and they know the truth.’  
 
178 From 18 Feb. (13:03, Identity Documents sample): Мы уверены, что наши усилия направленные на 
привлечение внимания международного сообщества к тому, как преступная хунта переписывает 
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The DNR criticizes the OSCE, arguing that the SMM does not do enough to observe alleged 
Ukrainian crimes.179 The same day Plotnitskij and Zakharchenko announced their 
‘humanitarian aid’ program for the Donbas they had a meeting with deputy head of the SMM 
Aleksander Hug. Zakharchenko is quoted by DAN saying that after this meeting European 
states will have some ‘hard mental work’ to do.180 DAN news and the DNR deem these 
meetings to be important. However, the OSCE does not publicize these meetings in the same 
way. Zakharchenko alleged that the SMM is ignoring ceasefire violations by the Ukrainian 
side. Moreover, he said he is unwilling to pull back any arms if the Ukrainians do not do so 
first. According to DoNi, ‘Alexander Hug responded to all charges with stock phrases and 
appeals to observe the Minsk agreements.’181 Furthermore, during the flare up of the conflict 
around Avdiivka, Pushilin was quoted by DoNi saying that the OSCE monitoring is 
‘insufficient’ because it does not record the calibre used and does not point out the violator.182 
According to DoNi and the DNR, the violator is always Ukraine. The criticism of the SMM 
goes together with a rhetorical commitment to the Minsk agreements.  
 
8.2 Foreigners visiting the DNR and vice versa  
 
Another way of engaging with international society, as we have seen in the previous section 
on patron state engagement, is sending and receiving delegations from other states. Usually 
these interactions are with Russia, but, as described in chapter on democratization, there is 
also engagement with citizens from European states. Undeterred by the international isolation, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
историю (…). ‘We are convinced that our efforts will direct the attention of international society to how the 
criminal junta is rewriting history (…). ’  
 
179 Such as in this 17 Feb. article (15:32, Identity Documents sample): Глава ДНР выразил надежду на 
объективное освещение ситуации в Донбассе наблюдателями ОБСЕ. ‘The head of the DNR expressed the 
hope for an objective covering of the situation in the Donbas by the observers of the OSCE.’ 
 
180 From 17 Feb. (13:16, Identity Documents sample): «европейские государства задумаются, для 
Европы начнется тяжелая умственная работа». ‘European states will have to think, for Europe heave mental 
work is starts.’  
 
181 From 17 Feb. (19:12, Identity Documents DoNi sample).  
 
182 From30 Jan. (19:58, Avdiivka DoNi sample): “We consider the OSCE SMM activity insufficient. To ease the 
tensions and to settle the conflict it is necessary to clearly identify the violator of the ceasefire, to record the 
caliber of the arms used in shelling and the type of arms used. We urge the OSCE and the JCCC to do anything 
possible to make ceasefire manifest itself into reality, not just into empty rhetoric.” 
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DAN news posted an article about how economists from the DNR have visited over 50 
international and local conferences.183 These apparently included conferences in the U.S. and 
Latvia.184 Moreover, the article notes that economists from the DNR have been published in 
international journals and that the journal of the institute is indexed in the database in Russia, 
Japan, and Google.185 This example shows how something seemingly apolitical is turned into 
a strategy of international engagement. At the same time, it is a sign to the inhabitants of the 
DNR that they are living in a normal state which has international connections. The latter also 
happens in an article otherwise wholly dedicated to the under 10 chess championship: it 
finishes with the remark that the winners will represent the DNR at international 
tournaments.186 Unless those tournaments are in other unrecognized states, these children will 
probably not represent the DNR anywhere. Nevertheless, the message is clear: the DNR is a 
normal state that participates in international affairs like any other state. An article from the 
Avdiivka time sample shows how a visit from international guest is presented. On the January 
28, 2017 American trombone player Nicholas Conn came to visited Donetsk. Conn stated he 
was ‘not afraid of any sanctions, because I believe that playing music for the pleasure of 
people is not a crime.’187 This reminds of the international ‘observers’ at the primaries. 
Willing foreigners are found and used to convey the message that the DNR is a normal state. 
The article further boasts that in 2017 artists from the UK, France, and Greece will visit 
Donetsk. Foreigners are used to portray the DNR as a normal state. These foreigners might 
come to the DNR out of ideological convictions such as Janus Putkonen who runs DoNi news, 
or Giulietto Chiesa who was an international observer at the primaries. However, it is also 
beneficial for the DNR when people visit on apparent apolitical reasons.  
 
                                                          
183 From 18 Feb. (12:46, Identity Documents sample): Ученые-экономисты ДНР в 2016 году приняли участие 
в 50 международных и местных конференциях. ‘Economic scientists of the DNR took part in over 50 
international and local conferences in 2016.’  
 
184 The ‘international’ conferences visited also included Russia and the LNR.  
 
185 From 18 Feb. (12:46, Identity Documents sample): (журнал) индексируется в международных 
наукометрических базах Российской Федерации, Японии, а также Академии Google. 
 
186 From 19 Feb. (17:07, Identity Documents sample): Как ожидается, лучшие юные шахматисты войдут в 
детскую сборную ДНР по шахматам и будут представлять Республику на международных соревнованиях. 
‘As expected, the best young chess players will go into the children’s chess team of the DNR and will represent 
the republic at international competitions.’ 
 
187 From 28 Jan. (18:47, Avdiivka sample): Я не боюсь каких-либо санкций, потому что уверен в том, что 
играть музыку на радость людям – не преступление».  
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8.3 DoNi Articles about International Engagement  
 
DoNi publishes more articles about international topics, seemingly at random, than DAN. 
These articles are to discredit Ukraine and/or the West. Take for example this headline from 
the Primaries sample: ‘Western instructors train Ukrainian military in new torturing 
methods’.188 An article that alleges that Dutch investigators are ‘sabotaging’ the MH17 
investigation also fits in this category.189 There two articles about Trump and Putin talking on 
the phone.190 One of the most interesting articles of this category is an article by Janus 
Putkonen in which he defends his claim that the US had sent 3600 tanks to Europe.191 This 
article has been widely shared (over 40,000 combined views) in international fringe media but 
also broadcast in Russian state media (Nimmo 2017). It has been widely denounce as fake 
news- while 3600 vehicles were indeed transferred to Europe, only 180 of them were actual 
tanks. Putkonen defends his piece by saying that he what he meant by ‘tank’ was an armored 
fighting vehicle and not a main battle tank. Putkonen’s original piece was likely a deliberate 
fake. What is interesting here is that Putkonen had felt the need to respond to these allegations 
of fake news. He finishes the article saying that ‘‘the real "fake news" in the West are those 
mainstream media sources, who are not telling you all these facts and who are accusing as 
liars those of us, who are offering truthful numbers and other concealed information about 
US-EU-NATO aggression.’’192 
Another interesting DoNi article is one that cites a MP from the European parliament, Jean-
Luc Schaffhauser, who argues that the EU should put pressure on Kyiv to make them fulfill 
the Minsk agreements.193 Schaffhauser claimed the EU should threaten Ukraine with 
sanctions if it does not hold substantial talks with the ‘de-facto Donbas authorities’ about 
implementing the agreements. Schaffhauser: is a right-wing French MP famous for receiving 
                                                          
188 From 3 Oct. (15:53 Primaries DoNi sample). Another almost identical article was posted at 18:11. 
 
189 From 30 Jan. (09:00, Avdiivka DoNi sample). 
 
190 From 28 Jan. (11:12 Avdiivka DoNi sample) and 30 Jan. (13:31 Avdiivak DoNi sample).  
 
191 From 17 Feb. (13:57 Identity Documents DoNi sample): '3,600 US Tanks in Europe' - Truth or Fake News 
from DoNi Donbas News Agency? 
 
192 From 17 Feb. (13:57 Identity Documents DoNi sample). 
 
193 From 17 Feb. (19:36, Identity Documents DoNi sample).  
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140,000 euros for brokering a 9-million-euro loan to Front National from a Russian bank 
(Lamant 2014). The final article in this category is about a telephone conversation between 
Poroshenko and U.S. secretary of state Rex Tillerson in which Tillerson allegedly told 
Poroshenko to adhere to the Minsk agreements.194 These articles are all anti-Western in their 
own way and do not seem to have the explicit goal of legitimizing the DNR internationally.  
 
8.4 International legitimation through DoNi  
 
Articles by DoNi have the explicit goal of informing a foreign audience about the events in 
the Donbas.195Almost half of DoNi articles in the time sample are translations of Russian 
versions. As such, many articles are about the conflict. Nevertheless, if the only goal of the 
regime was just to have a translation of their media, they could just have translated all DAN 
news articles. Instead, Putkonen and Néant have started their own company out of ideological 
conviction to bring Donbas pro-separatist news to a wider audience. Putkonen and Néant are 
actively trying to participate in what they see as an ‘information war’ between Russia and the 
West. This translates into a main difference between DAN and DoNi. DAN news may publish 
short articles about cultural events that took place, effectively working as local newspaper. 
Furthermore, they publish articles from time to time that do not relate to politics or the 
situation in the DNR. The intended audience of DAN would be the people living in the DNR. 
These people read the DNR news because they want to know what is going on in their place 
of residence. DAN news is one of many Russian language sources propagating Russian/DNR 
view. Thus, DAN readers are similar to any other audience for a newspaper focused on a 
particular geographic area.  
DoNi readers are of a different category. I would argue that while Putkonen and Néant 
may intend to reach a wide international audience, they mostly reach people who are already 
convinced the ‘Western’ media is lying to them. They are mostly targeting those in the EU, as 
their DoNi press center publishes in English, French and Italian. This has an influence on the 
type of articles they publish which are less of a local character. Moreover, regime 
performance and state building are mentioned less, as the articles in these categories were 
                                                          
194 From 18 Feb. (17:12 Identity Documents DoNi sample).  
 
195 See the https://dninews.com/?q=content/about-us: Main task for DoNi media organization is to collect and 
share trusted and confirmed information from Donbas people's republics, and provide daily publications mainly 
in English for foreign audience. 
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mostly of a local nature. Culture, history and identity do not show up at all in the DoNi 
sample. I would argue that this is also due to the intended audience. The result is that the 
international legitimation strategy of DoNi is focused not so much on proving the DNR is a 
stable state and a democracy as is common in unrecognized states (Caspersen 2015, 190). 
Rather, they focus on reporting the alleged crimes the Ukrainian military and battalions 
commit in the Donbas. DoNi is thus focused on discrediting Ukraine. While they are engaged 
in the external legitimation of the DNR in some way, their scope is broader than only the 
DNR.   
 
8.5: Conclusion: international media and international engagement 
 
The Minsk agreements are seen by DAN news as a platform for international engagement. 
Articles about the Minsk agreements and are highly critical first of Kyiv not fulfilling the 
agreements. DAN news covers international engagement mainly through Minsk. This is 
presented as the only international format through which the world listens to the DNR. 
However, as with other formats in which unrecognized states participate together with 
recognized ones, the main goal is eventual reintegration (de Waal, 2017). As such, the DNR 
rather paradoxically stresses their independence in a forum designed to reintegrate them into 
Ukraine. The message DAN news is sending out to a domestic audience is that the DNR is 
drawing the attention of international actors to alleged Ukrainian violations of the agreements. 
As such, the international engagement articles serve a domestic purpose. The same logic 
applies to articles about international visitors to the DNR- they are primarily meant to show 
that the DNR is considered an actual state by foreigners.  
The international aspect of the DNR media as presented by DoNi should be seen as an 
aspect of the disinformation campaign of Russia against the West. The DAN news articles do 
not fit into this disinformation campaign, as DAN news articles, even those about 
international themes, have a local perspective and are mostly intended for a local audience. 
Studies of the media strategies of other unrecognized states will be necessary to establish 
whether the DNRs use of DoNi to propagate pro DNR and anti-Ukraine and anti-NATO 
information is unique among unrecognized states. Given the contentious nature of the Ukraine 
conflict and the geopolitical faceoff that resulted from it (or caused it), the DNR has more 
need for such a disinformation strategy. Indeed, the events in Ukraine has given rise to a 
polarized information environment (Toal and O'Loughlin 2017, 911). Moscow has the need 
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for such a strategy, as they are heavily involved in the DNRs war for secession from Ukraine. 
As I have showed in the chapter on democratization, the DNR attracts people from the EU or 
other Western countries who are ideologically committed to the DNR. This translates less into 
practical international legitimation strategies, and more into Ukraine bashing to an 
international audience. Consequently, through DoNi the DNR is trying more to discredit 
Ukraine as a member of the international community than to portray themselves as an 
acceptable member.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusion: assessing the legitimation strategies of the DNR  
 
This thesis has drawn on Beetham, Gilley and Clark in order to operationalize the concept of 
legitimacy. Power is seen as legitimate if it conforms to established rules, these rules come 
from shared beliefs by those in power and those subject to power. Moreover, those subject to 
power need to have a way of expressing consent (Beetham 1991). Bruce Gilley holds that 
development, democracy/rights, and governance are key in explaining what makes a state 
legitimate (Gilley 2009). Clark sees external legitimacy mainly as the acceptability of 
membership into the international community that is largely dependent on internal factors. In 
unrecognized states, external and internal legitimacy exist in degrees. These entities embark 
on legitimation strategies, which focus on the building blocks of legitimacy most important to 
them. The research presented in this thesis aimed to contribute to research on unrecognized 
states as well as the conflict in Ukraine. It has done so by examining the ‘state’ media of the 
DNR, asking the question: how does the DNR attempt to legitimize itself domestically and 
internationally?  
 
9.1: Discrediting Ukraine as a Legitimation Strategy 
 
The category of ‘conflict and security’ was by far the biggest in both Russian (41%) and 
English (53%) language samples. Ensuring security is an important legitimation strategy for 
all unrecognized state. Security is provided by themselves or with the help of a patron state. In 
the category of ‘conflict and security’ the most prevalent articles were small articles about 
how many times Kyiv had attacked the DNR. These articles are a consequence of the conflict. 
However, they also serve another function which is framing the conflict as a war of the 
Ukrainian army against DNR civilians. The vilification of Ukraine becomes particularly 
visible in the subcategory of ‘Ukraine immoral’ were the side of Kyiv, primarily the battalions, 
are credited with having conducted or planning to conduct horrible acts against the civilian 
population. Additionally, the Ukrainian army is described as demoralized or incompetent. The 
legitimation strategy of providing security in the DNR is centered on discrediting Ukraine It 
presents the DNR as the protector of the population of the Donbas, which Ukraine is trying 
destroy. It is used as a domestic and international legitimation strategy. Domestic because it 
asserts the need for the DNR to exist; it is a way to present reintegration into the parent state 
as the worst possible option. DoNi news stood out by its focus on the immorality of Ukrainian 
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actions. It aims to present the DNR defending its population against Ukrainian aggression. In 
doing so, DoNi fits into a wider anti-Ukrainian propaganda campaign.  
Regime performance and state building were the second most used strategies in the 
DAN news sample. This encompassed a broad array of articles in which DAN news credited 
the DNR with having provided something, or more broadly, with functioning as a state. DAN 
news did this by presenting articles that described the institutions of the DNR. Moreover, they 
published articles about the political system. In the Identity Documents sample two types of 
articles particularly stood out: those about the humanitarian aid program and the economy. 
Both were a reaction to the railway blockade put up by Ukrainian battalions in January that 
year. The humanitarian aid program showed the DNR presents itself as being able to provide 
for the people they consider to be their citizens living in Kyiv controlled territories. This is an 
example of how the DNR tries to legitimize itself in opposition to Ukraine; the comparison 
with Ukraine seems to be an essential element in both domestic and international legitimation 
strategies. In the DoNi sample regime performance was less prominent as a strategy. I believe 
this to be due to the essentially local nature of the issues the articles dealt with. The few 
articles published by DoNi were connected to the blockade and presented a favorable image 
of the DNR as opposed to Ukraine.   
Democratization was only present in the Primaries sample. Turnout was a major theme 
in the articles about the elections, reflecting a Soviet and post-Soviet authoritarian pattern. 
The content of the elections was not present in the media. Despite the fact they were primaries 
for local elections, local issues did not come up. Nevertheless, the DAN news presented the 
elections as a massive show of consent to the ruling elite. International observers were used in 
the DAN sample to bolster the legitimacy of the elections in the eyes of the local population. 
In the DoNi sample they served as a tool of international legitimation. In general, the presence 
of foreign observers is a sign that the DNR is aware that foreign election observers are an 
essential part of elections. Moreover, the essential international character of these local 
elections corroborates Clark’s and Caspersen’s argument that democratization has become an 
important element of external legitimacy in general, and in unrecognized states in particular 
(Clark 2007; Caspersen 2011). The elections were compared with elections in the countries 
the international observers were from, and they unanimously concluded that the democracy in 
the DNR is better than in the West. Due to Moscow’s large amount of control over DNR 
internal affairs, any meaningful democratization is not possible. Thus, it seems that the DNR 
primarily prioritizes the international element of democratization.  
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History, culture and identity were topics that came up relatively rarely. Interestingly, the 
DoNi sample boasted not one article related to these themes. I would argue that this the case 
because many of the articles in this category were of an essentially local nature. Establishing a 
group identity is vital if the main claim to legitimacy of the regime is protection of a group. In 
the DNR however the search for identity was a confused one that at times incorporated 
imperial, Soviet, regional, and ‘Russian world’ elements. One constant was the connection 
with Russia, and the partnership with Russia in cultural projects. Most articles about culture 
seemed to illustrate the normality of life in the DNR.  
Without patron state support the DNR would not exist. However, the most essential 
spheres of support do not appear in the media. The exact role the patron state plays in 
providing security is wholly ignored, reflecting Russia’s plausible deniability strategy. 
President Putin issuing a decree recognizing the identity documents given out in the 
DNR/LNR was the most direct act of recognition by Russia. The news coverage of the 
Identity Documents sample however was more focused on smaller recognizing acts such as 
trips of DNR groups to Russia or trips of Russian citizens to the DNR. Patron state 
engagement was presented in two ways: as international contacts, and as steps towards 
integration into Russia. Other international contacts are through the Minsk process and 
foreigners visiting the DNR. Foreigners are deeply involved in presenting a favorable image 
of the DNR to an international audience. People such as Janus Putkonen and Christelle Néant 
disseminate DNR propaganda to a mostly EU audience and as such are part of a wider 
disinformation campaign. Discrediting the parent state is again a vital element of the 
international legitimation strategy of the DNR.  
The connecting element in legitimation strategies, domestic and international, is the 
comparative element. The DNR is presented in opposition to Ukraine. It seems that the main 
strategy of the DNR is to convince their population that life is worse in Ukraine. It seems less 
important to be pro-DNR than to be anti-Ukraine. Such strategies are common in 
unrecognized states (Kemp 2005). Given the tensions between Russia and Ukraine (and the 
rest of Europe) following the annexation of Crimea and the start of the conflict, this strategy 
fits into a broader international campaign by Russia to discredit Ukraine. Therefore, the 
international legitimation of the DNR carried out by the foreigners working at DoNi news is 
inherently connected to the polarized information environment that was created after Crimea.  
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9.2 Discussion  
 
The methodology used has some consequences for the validity of the conclusions. The chosen 
theoretical framework has allowed me to build upon the research of other scholars when 
examining the legitimation strategies of the DNR. Scholarship on legitimation strategies of 
unrecognized states allowed me to analyze DNR legitimation strategies. A disadvantage of the 
chosen theoretical framework is that the outcomes of the research are influenced by the 
framework: legitimation strategies not fitting in the theoretical framework may not have been 
noticed or wrongly interpreted. This touches upon the basic difference between a guided and a 
conventional content analysis. I believe that this problem was reasonably mitigated. The 
initial categories are broad enough to capture most of the content clearly. Furthermore, the 
more detailed categories are still quite broadly conceived. The categories and subcategories 
are designed to be understandable to any reasonably intelligent individual without a 
specialization in international relations or Russian and Eurasian studies.  
The absence of an English language Minsk sample created problems with comparing 
the DAN and DoNi samples. I had no second coder to corroborate my categorization of the 
articles. Finally, the chosen time samples determine to some extent what legitimation 
strategies are present. The selection of the time samples by critical moments has the 
disadvantage that they may not be a good representation of the whole. For example, including 
the Avdiivka and Minsk samples may have caused ‘Security and Conflict’ to be 
disproportionally present. However, the advantage is that it allowed me to examine a wider 
array of legitimation strategies. The limitations described above are limitations inherent in 
qualitative analysis and concern the questions of repeatability and objectivity. The benefit of 
qualitative analysis is that it allows the researcher to explore the reasoning behind certain 
actions. In the study of legitimation strategies, both methods are valuable. Quantitative for 
understanding which strategies are used, and qualitative for how they are used. The research 
presented in this thesis has been of a qualitative nature, as it has explored how legitimation 
strategies as described in theoretical framework have been implemented in the DNR. 
Therefore, the conclusions based on which strategies are most prominent in the DNR need to 
be confirmed by quantitative research. Future research on the online presence of unrecognized 
states could take a more quantitative direction. For example, it could use large N datasets to 
examine to what extent unrecognized states differ in their online presence. Alternatively, it 
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could develop in a qualitative direction and analyze the online output of unrecognized states 
using methods such as discourse analysis. 
 
9.3: Assessment of DNR Legitimation Strategies and their Implications 
 
A tentative assessment to what extent the legitimation strategies of the DNR have been 
successful is based on an understanding of which factors are most important in internal and 
external legitimacy. Comparing the results of the research to the few opinion surveys that are 
available such an assessment is possible. The DNR mainly legitimizes itself domestically by 
emphasizing its role in protecting citizens from Ukraine and by discrediting Ukraine. 
Internationally, the main strategy is also to discredit Ukraine. The most recent opinion poll of 
residents of the DNR/LNR196 shows a deep distrust of the government in Kyiv. Moreover, the 
respondents from the DNR/LNR are strongly in favor of having a special status, within 
Ukraine (35%) or within Russia (33.1%) (Sasse 2017, 11-12, 14). Note how ‘an independent 
country’ does not come out strongly. A poll done by the Donbas Think Tank in spring 2016 of 
605 people in uncontrolled territory (the DNR) and 805 people in controlled territory 
(Donetsk Oblast) is more focused on the issues people face. Asked what they were most 
afraid of, 78% in the DNR mentioned the return of armed conflict to their place of residence. 
As for the perception of where life is better, 33% answered in Ukraine while 49% said there 
was no difference. Moreover, when asked to compare the governments readiness to listen to 
the concerns of people, 43% of people in the DNR said the DNR did better, while 31% saw 
no difference.  
These answers touch upon the most prevalent legitimation strategies the DNR uses: 
security, state building/regime performance, and democratization, corroborating my findings. 
The second and third points fit with Gilley’s conceptualization of what factors are most 
important for legitimacy. Regime performance and state building are essential parts of 
legitimacy, and the DNR claims to provide both factors better than Ukraine. Democratization 
is important for the DNR as an international legitimation strategy. However, it seems that as a 
domestic strategy it may also work, although this may also be due to the poor performance of 
the Ukrainian state on a local level in the Donbas. The emphasis on security may mean that if 
                                                          
196 This poll encompasses the whole of occupied territories. However, due to the similar situation the DNR and 
LNR are in, opinions are likely to be similar.  
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people are worried about their physical safety due to a threat of war, other factors of 
legitimation become less important. In this scenario, providing security may be the most 
effective legitimation strategy. Whether legitimation strategies have been successful in terms 
of Beethams conceptualization of legitimacy is harder to establish. The DNR has not acquired 
power according to the rules. Moreover, while they try to justify their power in terms of their 
beliefs, they seem more focused on delegitimizing Ukraine. Consent is shown in elections, but 
it is unclear to what extent this is genuine consent. Internationally the DNR seems to adhere to 
Clarks theory that democracy has become an important part of external legitimacy. However, 
there is no indication that the DNR has moved in the spectrum of acceptability of 
unrecognized states (Berg and Toomla 2009). The recent elections after Zakharchenko’s death 
were widely condemned by international society, and sanctions against Russia over the 
Donbas are still in place. This is a worrying outcome for Ukraine because it means that 
domestic legitimation strategies of the DNR may be successful to some extent. Internationally, 
DNR legitimation strategies are less successful. However, this does not mean that people are 
likely to choose life in an independent DNR over life in Russia, or life in Ukraine with a large 
degree of autonomy. 
The current conflict is unlikely to be solved without a Russian military withdrawal. 
Nevertheless, in the meantime the government in Kyiv can take some steps to make eventual 
reintegration easier. Attempts by Kyiv to reintegrate the parts of the Donbas controlled by the 
DNR should acknowledge that in the past several years the attitudes of the residents of the 
DNR may have changed. The longer the present situation continues, the harder reintegration 
into Ukraine will be. Kyiv will need to convince the population of the DNR that reintegration 
is positive for them by ensuring safety and stability. However, the grievances of DNR citizens 
with the government in Kyiv cannot be solved only by a PR offensive. Rather, Ukraine should 
be more careful with shelling of areas where people live. Moreover, it may have to guarantee 
amnesty for those who cooperated with the DNR, as amnesty for the rebels is a key feature of 
conflict resolution (Kudelia 2018). The Kyiv government should pay extra attention to issues 
of regime performance and democratization in the parts of Donetsk oblast that it controls. 
Kyiv should clearly demonstrate that people on their side of the contact line have a better life, 
and that the authorities in Ukraine listen to the concerns of the local population. There is a 
large amount of contact between the populations on both sides of the contact line. If people on 
the Kyiv side enjoy an increase in safety and living standards, that information will reach 
residents of the DNR. Considering DNR legitimation strategies rely on discrediting Ukraine, 
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ensuring a better life for those in Ukraine may be the most powerful delegitimation strategy 
Kyiv has at its disposal.  
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Appendix I 
 
This appendix contains all the titles of the articles in Russian language sample. Without 
exception, they are taken from www.dan-news.info. All articles were downloaded and 
converted into PDFs in September 2018.   
 
Minsk Russian Time sample (10-12 February 2015)  
10th of February 2015 
Time   Title  
9:55 За сутки в Донецке под обстрелами 
погибли два мирных жителя, 12 ранены — 
мэрия 
10:59 Украинские силовики 37 раз за ночь 
обстреляли населенные пункты ДНР — 
Минобороны 
11:34 Центру экстренной медпомощи ДНР не 
хватает 700 сотрудников, пополнения 
ждут через несколько месяцев 
12:11 Батальон «Азов» атаковал Широкино под 
Мариуполем, ополчение удерживает 
позиции — Минобороны 
12:15 Украинские силовики целенаправленно 
выпустили «Точку-У» по Донецку — 
Минобороны ДНР 
12:19 Украинские силовики потеряли за ночь 42 
человека убитыми и ранеными — 
Минобороны 
13:21 Новые ограничения на продажу билетов 
«Укрзализныци» не скажутся на ситуации 
в ДНР — Минтранс 
13:27 Сообщение Минсвязи ДНР о 
формировании реестра ИТ-предприятий 
13:51 На День донора в донецкой ЦГКБ номер 1 
собралось втрое больше участников, чем 
ждали медики 
14:41 10 февраля в 19:30 брифинг 
замкомкорпусом МО ДНР Эдуарда 
БАСУРИНА 
15:33 Обмена пленными между ополчением 
ДНР и ВСУ сегодня не будет – омбудсмен 
ДНР 
15:49 В ДНР выстраиваются очереди на 
мобилизацию в ополчение (фото) 
16:17 Взрывотехники МЧС обезвредили 8 
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элементов РСЗО «Град» и «Ураган» в 
Донецке, Горловке и Макеевке 
16:35 Контактная группа в Минске встретится 
после 18:00 — МИД Белоруссии 
19:16 Представитель ДНР на мирных 
переговорах Денис Пушилин прибыл в 
Минск и ожидает начала встречи 
19:32 Обстрел Краматорска – провокация ВСУ, 
направленная на дискредитацию 
ополчения, заявили в Минобороны ДНР 
20:53 В Минске началась встреча Контактной 
группы 
21:00 Офицеры ВСУ бросают свои 
подразделения и скрываются из 
Дебальцево – Минобороны ДНР 
21:02 Минобороны ДНР располагает данными, 
что ВСУ готовят наступление на Донецк 
21:04 Ополчение ДНР заняло все высоты вокруг 
Дебальцево – Минобороны ДНР 
21:28 Внимание! Отмена утреннего брифинга. 
11 февраля в 19:30 вечерний брифинг 
замкомкорпусом МО ДНР Эдуарда 
БАСУРИНА 
23:01 В Минске завершилась встреча 
Контактной группы по урегулированию 
ситуации в Донбассе 
23:05 ДНР и ЛНР передали членам Контактной 
группы предложения по мирному 
урегулированию — Пушилин 
23:26 Совместное заявление полпредов ДНР и 
ЛНР в Контактной группе Дениса 
Пушилина и Владислава Дейнего 
23:37 О прекращении огня пока говорить рано 
— Пушилин 
 
11th of February 2015  
Time Title  
01:04 Возобновление переговоров в Минске 
будет зависеть от готовности, прежде 
всего, Украины дать ответ на 
предложения ДНР и ЛНР – Пушилин 
9:17 ВСУ нанесли удар по центру Донецка, 
снаряд попал в автостанцию «Центр», где 
находилось большое количество людей 
9:57 В результате обстрела станции «Центр» в 
Донецке ранены как минимум 9 человек 
10:12 Обстрел автостанции в Донецке был 
спланированной диверсией — 
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Минобороны ДНР 
10:38 Украинские силовики потеряли за ночь 35 
человек убитыми и ранеными — 
Минобороны ДНР 
11:15 Минтранс ДНР попросил ОБСЕ 
расследовать обстрел железнодорожников 
украинскими силовиками 
11:52 Жертвами обстрела автостанции в 
Донецке стали шесть человек, восемь 
ранены — Минздрав 
12:15 В донецкую автостанцию «Центр» попал 
снаряд калибра 152 мм — мэр Донецка 
12:31 На базе МВД ДНР создан штаб быстрого 
реагирования на обстрелы и диверсии 
13:19 Обмен пленными между ДНР и ВСУ 
отложен из-за бюрократических 
трудностей с украинской стороны 
14:14 В результате сегодняшних обстрелов в 
Донецке погибли 5 человек, 8 ранены — 
данные мэрии 
14:34 В Донецке и Макеевке обезврежены 
неразорвавшиеся снаряды и фрагменты 
ракет — МЧС ДНР 
14:47 Трагедия на автостанции окончательно 
продемонстрировала безразличие Киева к 
жизням мирных граждан – МИД 
14:53 Сообщение Министерства труда и 
соцполитики ДНР о выплатах 
компенсаций пострадавшим от военных 
действий 
17:18 ДНР обеспечена основными 
медикаментами на несколько месяцев 
вперед — Минздрав 
18:01 В ДНР отказались от взимания 
таможенных сборов на импортируемые 
продукты 
19:51 Ополчение ДНР отразило за день 6 атак 
ВСУ в Дебальцево, кольцо вокруг города 
укрепляется – Минобороны ДНР 
19:57 Более 2 тысяч 300 украинских силовиков 
погибли за последние 25 суток – 
Минобороны ДНР 
20:03 Украинские силовики более 30 раз за день 
обстреляли населенные пункты ДНР — 
Минобороны 
20:17 12 февраля в 10:00 брифинг 
замкомкорпусом МО ДНР Эдуарда 
БАСУРИНА 
20:25 Организованная эвакуация из Дебальцево 
в ДНР остановилась, Киев не идет 
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навстречу Донецку – Басурин 
20:26 Контактная группа по Украине 
возобновила работу в Минске 
21:33 Полное политическое урегулирование 
конфликта с Украиной возможно, если эта 
страна будет иметь внеблоковый статус — 
Пушилин 
22:47 В больницу № 20 Донецка попал снаряд 
ВСУ — МЧС 
23:21 В переговорах Контактной группы есть 
положительные подвижки – Пушилин 
 
 
 
12th of February 2015 
Time Title  
05:30 В ДНР отмечают 97 лет со дня создания 
Донецко-Криворожской республики   
10:09 Украинские силовики 55 раз за сутки 
обстреляли населенные пункты ДНР — 
Минобороны 
10:15 Нацистский батальон «Азов» мешает 
эвакуации мирного населения поселка 
Широкино — Минобороны ДНР 
10:25 На выходе из Дебальцевского котла в 
сторону Украины силовиков ждут 
заградотряды — Минобороны ДНР 
11:08 Ночь в Донецке прошла напряженно, 
утром канонада продолжается — мэрия 
12:18 В Минске заключена договоренность о 
прекращении огня с 15 февраля — Путин 
12:43 В случае нарушения Киевом достигнутых 
договоренностей новых соглашений не 
будет — Глава ДНР Захарченко 
13:24 В Донецке учреждено городское 
отделение «Молодой Республики» 
13:38 12 февраля в 19:30 вечерний брифинг 
замкомкорпусом МО ДНР Эдуарда 
БАСУРИНА 
13:49 В Донецке началось празднование 97-
летия Донецко-Криворожской Республики 
14:09 В ДНР создан профсоюз 
металлургической и горнодобывающей 
промышленности 
15:38 Украинские силовики обстреляли 
Куйбышевский район Донецка — мэрия 
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16:07 Сотни граждан ДНР вышли на митинг в 
честь 97-летия Донецко-Криворожской 
Республики 
17:29 Установленный в Минске срок 
освобождения пленных реален для ДНР, 
но затруднителен для Киева — Морозова 
17:33 Киев удерживает 580 пленных из ДНР, 
еще 1500 человек пропали без вести — 
Морозова 
17:52 Зона вещания цифрового телевидения 
ДНР охватила регион от Волновахи до 
Краматорска — Минсвязи 
18:50 Пургин обсудил историческое наследие 
Донецко-Криворожской Республики с 
внуком Артема и писателем Владимиром 
Корниловым 
19:13 13 февраля в 10:00 брифинг 
замкомкорпусом МО ДНР Эдуарда 
БАСУРИНА и министра образования ДНР 
Игоря КОСТЕНКА 
19:25 Реализация подписанного в Минске 
соглашения даст возможность 
многократно нарастить поставки 
гумпомощи в Донбасс – ЦУВ 
19:39 Киеву следует демонстрировать не только 
навыки разрушения, но и созидания – 
ЦУВ 
19:47 ВСУ в Дебальцево дезорганизованы и 
подавлены, все попытки прорвать 
окружение безуспешны – Минобороны 
20:01 Ополчение ДНР сделает все для 
прекращения огня – Басурин 
20:05 За сутки ВСУ потеряли 127 человек 
убитыми, за время активной фазы зимних 
боев — почти 2400 человек, заявили в 
Минобороны   
21:18 Донбасс сейчас борется не только за свои 
права, но и за права всех жителей 
Украины – Пушилин 
 
 
 
Primaries Russian time sample (1-3 October 2016) 
1st of October 2016 
Time Title 
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5:30 В ДНР наступил «День тишины» перед 
первыми в истории Донбасса праймериз 
7:38 ВСУ накануне первого разведения сил 
применили тяжелое вооружение при 
обстреле территории ДНР — источник 
9:52 В Донецке началась передача бюллетеней 
для праймериз участковым 
избирательным комиссиям 
10:00 Активисты «Молодой Республики» за три 
месяца помогли восстановить 16 домов в 
прифронтовом поселке 
10:44 В селе Петровское к югу от Донецка 
началась подготовка к первому 
разведению сил и средств 
11:08 Украинская сторона сорвала разведение 
сил в Петровском — СЦКК 
13:03 ЛНР завершила отвод сил и средств в 
районе Золотого – ЛИЦ 
13:05 Украинские силовики за сутки почти 180 
раз обстреляли ДНР, заявили в 
командовании Республики 
14:10 Пушилин в рамках сдачи норм «Готов к 
труду и обороне» 50 раз поднял гирю в 16 
кг (фото) 
14:12 Глава ДНР организовал ученикам 
Амвросиевской школы-интерната поездку 
в донецкий планетарий и аквапарк 
15:14 1 октября в 16:30 брифинг 
замкомандующего оперативным 
командованием ДНР Эдуарда 
БАСУРИНА 
16:37 Праймериз в ДНР окажут влияние на 
политическую ситуацию во всей Европе 
16:41 Международные наблюдатели в день 
праймериз намерены побывать на 
максимальном количестве участков 
16:46 ВСУ за сутки открывали огонь по 
территории 9 населенных пунктов ДНР – 
Басурин 
16:49 Разведка ДНР сообщила об усилении 
позиций ВСУ танками, БМП и 
автомобилями с боеприпасами 
16:51 Силы ДНР развернули полевые кухни для 
жителей прифронтовых Докучаевска, 
Зайцево, Октябрьского 
21:27 Донецкая филармония отметила 85-летие 
концертом и спецгашением 
художественных почтовых конвертов 
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2nd of October 2016 
Time Title 
00:00 В Донбассе впервые в истории пройдет 
предварительное общественное 
голосование 
7:50 Экологи ДНР начали восстановление 
лесов в районе легендарной Саур-Могилы 
8:16 В Донецке открылись избирательные 
участки, первые в истории Донбасса 
праймериз начались 
8:26 ВрИК заявила, что первые в Донбассе 
праймериз начались без нарушений 
8:46 ВСУ выпустили почти 80 артснарядов и 
мин по окраинам Ясиноватой и Горловки 
– источник 
9:40 В селе Петровском приступят к 
разведению сил 3 октября – Минобороны 
ДНР 
11:00 Мэр Донецка на первых в истории ДНР 
праймериз «проголосовал за будущее 
Республики» 
11:08 Захарченко принял участие в первом в 
истории Донбасса предварительном 
голосовании 
11:13 Правопорядок на праймериз в ДНР 
обеспечивают более 900 полицейских – 
МВД 
11:23 Обращение Главы ДНР Захарченко к 
жителям Республики 
11:37 Праймериз призваны выстроить 
идеальную систему избирательного 
процесса – Захарченко 
12:08 Более 124 тыс. избирателей 
проголосовало на праймериз к 12:00 – 
ВрИК 
12:43 Иностранные наблюдатели за первые 
четыре часа голосования на праймериз не 
выявили нарушений 
13:00 2 октября в 14.00 брифинг 
замкомандующего оперативным 
командованием ДНР Эдуарда 
БАСУРИНА (АДРЕС ИЗМЕНЕН) 
13:06 Праймериз – это шаг к свободе Донбасса, 
заявил один из кандидатов на пост мэра 
Донецка Артем Сердюков 
13:08 Образованию нужны учителя-универсалы, 
компетентные во многих науках 
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13:39 В прифронтовой зоне Донецка наиболее 
активно голосует молодежь – директор 
школы поселка Азотный 
14:11 Разведка ДНР сообщила об усилении 
позиций ВСУ танками, БМП и 
иностранными наемниками 
14:14 ФОТО: Жители прифронтового 
Куйбышевского района пришли на 
праймериз-2016 
14:19 Командование ДНР заявило о полной 
готовности к разведению сил в 
Петровском 3 октября 
14:21 Командование ДНР заявило об 
обострении ситуации на фронте, ВСУ за 
сутки открывали огонь 269 раз 
14:22 Двое бойцов ДНР погибли, еще один 
ранен за сутки в результате обстрелов со 
стороны ВСУ – Басурин 
14:24 Вернувшиеся из Украины и России 
жители ДНР пришли на голосование ради 
улучшения жизни в Донбассе 
14:26 Командование ДНР исключило любую 
угрозу безопасности избирателей на 
праймериз 
14:54 Учителя Донбасса в ходе конфликта 
показали пример мужественности – 
Народный учитель СССР 
15:07 За семь часов предварительного 
голосования на участки пришли более 290 
тыс. избирателей – ВрИК 
15:27 Полиция ДНР не зафиксировала 
нарушений общественного порядка при 
проведении праймериз 
15:33 Голосование среди пациентов 
организовано на высоком уровне – 
главврач республиканской больницы 
15:45 Глава ДНР анонсировал масштабные 
реформы в республиканской системе 
образования 
15:57 Наблюдатели из Италии и Южной Осетии 
заявили, что не ожидали столь высокой 
явки на праймериз 
16:25 Автопробег в поддержку праймериз в 
Донецке собрал 125 автомобилей 
17:44 Фоторепортаж: Ленинский район на юге 
Донецка активно участвует в процессе 
праймериз 
17:45 Репортаж: Праймериз в Калининском 
районе. Выбор шахтеров 
18:06 Количество избирателей 
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проголосовавших на праймериз к 18:00 
приблизилось к 350 тысячам 
18:26 Власти наиболее обстреливаемого района 
Донецка отметили высокую явку на 
праймериз (ФОТО) 
18:40 Рестораторы Донецка напоили горячим 
чаем избирателей центрального района 
столицы 
19:24 Фоторепортаж: Праймериз в самом 
крупном районе столицы – Кировском 
19:45 Наблюдатель из Италии: Не смотрите на 
Европу, стройте свою демократию 
20:00 Избирательные участки закрылись, в 
ближайшее время начнется подсчет 
голосов — ВрИК 
20:32 В ДНР официально начался подсчет 
голосов 
21:05 ВрИК огласила предварительные данные 
по явке избирателей, на участки пришли 
почти 370 тыс. Человек 
21:08 Праймериз пойдут на пользу 
политическим институтам ДНР и ее 
имиджу в мире — депутат 
21:23 Праймериз в Донецке прошли без 
эксцессов – МВД 
22:20 Наблюдателей из Чехии впечатлила 
хорошая организация праймериз на фоне 
большого наплыва избирателей 
 
 
3rd of October 2016 
Time Title 
5:31 3 октября в 10.00. большая пресс-
конференция по ПОДВЕДЕНИЮ 
ИТОГОВ ПРАЙМЕРИЗ 
7:47 ВСУ накануне очередного разведения сил 
обстреляли ДНР из тяжелой артиллерии 
8:43 Минимум девять домов повреждены в 
результате обстрела Ясиноватой со 
стороны ВСУ — администрация 
10:16 В предварительном голосовании приняли 
участие свыше 370,5 тыс. человек — 
окончательные данные ВрИК 
10:19 Мэр Донецка победил на праймериз с 
результатом 83,2% 
10:27 Члены ОД «Донецкая Республика» 
победили в качестве самовыдвиженцев в 
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505 округах из 514 на праймериз 
10:47 ВрИК не исключила продолжения 
проведения праймериз в городах ДНР 
11:38 Командование ДНР предложило Киеву 
начать разведение сил и средств в 
Петровском 3 октября в 15:00 
13:06 ДНР, Украина, ОБСЕ и СЦКК 
согласовали начало разведения сил в 
Петровском 3 октября в 15:00 
13:10 Донецкие медики на избирательных 
участках во время праймериз оказали 
помощь 101 жителю 
13:14 Международные наблюдатели отметили 
высокую организацию всех этапов 
проведения праймериз 2 октября 
13:33 Горняки ДНР с начала года добыли почти 
девять миллионов тонн угля 
15:01 Первое за время конфликта разведение 
сил в ДНР началось в селе Петровское к 
югу от Донецка 
15:03 Донецкие власти намерены вернуть 
жителям прифронтового поселка 
Октябрьский автобус до ж/д вокзала 
15:13 В ДНР завершился первый этап 
разведения сил 
15:52 Силы ДНР вернутся в район Петровского, 
если Киев до 16:00 не подтвердит факт 
отвода своих сил — Басурин 
16:12 ВСУ начали обстрел района Петровского 
с позиций, откуда должны были вывести 
войска – Минобороны 
16:40 ОБСЕ обратилась к украинской стороне с 
просьбой «принять меры», после начала 
обстрела района Петровского 
16:57 Киев сорвал разведение сил в Петровском, 
силы ДНР возвращаются на исходные 
позиции 
18:10 МЧС и Минфин ДНР разделили 1-2 места 
в турнире по шахматам среди 
министерств и ведомств 
19:50 ВСУ за сутки 90 раз обстреляли 
территорию ДНР 
20:24 Разведка ДНР зафиксировала усиление 
позиций ВСУ минометами, танками и 
артиллерией 
 
Avdiivka Russian time sample (28-30 January 2017) 
28th of January 2017 
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Time  Title  
9:45 Огнем ВСУ на юге ДНР нарушено 
газоснабжение, повреждено два жилых 
дома – местные власти 
12:08 Квалификацию водителей троллейбуса и 
трамвая в ДНР за время конфликта 
получили 80 человек 
14:02 Под огнем украинской армии за сутки 
погиб один военнослужащий ДНР – 
командование 
14:10 «Правый сектор» готовит 
провокационные обстрелы объектов с 
хлором вблизи ДФС для обвинения сил 
ДНР 
14:33 Число обстрелов территории ДНР со 
стороны украинской армии за сутки 
возросло до 1270 раз – Басурин 
15:44 Донбасская юракадемия отметила свое 
двухлетие награждением, концертом и 
показом ролика о жизни вуза 
16:19 Донецкая молодежь заложила в 
столичном парке им. Щербакова «капсулу 
времени» для потомков XXII века 
17:04 Нарушенное обстрелами газоснабжение 
села Заиченко на юге ДНР восстановлено 
– местные власти 
17:30 ВСУ обстреляли Докучаевск, прямым 
попаданием поврежден многоэтажный 
дом и магазин – мэр 
18:47 Фоторепортаж: Американский 
тромбонист выступил на донецкой сцене с 
оркестром столичной филармонии 
 
 
29th of January 2017 
Time Title 
9:42 Шесть сел на юге ДНР остались без 
электроснабжения в результате обстрелов 
со стороны ВСУ – власти 
10:16 Село на юге Ясиноватой обесточено в 
результате огня со стороны ВСУ, обстрел 
продолжается – власти 
10:50 ВСУ открыли огонь из тяжелой 
артиллерии по окрестностям Ясиноватой, 
выпущено свыше 70 снарядов 
11:16 ВСУ с вечера выпустили 265 снарядов и 
мин по прифронтовым зонам ДНР вдоль 
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линии соприкосновения 
11:24 Обстрелом со стороны ВСУ повреждены 
два домостроения в Макеевке — 
командование 
12:32 В ДНР за сутки в результате украинских 
обстрелов повреждено пять домов и 
детский сад – Басурин 
12:32 Украинские силовики за прошедшие 
сутки более 1000 раз обстреляли 
территорию ДНР – Басурин 
12:35 ВСУ атаковали позиции ДНР в районе 
Авдеевки, после чего открыли огонь из 
артиллерии – Басурин 
12:38 Армия Украины за несколько часов 
выпустила почти 950 снарядов и мин по 
району Ясиноватой — Басурин 
13:10 Обстрелом ВСУ убит военнослужащий 
ДНР, еще один ранен — командование 
13:27 Депутаты НС ДНР в рамках 
благотворительной акции организовали 
для детей показ спектакля «12 месяцев» 
13:37 ВСУ обстреляли водохранилище 
Верхнекальмиусской фильтровальной 
станции – «Вода Донбасса» 
13:48 Мирный житель ранен в результате 
обстрела Донецка со стороны ВСУ — 
командование 
14:17 Командование ДНР назвало 
подразделение, причастное к обстрелу 
Куйбышевского района Донецка 
14:23 Съемочная группа телеканала НТВ попала 
под обстрел в Макеевке 
15:14 Старейший донецкий клуб юных 
журналистов «Юнпресс» отметил свой 30-
летний юбилей 
16:09 Обстрелами украинских силовиков 
повреждены два жилых дома на юге ДНР 
– власти 
16:22 Нарушенное огнем ВСУ 
электроснабжение шести сел на юге ДНР 
восстановлено – местные власти 
16:48 Мирный житель, раненный при обстреле 
Донецка, находится в состоянии средней 
тяжести – медики 
16:55 Писатели РФ, ДНР и ЛНР предложили 
вернуть в школьную программу роман 
Фадеева «Молодая гвардия» 
17:02 ВСУ обстреляли Донецкую 
фильтровальную станцию, зафиксированы 
повреждения – «Вода Донбасса» 
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17:55 ВСУ готовятся обстрелять 
подконтрольные Киеву территории 
Донбасса из РСЗО «Град» — разведка 
ДНР 
18:08 Обстрел Донецкой фильтровальной 
станции велся из тяжелой артиллерии – 
командование 
18:10 Энергетики ДНР восстановили 
энергоснабжение села на юге Ясиноватой, 
нарушенное огнем ВСУ – мэр 
18:20 Боевики ВСУ за день потеряли 20 человек 
убитыми, свыше 30 получили ранение – 
командование ДНР 
 
 
30th of January 2017 
Time  Title  
9:49 При обстрелах Донецка и Макеевки 
повреждения получили шесть домов, 
школа и котельные — источник 
10:02 Пять многоквартирных домов в Донецке и 
окрестностях остались без газа после 
ночных обстрелов 
10:10 ВСУ с вчера выпустили по прифронтовой 
территории ДНР свыше 200 снарядов и 
мин 
10:27 Электроснабжение шести южных сел ДНР 
нарушено обстрелом со стороны ВСУ – 
сводные данные 
10:30 Украинская армия возобновила обстрел 
Макеевки, школьников эвакуировали в 
подвал – командование ДНР 
10:36 СЦКК согласовал «режим тишины» для 
восстановления ЛЭП на юге ДНР – 
командование Республики 
10:46 Мирная жительница Макеевки погибла, 
три человека ранены при обстреле со 
стороны ВСУ 
10:54 КПП «Майорск» в Горловке попал под 
огонь украинских силовиков – источник 
12:12 Жители ДНР с июля 2015 года усыновили 
более 100 детей-сирот – Госслужба по 
делам семьи 
12:18 Депутаты фракции «Донецкая 
Республика» за осеннюю сессию провели 
368 приемов в отделениях ОДДР 
13:42 Молодые художники ДНР создадут 
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объединение для реализации 
патриотических арт-проектов 
13:52 Заявление полномочного представителя 
ДНР на переговорах Контактной группы в 
Минске Дениса Пушилина 
14:09 ДНР призывает ОБСЕ и СЦКК любыми 
способами добиться от Украины 
реального прекращения огня — Пушилин 
14:23 Украинская армия за сутки почти 2000 раз 
нарушила режим прекращения огня – 
Басурин 
14:42 Число погибших за сутки под обстрелами 
со стороны ВСУ мирных жителей ДНР 
возросло до двух человек 
15:13 Наблюдательный пункт СЦКК под 
Ясиноватой оказался в зоне обстрела со 
стороны украинской армии 
15:49 Потери украинской армии убитыми и 
ранеными за сутки превысили 65 человек 
16:29 Ясиноватский машиностроительный завод 
получил повреждения при обстреле со 
стороны ВСУ 
16:32 Останки мамонта вернутся в 
экспозиционный зал Донецкого 
республиканского краеведческого музея 
16:33 31 января в 9:00 брифинг 
уполномоченного по правам человека в 
ДНР Дарьи МОРОЗОВОЙ, пресс-
секретаря МГБ ДНР Марии ПЕТРОВОЙ и 
военнослужащего ДНР Эдуарда КЛЫПЫ 
17:15 Нарушенное обстрелами ВСУ 
электроснабжение южных сел ДНР 
восстановят к концу дня – Яновский 
17:31 МЧС ДНР в связи с ухудшением погоды 
открыло в Республике 12 мобильных 
пунктов обогрева 
18:11 Обострение на фронте вблизи 
фильтровальных станций под Донецком 
не повлияло на водоснабжение региона 
18:13 Последствия обстрела Донецкой 
фильтровальной станции 29 января 
(ФОТО) 
20:13 Донецкая фильтровальная станция 
обесточена в результате обстрела – «Вода 
Донбасса» 
21:12 Двое мирных жителей ранены при 
обстрелах Донецка и Макеевки 
украинскими силовиками — 
командование 
21:27 Киев потерял убитыми 10 боевиков, еще 
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15 ранены при попытке атаковать позиции 
ДНР под Ясиноватой 
 
 
Identity documents Russian time sample (17-19 February 2017). 
17th of February 2017 
Time  Title  
9:30 Для заполнения рынка ДНР товарами 
отечественного производства 
принимаются все возможные меры – МЭР 
9:42 ВСУ с вечера обстреляли девять 
населенных пунктов ДНР, выпущено 
порядка 365 снарядов и мин 
10:03 Жилой частный дом поврежден в 
Ясиноватой в результате обстрелов со 
стороны ВСУ – местные власти 
10:15 Производители бытовой химии ДНР за 
2016 год выпустили на рынок Республики 
40 новых продуктов 
10:56 Обращение к лидерам Запада и РФ 
подписями поддержали 80 сотрудников 
Минстроя ДНР 
10:56 Сотрудники Гортехнадзора ДНР собрали 
подписи в поддержку обращения к 
лидерам мировых держав 
11:25 ЛНР и ДНР подготовили программу 
гумпомощи жителям подконтрольной 
Киеву территории Донбасса 
12:06 Ансамбль «Донбасс» в канун Дня 
защитника Отечества представит новую 
программу в прифронтовой Горловке 
12:20 Совместное заявление Глав ДНР и ЛНР о 
гуманитарной помощи Донбассу 
12:21 Главы ДНР и ЛНР объявили о начале 
программы гуманитарной помощи 
оккупированному Донбассу 
12:32 Глава ДНР заявил о намерении упростить 
прохождение КПП для жителей 
оккупированной части Донбасса 
12:39 17 февраля в 16:30 брифинг 
замначальника Центра управления в 
кризисных ситуациях МЧС ДНР Виталия 
ЗАРУБИНА 
12:46 Главы ДНР и ЛНР проведут в Луганске 
совместную встречу с замглавы СММ 
ОБСЕ Александром Хугом 
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14:24 Комментарий и.о. министра иностранных 
дел ДНР Натальи Никоноровой 
14:26 Программа помощи жителям 
оккупированного Донбасса имеет 
исключительно гуманитарные цели – 
МИД ДНР 
14:41 Под обстрелами ВСУ за неделю погибли 
восемь военнослужащих ДНР, двое 
ранены – командование 
14:47 Украинские силовики за неделю свыше 6 
тыс. раз открывали огонь по территории 
ДНР – Басурин 
14:53 Встреча лидеров Народных Республик и 
замглавы миссии ОБСЕ проходит в 
Луганске 
14:57 Первый в 2017 году гумконвой МЧС РФ 
прибудет в Донецк 21 февраля 
14:57 Подрыв склада ВСУ под Авдеевкой унес 
жизни пяти украинских военнослужащих, 
семь ранены – Басурин 
15:06 За неделю из украинских подразделений 
под Авдеевкой дезертировал 21 человек – 
разведка ДНР 
15:10 Киев до конца года планирует занять ряд 
населенных пунктов «серой зоны» в 
Донбассе – Захарченко 
15:32 Глава ДНР выразил надежду на 
объективное освещение ситуации в 
Донбассе наблюдателями ОБСЕ 
15:36 Захарченко и Плотницкий подписали 
программу помощи жителям 
оккупированной части Донбасса 
16:24 Гуманитарная программа по 
воссоединению народа Донбасса 
16:33 Саперы МЧС ДНР за неделю обезвредили 
50 взрывоопасных предметов 
17:07 Число подписей жителей ДНР за мир в 
Донбассе превысило 160 тысяч 
17:25 Артисты донецкого цирка «Космос» 
проведут серию мастер-классов для 
народных коллективов ДНР 
18:33 Хоккейные федерации ДНР и Чеченской 
Республики подписали соглашение о 
сотрудничестве 
18:41 Программа помощи жителям 
оккупированного Донбасса начата из-за 
их бедственного положения — Пушилин 
20:15 ВСУ днем обстреляли восемь районов 
Республики из артиллерии и танков – 
источник 
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20:29 Вечер памяти знаменитой певицы Анны 
Герман собрал в Макеевке более 400 
зрителей 
 
 
 
18th of February 2017 
Time  Title  
9:39 ВСУ утром открыли огонь по Ясиноватой, 
обстрел продолжается – местные власти 
11:00 За время военных действий в Горловке 
повреждено и разрушено более 3,4 тыс. 
зданий – мэрия 
11:05 В столице ДНР началось массовое 
шествие против невыполнения Киевом 
Минских соглашений 
12:00 Более 20 тысяч жителей ДНР на митинге в 
Донецке выступили за полную 
реализацию Минских соглашений 
12:46 Ученые-экономисты ДНР в 2016 году 
приняли участие в 50 международных и 
местных конференциях 
13:12 Коммунальщики Енакиево 
присоединились к сбору подписей под 
обращением к лидерам Запада и РФ 
13:47 В аппарате Морозовой заявили о взятии в 
плен украинскими силовиками трех 
жителей ДНР 
14:00 ВСУ за сутки почти 2 тыс. раз обстреляли 
ДНР, под Волновахой замечена тяжелая 
артиллерия – Басурин 
14:01 Под украинскими обстрелами за сутки 
погиб один военнослужащий ДНР – 
командование 
14:17 ВСУ открыли огонь по Спартаку во время 
работы там полевой кухни для 
нуждающихся жителей – Басурин 
15:03 Концертом и возложением цветов 
отметили в Дебальцево вторую 
годовщину освобождения города 
15:29 Количество поврежденных обстрелами 
домов в ДНР за все время боев превысило 
24 тысячи – Минстрой 
15:45 Профсоюзы медиков ДНР и Санкт-
Петербурга намерены подписать договор 
о двустороннем сотрудничестве 
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15:58 Массовое шествие и митинг в центре 
Донецка прошли без нарушений 
правопорядка – МВД ДНР 
16:12 Обновленный состав хора и солистов 
«Донбасс оперы» вернул оперу 
«Турандот» на донецкую сцену 
17:46 В Ясиноватой обстрелом повреждена 
ЛЭП, питающая насосную станцию 
Южнодонбасского водовода 
17:55 Путин подписал указ о временном 
признании в РФ документов, выданных в 
ДНР и ЛНР 
18:03 Представители Минобразования ДНР 
посетили чемпионат WorldSkills Russia в 
Астраханской области 
18:10 Активисты студотрядов ДНР получили 
награды в рамках российской 
патриотической акции «Снежный десант» 
18:40 Музыкальные педагоги ДНР приняли 
участие во Всероссийском семинаре 
руководителей духовых оркестров 
18:46 Обращение к трем мировым лидерам о 
ситуации в Донбассе поддержали свыше 
164 тыс. жителей ДНР 
18:55 Пушилин назвал долгожданным указ о 
признании в РФ документов, выданных в 
ДНР и ЛНР 
19:01 Захарченко выразил благодарность 
России за признание документов ДНР 
19:33 Заявление Захарченко по поводу второй 
годовщины принятия Резолюции Совбеза 
ООН по Минскому процессу 
19:48 Глава ДНР заявил о готовности Донецка 
ко всем шагам для мирного решения 
конфликта в рамках «Минска» 
21:24 Донецкая фильтровальная станция 
обесточена в результате обстрелов — 
«Вода Донбасса» 
 
 
19th of February 2017 
Time  Title  
8:00 Экологи ДНР начали сбор шишек в 
рамках нового этапа восстановления 
лесов после боев 
9:46 Артогнем ВСУ обесточено 
Коминтерново, в Ясиноватой снаряд 
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попал в крышу жилого дома – местные 
власти 
10:10 Подача воды в пять районов Донецка 
частично сокращена из-за нарушенного 
электроснабжения ДФС 
10:44 19 февраля в 13:00 пресс-конференция 
члена Комитета Совета Федерации по 
науке, образованию и культуре Андрея 
СОБОЛЕВА 
14:01 ВСУ за сутки почти 2,5 тыс. раз 
обстреляли ДНР, под Донецк стягивается 
украинская артиллерия – Басурин 
14:02 ВСУ при поддержке минометов атаковали 
позиции ДНР под Донецком — Басурин 
14:56 Член Совфеда от Севастополя передаст 
Главе ДНР в подарок символ города как 
знак единения регионов 
15:04 ВСУ обстреляли бригаду электриков под 
Ясиноватой — командование 
15:12 Коммунальщики ДНР восстановили 
электроснабжение в Коминтерново после 
обстрелов – власти 
16:15 Российский сенатор заявил о начале 
нового этапа культурного сотрудничества 
Севастополя и ДНР 
16:34 Жертвуя пешкой: шахматисты ДНР до 9 
лет вступили в борьбу за звание лучшего 
на турнире в столице 
19:59 Культурный диалог между Севастополем 
и ДНР открылся концертом российских 
артистов в Макеевке 
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Appendix II 
 
This appendix contains all the titles of the articles in the English language sample. Without 
exception, they are taken from www.dninews.com.All articles were downloaded and 
converted into PDFs in September 2018.   
Primaries English time sample (1-3 October 2016) 
1st of October 2016 
Time Title  
10:37 Ukrainian military violate ceasefire regime 
863 times over 
past week 
11:26 Handover of ballot papers for primaries to 
ballot commissions starts 
12:14 Ukrainian side disrupts disengagement of 
forces in 
Petrovskoye 
12:45 2 dead people, more three wounded over past 
week as 
result of Ukrainian shellings 
13:16 DPR Ombudsman: Ukrainian military arrest 
5 
Republican citizens 
13:22 Election silence in the DPR before the first-
ever primaries 
in Donbass 
14:13 Young Republic activists help restore 16 
houses in frontline 
locality 
14:52 LPR forced to pull back forces amid Kiev 
sabotaging 
disengagement 
15:27 Protests of thousands to burst in Kiev in 
October 
16:00 AFU redeployed 300 tons of ammunition to 
Donbass, 
including incendiary and phosphoric shells 
17:13 Donetsk Defense: Situation Report - 
1.10.2016 
17:37 DPR primaries to exert impact on political 
situation EUwide 
17:52 Novorossiya supporters destroyed photo 
show displaying bloody AFU punishers 
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2nd of October 2016 
Time Title 
10:24 Primaries launched, polling stations open in 
Donetsk 
10:33 DPR Election Commission observes no 
violations after 
primaries launched 
11:40 British observer: Primaries grant all 
candidates equal rights 
12:18 DPR Head: Together we will make the rule 
people’s 
indeed! 
13:27 Ukrainian journalist came to vote in LPR 
primaries anonymously 
14:38 Foreign observers detect no violations in 
DPR primary 
vote first hours 
15:03 Ukrainian army shelled DPR territory with 
mortars and 
heavy artillery at night 
15:48 More than 290 thousand voters took part in 
primaries 
within 7 hours 
16:34 Ukrainian army shell DPR territory 269 
times over past 
24 hours, two soldiers perished 
16:53 Triumph of freedom: Janus Putkonen casts 
vote in DPR primaries as official Republic's 
citizen 
20:42 DPR polling stations closed, ballots' count 
starts 
21:03 Primaries in DPR and LPR: today was a 
historical day for Donbass 
(No Time) Gallery: Primaries in Donetsk People's 
Republic 
2.10.2016 
 
3rd of October 2016 
Time Title 
9:23 No incidents reported during primaries in 
Donbass 
republics 
10:13 AFU fired at DPR terrritory with heavy 
artillery on the 
eve of forces' disengagement 
11:22 Russian security service detains Ukrainian 
intelligence 
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officer over espionage charges 
12:11 Russian Foreign Ministry comments on 
arrest of 
Ukrainian spy 
12:50 One People’s Militia soldier killed, two 
wounded in Kiev shelling LPR 
13:27 International observers state DPR primaries 
an example to West 
14:16 Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry urges Russia to 
release 
journalist suspected of espionage 
15:05 Mayoral primaries’ front runner Martynov 
scores great 
success, final turnout over 370 thousand 
15:28 Primaries may be arranged in other DPR 
cities after 
success in capital 
15:33 Primary elections in the Lugansk People’s 
Republic – an 
observer’s account 
15:33 Western instructors train Ukrainian military 
in new torturing methods 
16:29 AFU start shelling area of Petrovskoye from 
positions, 
from where they are to withdraw their troops 
16:54 DPR miners win almost 9 million tons of 
coal from 
beginning of year 
17:38 OSCE appeals to Ukrainian side to take steps 
after shelling start of Petrovskoye area 
18:03 Primaries in Donetsk and Lugansk People`s 
Repblics: 
final results 
18:42 Kiev disrupts disengagement of forces in 
Petrovskoye, 
DPR forces go back to departure positions 
18:11 Western instructors teach Ukrainian soldiers 
torture new methods 
19:23 At least 9 houses damaged as result of 
shelling 
Yasinovataya on part of AFU 
20:01 LPR: Kiev refuses to withdraw forces 
from contact line 
near Stanitsa Luganskaya 
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Avdiivka English time sample (28-30 January 2017) 
 
28th of January 2017 
Time Title 
10:26 Two houses damaged as Ukrainian forces 
shell 
DPR southern territory 
11:12 Trump, Putin to talk by phone at 20:00 
Moscow time on Saturday 
12:33 Poroshenko wants to increase weapons 
export as 
source of income 
13:02 Igor Plotnitsky expresses condolences over 
death of 
the first LPR Leader Valery Bolotov 
14:34 Infantry platoon training in Donetsk People's 
Republic - Video Report 
14:54 Donetsk Defense: Situation Report, 
28.01.2017 
15:37 Pensions are rising in Donetsk People's 
Republic - TV Report 
15:55 Ukrainian criminals shell DPR territory 
1,270 times over past 24 hours 
16:22 DPR serviceman died under Ukrainian 
army’s fire over 24 hours 
16:52 Aftermath: Ukrainian shelling civilians in the 
city 
of Brianka, LPR - Video Report 
17:31 13 Donetsk children sent to Moscow for 
treatment - 
TV Report 
17:40 Drunken Ukrainian soldier shot himself 
18:02 RIP - Valeriy Bolotov, the founder of 
Lugansk 
People's Republic 
18:49 Donetsk Defense TV News Report, 
28.1.2017 
 
29th of January 2017 
Time Title 
12:26 Kiev forces' direct hit damages multi-storey 
building and a shop in Dokuchaievsk 
12:36 Village knocked out by Ukrainian fire in 
Yasinovataya south, shelling continues 
13:00 Basurin: Kiev forces attack DPR positions 
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near 
Avdeyevka and launch artillery fire 
13:38 Ukrainian military fire at DPR territory over 
1,000 
times for past day 
14:08 Donetsk Defense: Situation Report, 
29.01.2017 
14:30 Civilian wounded as Kiev troops shell 
Donetsk 
14:59 Ukraine's army launches nearly 950 
projectiles 
and shells onto Yasinovataya area for several 
hours 
15:26 Five houses and a kindergarten damaged in 
DPR 
by Ukrainian shellings this day 
15:58 Russian NTV reporters come under Kiev's 
fire in 
Makeyevka 
16:28 DPR frontline in south ready to repel 
Ukrainian 
attacks - Video Report 
16:42 Ukrainian shellings damage two houses in 
DPR south 
17:03 One DPR soldier killed, one wounded – 
Operational Command 
17:29 AFU fire at Verkhnekalmiusskaya filter plant 
reservoir – "Water of Donbass" 
17:32 Ukraine firing with heavy artillery Avdeevka 
village - TV Report 
17:58 Power supply of six villages in DPR south 
restored 
18:17 Ukraine shells Makeyevka and 
Kuibyshevsky in 
DPR on Sunday - Video Report 
 
 
30th of January 2017 
Time Title 
9:00 Dutch investigators sabotaging probe of 
MH17 
crash – Ex-Russian Official 
10:08 Kiev shellings damage six houses, school 
building 
and boiler rooms in Donetsk and Makeyevka 
11:12 One woman died, three civilians wounded as 
Ukrainian criminals shell Makeyevka 
126 
 
11:30 Ukrainian forces launch over 200 shells onto 
DPR territory since evening 
12:08 Mayorsk checkpoint in Gorlovka shelled by 
Ukrainian murderers 
12:57 Ukrainian forces resume Makeyevka 
shelling, 
school pupils hide in basement 
13:31 Putin, Trump convinced Ukraine crisis 
cannot be protracted 
15:13 JCCC coordinates ceasefire regime to 
repair power 
lines in DPR south 
16:06 Ukrainian army violates ceasefire regime 
almost 2,000 times over 24 hours 
16:25 Frontline Report: Ukrainian attack repelled 
in 
outskirt of Donetsk city 
17:23 School in Makeyevka shelled by Ukraine on 
Monday morning - Video Report 
17:24 Donetsk Defense: Situation Report, 
30.01.2017 
17:46 Ukrainian radicals blow up railway track in 
grey 
zone between Donbass and Ukraine 
18:09 JCCC observation point area near 
Yasinovataya shelled on AFU part 
18:30 Ukraine Shelled Apartment Houses in 
Donetsk city - Video Report 
18:41 Two DPR civil residents died under AFU 
shellings over 24 hours 
19:18 DPR People's Militia hiring new soldiers to 
artillery unit - TV advertisement 
19:31 Kiev authorities get Avakov in a tight corner 
19:58 Pushilin: 'Ukraine does everything possible 
to 
resume full-scale hostilities' - TV Statement 
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Identity Documents English language time sample (17-19 February 2017) 
17th of February 2017 
Time Title 
8:46 Ukrainian forces shell Yasinovataya 
10:18 Ukrainian ammunition detonates near 
Avdeyevka 
10:51 Minsk talks – smokescreen to prepare AFU 
offensive 
11:36 Ukrainian forces shell nine DPR localities 
overnight 
12:11 Residential house damaged in shelling of 
Yasinovataya 
12:40 LPR and DPR prepare humanitarian aid 
program 
for Kiev-occupied Donbass territories 
13:13 DPR Head attends opening of new longwall 
13:47 Donbass will stand the blockade!” – DPR 
Head Alexander Zakharchenko 
13:57 '3,600 US Tanks in Europe' - Truth or Fake 
News from DONi Donbass News Agency? 
14:19 DPR and LPR leaders to hold meeting with 
OSCE Deputy Head Alexander Hug 
14:57 Joint statement by LPR and DPR Heads Igor 
Plotnitsky and Alexander Zakharchenko 
15:19 DPR to ease checkpoint procedure for 
residents of Kiev-occupied part of Donbass 
16:28 First loan provided in Donetsk People's 
Republic - TV Report 
16:41 Ukrainian punishers open fire at DPR 
territory 
over six thousand times 
17:19 DPR MFA: Aid program for occupied 
Donbass meant for humanitarian purposes 
only 
17:54 Zakharchenko in Lugansk: 'We Remember 
Our 
Duty' [Video] 
18:22 Zakharchenko expresses his hope for 
Donbass 
situation objective coverage by OSCE 
18:55 Russian humanitarian convoy arrives in 
Donetsk 
on February 21 
19:02 Donetsk Defense TV News Report, 
17.2.2017 
19:12 Alexander Zakharchenko: "OSCE Mission 
refuses to accept our arguments" 
19:36 EU should put pressure on Kiev to stabilize 
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Donbass situation – EU lawmaker 
19:54 Kiev plans to occupy several localities in 
Donbass 'grey zone' – Zakharchenko 
 
 
18th of February 2017 
Time Title 
10:33 Ukrainian army engages fire on 
Yasinovataya 
11:22 One million children in Donbass need urgent 
humanitarian aid — UNICEF 
12:09 Ukrainian army violates ceasefire eight times 
- 
LPR People's Militia 
12:40 LPR People’s Militia bomb technicians 
demine 
10km of conduit 
13:19 Rally in Donetsk City: 20,000 DPR residents 
demand implementation of Minsk 
Agreements 
13:49 Zakharchenko's Order: 'No withdrawal of our 
weapons before Ukraine' 
14:23 Over 3,400 buildings destroyed in Gorlovka 
during 
war 
15:12 DPR Citizens: 'Ukrainians, you are 
occupants, not 
liberators - stop the war!' - Video Report 
15:30 OSCE Deputy Chief Alexander Hug accepts 
LPR 
documents on weaponry withdrawal 
15:58 Ukrainian forces shell Spartak during field 
kitchen's work 
16:30 Donetsk Defense: Situation Report, 
18.02.2016 
17:12 Poroshenko and Tillerson discuss Donbass 
crisis 
17:54 Putin signs decree: Russia's recognition of 
DPR 
and LPR documents 
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19th of February 2017 
 
Time Title 
12:36 Ukrainian artillery-shelling causes 
Kominternovo village de-energizing 
13:10 Three DPR residents captured by Ukrainian 
fighters this week 
14:36 Donetsk filtration plant de-energized by Kiev 
shellings, water supply disrupted 
15:05 Ukrainian punishers shell DPR territory 
almost 2, 500 times over 24 hours 
15:05 Zakharchenko's statement on Putin's Decree 
on 
recognition of DPR documents 
15:41 Kiev troops fire at electricians' brigade near 
Yasinovataya 
16:05 Decree on recognition of DPR, LPR 
documents in 
RF long-awaited event – Pushilin 
16:39 Donetsk Defense: Situation Report, 
19.02.2017 
17:20 DPR positions come under Ukrainian mortar 
attack near Donetsk 
17:59 'Deadlock': Donbass blockade risks plunging 
Ukraine into energy collapse 
 
 
 
 
 
